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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the past, safety assessments of nuclear power plants (NPPs), using methods such as seismic 
probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), usually utilized best estimate or design values for material 
properties of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) without consideration of any aging 
effects. In order to develop a realistic evaluation of the seismic safety of a plant, the potential 
effects of age-related degradation on (SSCs) should be considered. 
 
To address the issue of aging degradation for the safety of NPPs, the Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute (KAERI) has embarked on a five-year research project to develop a realistic 
seismic risk evaluation system which will include the consideration of aging of structures and 
components in NPPs. Three specific areas that are included in the KAERI research project, 
related to seismic PRA, are probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, seismic fragility analysis 
including the effects of aging, and a plant seismic risk analysis. 
 
To support the development of seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures 
and components, KAERI entered into a collaboration agreement with Brookhaven National 
Laboratory (BNL) in 2007. The collaborative research effort is intended to continue over a five 
year period with the goal of developing seismic fragility analysis methods that consider the 
potential effects of age-related degradation of SSCs, and using these results as input to seismic 
PRAs.  
 
This report describes the research effort performed by BNL for the Year 1 scope of work. This 
research focused on collecting and reviewing degradation occurrences in US NPPs and 
identifying important aging characteristics needed for the seismic capability evaluations that will 
be performed in the subsequent evaluations in the years that follow.  The report presents results of 
the statistical and trending analysis of this data and compares the results to prior aging studies. In 
addition, this report provides a description of current regulatory requirements, regulatory 
guidance documents, generic communications, industry standards and guidance, and past research 
related to aging degradation of SSCs. Finally, this report provides the conclusions reached from 
this research effort, which includes a summary of the findings from the identification and 
evaluation effort of degradation occurrences, an assessment of the degradation trending results, 
and insights into the important aging characteristics that should be considered in the tasks to be 
performed in the Year 2 through 5 research efforts. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is in the process of performing research to 
improve the evaluation methods to assess the seismic safety of new and existing operating power 
plants. These evaluation methods can be used to perform Periodic Safety Reviews (PSRs) and 
license renewal application (LRA) reviews. In addition, they can also be used to upgrade the 
seismic safety of a nuclear power plant (NPP).  In the past, such evaluation methods included a 
seismic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) which usually utilized design values without 
consideration of any aging effects. In order to develop a realistic evaluation of the seismic safety 
of a plant, the potential effects of age-related degradation on structures, systems, and components 
(SSCs) within a NPP should be considered.  
 
To address the issue of aging degradation on the safety of NPPs, KAERI has embarked on a five-
year research project to develop a realistic seismic risk evaluation system which will include the 
consideration of aging of structures and components in NPPs. Three specific areas that are 
included in the KAERI research project, related to seismic PRA, are probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis, seismic fragility analysis by considering age-related degradation, and a plant seismic 
risk analysis.  The major objectives of the KAERI project are:  
  
? Reduction of the uncertainty in a PSHA (Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis)  
? Development of site-specific evaluation response spectra for a seismic PRA  
? Development of seismic fragility analysis methodology by considering a realistic 
capacity and response of structures and components that includes the effects of aging 
? Development of time-dependent and nonlinear analysis technology for nuclear structures 
and components  
? Development of seismic risk quantification models and tools for Korean NPPs  
? Evaluation of the aging effect on the seismic risk of a NPP 
 
To meet the above objectives, KAERI entered into a collaboration agreement with Brookhaven 
National Laboratory (BNL) in 2007. The collaborative research effort is intended to continue over 
a five year period with the goal of developing seismic capability evaluation technology for 
degraded structures and components. The final results of this project will be utilized to update and 
improve the seismic PRA technology in Korea. The advanced seismic PRA tools developed by 
KAERI with input from the research performed by BNL, will be used for evaluations of the 
seismic safety of operating NPPs in Korea during the process of their PSR, for license renewal 
evaluations of old NPPs, and for future plants. 
1.2 Project Objectives 
 
The objective of the research effort being performed by BNL, as part of the collaborative research 
agreement, is to provide technical assistance to KAERI in developing seismic capability 
evaluation technology for degraded structures and components, which can be used to assess the 
safety of NPPs in Korea. This will be achieved by conducting research in the area of how age-
related degradation effects can be considered in performing seismic PRAs of NPPs. The research 
effort by BNL will be conducted over a five-year period from 2007 through 2012. The ultimate 
goal of the development of seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and 
components is divided into five sets of individual objectives associated with the each of the five 
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years. The objectives of the individual tasks to be performed in each of the five years is described 
below.   
  
Year 1 Objectives: 
 
The Year 1 objective is for BNL to collect and review degradation occurrences in US NPPs and 
identify important aging characteristics needed for the seismic capability evaluations that will be 
performed in the subsequent evaluations in the years that follow.  It is anticipated that aging 
characteristics such as the component type, aging effects, aging mechanisms, identification 
method, evaluation method, plant name, and date of occurrence would be considered for review. 
The information presented in this report provides a description of the research effort performed 
by BNL to meet the Year 1 objectives. 
 
Year 2 Objectives: 
 
The Year 2 objective is for BNL to identify modeling methodologies to represent the long-term 
behavior of materials used in NPPs.  BNL will perform a literature search for time-dependent 
models that can approximate the degradation effects of the key materials used for the structures 
and passive components.  It is envisioned that the degradation models identified would potentially 
cover the most common time-dependent changes in material properties (e.g., strength, ductility, 
modulus), loss of material (e.g., corrosion, erosion), and cracking. 
 
Year 3 Objectives: 
 
The Year 3 objective is for BNL to select one structure or component, with prior approval from 
KAERI, and develop the seismic fragility capacity.  The seismic fragility for this structure or 
component will be developed for the undegraded condition and various levels of degradation for 
the most common aging effect identified in the earlier Year 1 Task described above.  The intent 
of this task is to provide a pilot study that demonstrates how the seismic fragility calculation 
methodology can be performed. 
 
Year 4 Objectives: 
 
The Year 4 objective is for BNL to provide technical assistance to KAERI staff who will perform 
seismic fragility calculations for the other remaining important structures and components. The 
seismic fragility calculation for the other important structures and components are not necessarily 
expected to be the same as that performed in the Year 3 Task, due to the differences in the 
structure/components, materials, aging effects, and/or failure modes.   
 
Year 5 Objectives: 
 
The Year 5 objective is for BNL to provide technical assistance to KAERI to develop guidance 
for establishing degradation acceptance criteria for structures and components.  This may follow a 
similar approach that was utilized in the NRC aging research project that was performed by BNL 
recently and is reported in NUREG/CR-6715 and NUREG/CR-6876. The focus of BNL 
assistance will be on providing expertise in structural analysis and fragility analysis.  
1.3 Year 1 Research Scope 
 
The scope of the Year 1 research effort was to identify, collect and evaluate age-related 
degradation occurrences in United States (US) NPPs. This required developing a list of structures 
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and components suitable for KAERI’s seismic capability evaluations. Then, degradation 
occurrences for these structures and components were identified and reviewed. This information 
was evaluated in order to identify the important aging characteristics, and finally a trending 
analysis was performed to make a comparison to the results of past aging studies and to plan for 
the future tasks under the five-year research project. 
 
A list of applicable structures and components was developed, with KAERI’s approval, in order 
to define the scope of what types of structures/components should be reviewed for degradation 
occurrences.  Similar to the study reported in NUREG/CR-6679, that did not include active 
components, it was recommended that this list cover only structures and passive components 
(SPCs), but not active components.  Active components such as pumps, valves, and electrical 
equipment are components which must move or change their state in order to perform their 
intended functions, and can typically be monitored for aging effects by monitoring their 
performance.  By monitoring pressure, flow, electrical signal, etc., the potential aging degradation 
of active components can be identified, while for passive components, the extent of aging is 
usually difficult to identify and may even go undetected.  In addition, active components are 
usually subjected to periodic inspection, testing, and maintenance where aging effects would be 
detected and corrected over time. 
 
KAERI provided a list of structures and components that are considered to be the most risk 
significant by KAERI engineers from the work that has already been performed by KAERI.  
Reviewing this list along with the list of 18 SPCs described in NUREG/CR-6679, 10 categories 
of SPCs were identified for the scope of the degradation review to be included in this study for 
KAERI as follows: 
 
1. Anchorage 
2. Concrete 
3. Containment 
4. Exchanger 
5. Filter 
6. Piping system 
7. Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) 
8. Structural steel 
9. Tank 
10. Vessel 
 
These SPC categories will be explained in more detail in Section 3 of this report. 
 
The identification of degradation occurrences for these SPCs was performed using publicly 
available documents related to the nuclear power industry, primarily in the US. The documents 
reviewed for the current research program, reported herein, include Licensing Event Reports 
(LERs), US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) generic correspondences, documents related 
to license renewal activities, industry reports, NUREG reports, BNL and other national lab 
reports.  LERs are reports that must be submitted by NPP licensees to the NRC if certain potential 
problems occur such as: any event or conditions that occurred in the plant which resulted in a 
condition of the plant being seriously degraded or the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that 
significantly degraded plant safety. More details about LERs are reported in Section 3 of this 
report. 
 
The prior research reported in NUREG/CR-6679 collected and evaluated degradation occurrences 
for SPCs in US NPPs over the period 1985 to 1997.  Therefore, the current BNL research for 
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KAERI was intended to focus on the more current period from 1997 to the present. That way, 
there would not be any overlap and an assessment can be made for the current period and the 
results may be compared to the conclusions reached from the prior period. 
1.4 Report Organization 
 
This report consists of five sections.  Section 2 presents a summary of the past aging research 
studies which include programs and studies conducted by BNL, NRC, and other research 
institutes and the nuclear industry. Although, describing this information was not intended to be 
part of this research task, it is useful to provide this description in the report to present a 
framework of what aging technology information is available from past studies and the regulatory 
requirements and guidance documents related to aging. Section 3 of the report describes the 
review of the recent LERs and the corresponding statistical and trending analysis.  Section 4 
summarizes the review of the recent generic communications and LRAs.  Section 5 provides the 
conclusions reached from this research effort, which includes a summary of the findings from the 
identification and evaluation effort of degradation occurrences, and an assessment of the 
degradation trending analysis. 
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2 PAST AGING RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
There is substantial existing aging technology information from prior aging research studies and 
current industry programs. This includes both NRC and industry sponsored research programs. 
This section first describes NRC requirements/guidance related to aging degradation and then 
summarizes past NRC research programs, industry programs, and other technical information. 
Much of the information presented below is based on aging technology information reported in 
the prior BNL research program NUREG/CR-6679. Relevant information in this section, if not 
specially noted, refers to nuclear power plants in the U.S.  
2.1 NRC Requirements/Guidance 
 
This section summaries current NRC requirements and available guidance related to degradation 
of structures and passive components (SPCs), including requirements and guidance for 
containments, water-control structures, and masonry walls, and rules for maintenance and license 
renewal. 
 
Containments 
Periodic leak rate testing of containments is required in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix J.  The leak rate testing of a containment has three types of tests: A, B, and C. Type A 
tests are performed to measure the primary reactor containment overall integrated leakage rate, 
Type B tests are performed to detect local leaks for penetrations, and Type C tests are conducted 
to measure containment isolation valve leakage rates.  Prior to performing a Type A test, a 
general visual inspection of the accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment 
structures and components must be performed to identify any evidence of structural deterioration 
which may affect either the containment structural integrity or leak-tightness. 
 
Regulatory Guides 1.35 and 1.35.1 provides additional requirements for prestressed concrete 
containments for ungrouted tendons. Regulatory Guide 1.35 describes a basis acceptable to the 
NRC staff for developing an appropriate inservice inspection and surveillance program for 
ungrouted tendons in prestressed concrete containments. Regulatory Guide 1.35 provides 
guidance for performing visual inspections, prestress monitoring tests (lift-off tests), tendon 
material tests and inspections, inspection of filler grease, evaluation of inspection results, and 
reporting requirements.  Regulatory Guide 1.35.1 provides a basis acceptable to the staff for 
developing appropriate presstressing tolerance bands for tendons so that these limits can be 
compared against the lift-off forces measured in the sample inspection program of Regulatory 
Guide 1.35. 
 
10 CFR 50.55a has been revised to provide more precise requirements, assure that the critical 
areas of containments are routinely inspected, and take corrective action for defects that could 
compromise a containment’s structural integrity. The final rulemaking, which was effective on 
September 9, 1996, endorsed the 1992 Edition with 1992 Addenda of Section XI, Subsection 
IWE (Class MC Containments) and Subsection IWL (Class CC Containments) of the ASME 
Code. Since the final rulemaking, subsequent revisions of 10 CFR 50.55a have been issued and 
now the current version also endorses as acceptable the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda, the 
1998 Edition through the 2000 Addenda, and the 2001 Edition through the latest edition and 
addenda. All of these endorsements are subject to certain limitations and conditions. Licensees 
must incorporate Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL into inservice inspection programs for 
containments.  The rulemaking includes exemptions from and additional requirements to those in 
Subsections IWE and IWL. 
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Water-Control Structures 
Water-control structures include structures such as intake structures, canals, dams, earthen 
embankments and slopes associated with emergency cooling water systems or flood protection.  
For these structures, Regulatory Guide 1.127 describes a basis acceptable to the staff for 
developing an appropriate inservice inspection and surveillance program.  Guidance is provided 
for the compilation of engineering data, onsite inspection program, technical evaluation, 
frequency of inspections, and preparation of reports. 
 
Masonry Walls 
A major re-evaluation effort of masonry walls in the nuclear industry was initiated by the NRC IE 
Bulletin 80-11 “Masonry Wall Design.” This effort initiated by the bulletin was intended to 
demonstrate the structural adequacy of reinforced and unreinforced masonry walls.  Of the 
seventy plants originally in the scope of 80-11, two were shut down; three were reviewed under 
the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP); one plant had no safety-related masonry walls; four 
were qualified by analytical methods verified by full-scale testing; and the remaining sixty plants 
were qualified in accordance with the Structural Engineering Branch (SEB) Interim Criteria. 
 
NRC issued Information Notice No. 87-67, “Lessons Learned from Regional Inspections of 
Licensee Actions in Response to IE Bulletin 80-11,” in December 1987.  This notice described a 
number of deficiencies uncovered during site audits, which were grouped as: 
 
? Unanalyzed Conditions - existing cracks in unreinforced masonry 
? Improper Assumptions - mortar properties, boundary conditions, presence of reinforcement 
? Improper Classification - specification of safety-related versus non-safety walls 
? Lack of Procedural Controls - walk-down surveys, record keeping, modification activities 
 
The information notice also indicated that “NRC inspectors observed that mechanisms did not 
exist at certain facilities to ensure that the physical conditions of masonry walls remained as 
previously analyzed.” 
 
Then an internal NRC report entitled, “Status of Multi-Plant Action (MPA) B-59, Masonry Wall 
Design” was issued in August 1988.  This report recommended that the MPA be considered 
closed and also summarized the current status of each plant included in the action.  The report 
also stated that the Office of Inspection and Enforcement had responsibility of inspection related 
activities. 
 
10 CFR 50.65 – Maintenance Rule 
Another important regulation, 10 CFR 50.65 entitled, “Requirements for Monitoring the 
Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” was published by the NRC on July 10, 
1991. This regulation, which was referred to as the Maintenance Rule, became effective on July 
10, 1996. The goal of the Maintenance Rule is to monitor the effectiveness of maintenance 
activities for safety significant plant equipment in order to minimize the likelihood of failures and 
abnormal events caused by the lack of effective maintenance.  The final rule requires that 
licensees monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) 
against licensee-established goals in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the 
SSCs will be capable of performing their intended functions. Such monitoring needs to be 
established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account industry operating 
experience. 
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Other documents that provide additional technical information and guidance, related to the 
Maintenance Rule, include: Regulatory Guide 1.160, Rev. 2, “Monitoring the Effectiveness of 
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants;” NUMARC 93-01, Rev. 2, “Nuclear Energy Institute - 
Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants;” 
NRC Inspection Manual - Inspection Procedure 62706, “Maintenance Rule;” NRC Inspection 
Manual - Inspection Procedure 62002, “Inspection of Structures, Passive Components, and Civil 
Engineering Features at Nuclear Power Plants;” and NRC Inspection Manual - Inspection 
Procedure 62003, “Inspection of Steel and Concrete Containment Structures at Nuclear Power 
Plants.” 
 
10 CFR Part 54 - License Renewal Rule 
Nuclear power plants in the U.S. were initially licensed to operate for 40 years.  To extend the life 
of these plants, requirements for obtaining the renewal of an operating license, for an additional 
20 years, are presented in 10 CFR Part 54 - License Renewal Rule.  Under 10 CFR Part 54, 
applicants are required to identify all SSCs that are within the scope of the rule.  A screening 
review is then required to identify those SSCs that are “passive and long-lived” structures and 
components.  For the passive, long-lived structures and components, the applicant must 
demonstrate that the effects of aging will be managed so that the intended function(s) will be 
maintained consistent with the current licensing basis through the period of extended operation.  
 
In addition, applicants are also required to identify and update all time-limited aging analyses 
(TLAAs) which are part of the current licensing basis.  An example would be a design basis 
fatigue analysis of a piping system which assumed a specified number of loading events based on 
a 40-year period of operation. For prestressed concrete containments, a TLAA is required to 
demonstrate that the prestressing tendons, which lose the tendon prestress loads over time, are 
still adequate for the additional 20 years of operation beyond the initial 40 years assumed in 
design. 
 
In September 2005, the NRC issued Regulatory Guide 1.188, Rev. 1, “Standard Format and 
Content for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses.” This regulatory 
guide indicates that the application should include (1) general information, (2) an integrated plant 
assessment (IPA), (3) an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses (TLAAs), (4) a supplement to 
the plant’s final safety analysis report (FSAR), (5) any necessary changes to the plant’s technical 
specifications (along with related justifications), and (6) a supplement to the plant’s 
environmental report. The FSAR supplement should provide a summary description of the 
programs and activities that the applicant will use to manage the effects of aging for the period of 
extended operation, which is determined by the IPA and the evaluation of TLAAs. This 
regulatory guide also endorses the industry guidance document NEI 95-10, Revision 6 for use in 
implementing the license renewal rule. 
 
Another NRC document that provides guidance for license renewal of NPPs is NUREG-1800, 
Revision 1, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear 
Power Plants” (SRP-LR), published in September 2005.  This SRP-LR was prepared to provide 
guidance for staff reviewers in performing safety reviews of applications to renew licenses of 
nuclear power plants in accordance with 10 CFR Part 54.  A companion document also  published 
by the NRC in September 2005 is NUREG-1801, Revision 1, entitled, Generic Aging Lessons 
Learned (GALL) Report. This two volume document provides very specific guidance for use by 
applicants and the NRC staff reviewers to ensure effective, efficient and consistent satisfaction of 
the LR Rule requirements.  The revised SRP-LR references the GALL Report for descriptions of 
generic aging management programs which the staff has evaluated and found applicable to 
license renewal. 
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2.2 NRC Programs 
 
Some of the major NRC research programs related to aging degradation of structures and passive 
components (SPCs) in nuclear power plants are summarized below. A more complete listing of 
the NRC programs in this area is presented in NUREG/CR-6679. 
2.2.1 Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program 
 
In 1985 the NRC sponsored a research program to identify and resolve technical safety issues 
related to aging of SSCs in operating nuclear power plants. The principal goals of the program 
were to understand the effects of age-related degradation in NPPs and how to manage and 
mitigate them effectively.  NUREG-1144, Rev. 2 describes the objectives of the program, the 
current status of research, and summarizes the utilization of the research results in the regulatory 
process.  As a result of the NPAR program approximately 100 NUREG/CR reports have been 
developed as of June 1991, plus numerous published papers and proceedings. 
 
A listing of past research activities under the NPAR program through September 1993 is 
presented in NUREG-1377, Rev. 4. This NUREG contains summaries of NRC sponsored reports 
that were generated in the NPAR Program.  Each summary describes the objectives of the 
research, the contractor, and authors, and outlines significant research results.  Although most of 
the items included in this NUREG cover hardware oriented plant components and systems, there 
are some summaries given for structural and passive components. 
2.2.2 Structural Aging (SAG) Program 
 
In 1988, the NRC sponsored a major research program on structural aging referred to as SAG. 
The objective of the SAG Program was to develop the technical bases for addressing aging of 
safety-related concrete structures and providing guidance for use in evaluating continued service 
of these concrete structures.  Over 90 technical reports and papers have been published describing 
the results of the program. 
 
The SAG Program consisted of a management task and three technical task areas.  The objective 
of the management task was to effectively manage the technical tasks related to the safety issues 
of aging NPP concrete structures.  The first technical task was to develop a materials property 
database.  This consisted of a reference source containing data and information on the time 
variation of material properties under exposure to applicable environmental stressors 
(mechanisms) and aging factors.  The materials database covered various concrete types, steel 
reinforcements, prestressing tendons, structural steels, and rubber materials. The information 
contained in the database can be used to predict deterioration of structural components in NPPs 
and in developing limits on detrimental environmental exposures. 
 
The second technical task described a methodology that can be used to (1) make quantitative 
assessments of environmental stressors or aging factors that could affect safety-related concrete 
structures at NPPs and (2) provide recommended in-service inspection (ISI) or sampling 
procedures for use in evaluating the structural condition and for trending the performance of these 
components.  Also included in this task are the identification and evaluation of techniques for 
mitigation of stressors or aging factors that may affect critical concrete components, and an 
assessment of techniques for repair, replacement, or retrofitting of deteriorated concrete 
components. 
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The third technical task developed a quantitative methodology for continued service 
determinations. This included development of predictive models to assess the current and future 
reliability and performance of concrete structures.  
 
A summary of the entire SAG Program is provided in NUREG/CR-6424.  This report describes 
the SAG Program including a description of safety-related concrete structures and longevity 
considerations; inservice inspection, condition assessment, and remedial measure considerations; 
evaluation of NPP reinforced concrete structures; reliability-based methodology for condition 
assessments; and summary, conclusions, and recommendations.  The NUREG includes an 
excellent description of the aging mechanisms and aging effects for concrete and associated steel 
components of reinforced concrete structures. Appendix B to the NUREG provides a listing of 
the numerous reports and papers that were developed under the SAG Program. 
 
Some of the conclusions as reported in NUREG/CR-6424 are: 
• The performance of the reinforced concrete structures in NPPs has been good.  However, 
as these structures age, incidences of degradation due to environmental stressor effects 
are likely to increase to potentially threaten their durability.  Items of note would be 
corrosion of steel reinforcement due to carbonation of the concrete or presence of 
chloride ions, excessive loss of prestressing force, leaching of concrete, and leakage of 
post-tensioning system corrosion inhibitor through cracks in the concrete. 
• Techniques for detecting the effects of environmental stressors are sufficiently developed 
to provide qualitative data. 
• Methods for conducting condition assessments of reinforced concrete structures are fairly 
well established. Few standards or criteria are available for interpreting the results 
obtained from condition assessments. Current inspection requirements for NPP 
reinforced concrete structures are fairly limited with the exception of concrete 
containments. 
• Techniques for repair of concrete structures are well established and when properly 
selected and applied are effective. At the time, no codes or standards are available for 
repair of reinforced concrete structures, although some are being developed. Criteria that 
may be used to determine when a repair action should be implemented are not available. 
• A reliability-based methodology has been developed that can be used to facilitate 
quantitative assessments of current and future structural reliability and performance of 
reinforced concrete structures in NPPs. 
2.2.3 Nuclear Power Plant Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) 
 
Another important research effort sponsored by the NRC is presented in NUREG/CR-6490 
entitled, “Nuclear Power Plant Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL).” This report describes 
the research effort to perform a systematic review of plant aging information in order to assess 
materials and component aging issues related to continued operation and license renewal of 
operating plants.  A literature review was performed for mechanical, structural, thermal-hydraulic 
components and systems, and electrical components and systems. 
 
The results of these reviews were tabulated and included in a two-volume report. The NUREG 
concluded, “all ongoing significant component aging issues are currently being addressed by the 
regulatory process. However, the aging of what are termed passive components have been 
highlighted for continued scrutiny.” The NUREG lists the aging issues significant to passive 
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components. Most of the structural components evaluated pertain to the RPV (instrumentation 
and CRD housing nozzles, closure studs, jet pump and holddown beams, reactor internals, core 
shroud, etc.); piping and feedwater nozzles and interfacing tanks and components; concrete shield 
walls; and other concrete elements. 
 
The NUREG also concluded, “passive components are not as extensively or thoroughly covered 
by current plant maintenance procedures. Furthermore, surveillance and monitoring methods and 
instrumentation and procedures have not been as extensively developed or employed for passive 
components subjected to the highlighted aging mechanisms, nor are some of the passive 
component aging mechanisms as well understood.” In addition, the NUREG points out that 
passive components are often the most costly and most difficult to replace. Therefore, the 
knowledge base for predicting applicable aging effects behavior and significance is very 
important for passive components. 
2.2.4 Assessment of Inservice Conditions of Safety-Related Nuclear Plant Structures 
(NUREG-1522) 
 
NUREG-1522, entitled “Assessment of Inservice Conditions of Safety-Related Nuclear Plant 
Structures” was published by the NRC in June 1995. This report describes the condition of 
structures and civil engineering features at operating nuclear power plants and provided 
information that would help identify, monitor, and correct degraded conditions of these structures. 
The NUREG contains descriptions of age-related degradation, which were obtained from many 
different sources. The most significant information came from site visits, conducted by the NRC 
staff and its contractor BNL, at six older nuclear power plants (licensed before 1977). 
 
Some of the observations noted in the report identify certain types of structures (e.g. water intake 
structures, masonry walls, anchorages, tanks, buried piping, and inaccessible areas) as requiring 
special considerations. The report also concludes that based on the observations and information 
collected, structures and civil engineering features should be periodically inspected and a 
systematic maintenance program be implemented to ensure the expected useful life of the 
structures. 
2.3 Industry Programs 
2.3.1 NUMARC Industry Reports (IRs) 
 
Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), under the sponsorship by the DOE 
and EPRI directed the preparation of ten industry reports (IRs).  The IRs covered items such as 
PWR and BWR vessels, internals, primary coolant boundary, containments, and Class I structures. 
The purpose of the IRs is to address age-related degradation of these components on a generic 
basis. The IRs would provide the technical basis, which could be referenced by licensees in 
support of their license renewal application. 
 
Each IR identifies the components that comprise the subject item (e.g. BWR containment) and 
evaluates each component in terms of possible age-related degradation mechanisms. Thus, certain 
aging mechanisms were eliminated and only those age-related degradation mechanisms that could 
affect the component were identified and described. In addition, the IRs evaluated the capability 
of programs to manage aging mechanisms that are applicable, and where generic effective 
programs cannot be shown to be capable of managing the effects of age-related degradation, 
aging management options for plant-specific programs are described. 
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2.3.2 NEI – Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at 
Nuclear Power Plants 
 
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has developed an industry guidance document (NUMARC 
93-01, Rev. 2) entitled, “Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at 
Nuclear Power Plants.” This guideline was developed to assist the industry in implementing the 
Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65). The guideline describes the process for the identification of 
the SSCs within the scope of the Maintenance Rule and the process of establishing plant-specific 
risk significant criteria and performance criteria. 
 
NUMARC 93-01 provides guidelines that include methodologies to select plant structures, 
systems, and components; establishing risk and performance criteria/goal setting and monitoring; 
identification of SSCs subject to effective preventive maintenance programs; evaluation of 
systems to be removed from service; and periodic maintenance effectiveness assessments. 
 
The NUMARC document specifically addresses monitoring of structures under the Maintenance 
Rule (MR). The applicability of the MR to structures was a subject of considerable confusion 
within the industry during initial implementation of the MR. It is clearly stated in Section 10.2.3 
of NUMARC 93-01, that structures which perform intended functions, in accordance with the 
criteria provided in NUMARC 93-01, are within the scope of the MR and require a monitoring 
program which ensures that degradation is detected before there is loss of any intended function. 
 
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.160, Rev. 2 endorses NUMARC 93-01, Rev. 2 as an acceptable method 
to satisfy the general requirements of the Maintenance Rule. Regulatory Guide 1.160, Rev. 2 also 
addresses monitoring of structures under the Maintenance Rule and provides specific guidance 
for satisfying the requirements of the Maintenance Rule, as it pertains to structures. 
2.3.3 American Concrete Institute (ACI) Codes and Standards 
 
The American Concrete Institute (ACI) has developed a number of codes and standards that relate 
to degradation of reinforced concrete structures. ACI 201.1R-68, “Guide for Making a Condition 
Survey of Concrete in Service” provides a system for reporting on the condition of concrete in 
service. This guide includes a checklist for making a survey of the condition of concrete, provides 
a definition of the terms associated with the durability of concrete, and presents actual 
photographs to demonstrate the different types of aging effects. 
 
ACI 201.2R-77, “Guide to Durable Concrete” discusses the more important causes of concrete 
degradation and gives recommendations on how to prevent such damage. Topics covered include 
freezing and thawing, aggressive chemical exposure, abrasion, corrosion of steel and other 
materials embedded in concrete, chemical reactions of aggregates, repair of concrete, and the use 
of coatings to enhance concrete durability. 
 
ACI 207.3R-79, “Practices for Evaluation of Concrete in Existing Massive Structures for Service 
Conditions” describes methods for evaluating the physical properties of concrete in existing 
concrete structures. The report covers the review of preconstruction data, construction, operation 
and maintenance records; review of in-service inspections; condition surveys; nondestructive 
testing; and destructive testing. 
 
ACI 224.1R-93, “Causes, Evaluation, and Repair of Cracks in Concrete Structures” summarizes 
the causes of cracks in concrete and the means for their control. The report also describes 
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evaluation procedures and methods for crack repair such as epoxy injection, routing (enlarging 
the crack) and sealing, stitching (U-shaped metal units), use of additional reinforcement, and 
grouting. 
 
ACI 349.3R-96, “Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures” presents 
recommendations for developing an effective evaluation procedure for nuclear safety-related 
concrete structures. The report describes the selection process of critical structures, the various 
degradation mechanisms, inspection techniques, evaluation criteria, evaluation frequency, 
qualifications of evaluation team, and repairs. Under the evaluation criteria recommendations, 
ACI 349.3R-96 presents a three tiered evaluation criteria: acceptance without further evaluation, 
acceptance after review, and conditions requiring further evaluation. It is in this area that the 
technical basis for some of the acceptance criteria need to be developed, expanded, and 
documented. 
 
Other ACI standards such as ACI 224R-90, “Control of Cracking in Concrete Structures” and 
222R-89, “Corrosion of Metals in Concrete” are listed in the Reference section of ACI 349.3R-96. 
ACI 349.3R-96 also lists related standards from ASCE, ASME, and ASTM. 
2.3.4 American Society of Civil Engineers Standard 
 
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Standard ASCE 11-90, “Guideline for Structural 
Condition Assessment of Existing Buildings” provides guidelines and a methodology for the 
structural assessment of existing buildings. Assessment techniques are provided for conventional 
buildings (non-nuclear) constructed from materials consisting of concrete, metals, masonry, and 
wood. The standard describes assessment procedures, condition assessment of materials, and 
evaluation procedures. Tables are presented in the guideline, which provide for each test method, 
a description of the application, principle of operation, user expertise, advantages, limitations, and 
references. Also included in the guideline are tables, which identify the various test methods 
which are most appropriate to evaluate chemical and physical properties of the material. 
2.4 Other Sources of Technical Information 
2.4.1 Information from Japan 
 
Substantial technical information, regarding age-related degradation of structures and passive 
components is also available from international sources. A review of Japanese literature for 
degraded concrete structures was conducted by BNL under a separate research program for the 
NRC.  A report by Park (September 1998) entitled “Effects of Aging Degradation on Seismic 
Performance of Reinforced Concrete Structures: Summary of Japanese Literature in Related 
Areas” summarizes the results of the review. 
 
The 1998 report by Park provides a summary of a literature survey of available Japanese 
publications. Key observations are described in detail regarding age-related degradation 
mechanisms and seismic performance of degraded reinforced concrete structures. The report 
covers experimental studies on reinforced concrete members such as shear walls and beams in 
degraded conditions. Some of the observations and preliminary conclusions noted are: 
• Vertical cracks in beams (normal to member axis) reduce the bending stiffness. However, 
vertical cracks do not significantly reduce the bending strength. Vertical cracks, in 
general, do not affect shear strength, unless they are located at the compression failure 
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zone. Horizontal cracks (along component axis) affect the shear strength more than the 
bending strength. 
• The orientation of cracks in concrete shear walls determines whether cracks affect the 
seismic capacity of components. Cracks would affect the shear capacity if they coincide 
with cracks caused by applied seismic loads or when they alter the failure mode. 
• The size and number of cracks indirectly affect the seismic performance of all concrete 
structural members since the extent of corrosion is largely affected by crack size. 
• There are indications that some initial levels of corrosion of steel reinforcement would 
increase the flexural strength of beams. 
2.4.2 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – Nuclear 
Energy Agency (NEA) 
 
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is an intergovernmental body within the OECD located in 
Paris, France. The objective of the NEA is to assist its member countries in the development of 
nuclear energy as a safe, environmentally acceptable, and economical energy source through co-
operation among its participating countries. Currently there are 28 countries including the United 
States that are members of the NEA. One of the committees within NEA, the Committee on the 
Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) has a Working Group on Integrity of Components and 
Structures (IAGE). The main areas investigated by this working group include: the integrity of 
metal components; the integrity and ageing of concrete structures; and the seismic behavior of 
structures and components. A number of studies related to aging of structures and components 
were performed by the Working Group on IAGE and its predecessor the Principal Working 
Group (PWG-3) entitled “Integrity of Structures and Components.” 
 
An OECD - NEA Workshop on Finite Element (FE) Analysis of Degraded Concrete Structures 
was sponsored by the U.S. NRC and the OECD-NEA. This workshop was held at BNL on 
October 29-30, 1998. During the workshop over seventeen papers were presented related to the 
topic of the workshop. Many of the papers described technical approaches to utilize FE analysis 
methods for degraded concrete structures. A list of CSNI reports produced by or relevant to 
PWG-3 subgroups on the aging of concrete structures and the seismic behavior of structures is 
provided in NUREG/CR-6679. 
2.5 Review of Recent BNL Aging Program 
 
BNL has participated in a number of aging related research programs such as the NUREG-1522 
study and technical assistance for NUREG-1801 (GALL).  This section of the report will present 
a summary of an NRC sponsored BNL research study of aging degradation of NPP SPCs.  A 
multi-year research program was performed to assess age-related degradation of SPCs for U.S. 
nuclear power plants. The objective of this program was to develop the technical basis for the 
validation and improvement of analytical methods and acceptance criteria which can be used to 
make risk-informed decisions and to address technical issues related to degradation of structures 
and passive components. This research program consisted of two phases.  The Phase I effort 
included collection and evaluation of plant degradation occurrences, an assessment of the 
available technical information on age-related degradation, and a scoping study to identify which 
structures and passive components should be studied in the subsequent phases of the research 
program.  Based on the results of the Phase I effort, selected SPCs were evaluated in Phase II to 
assess the effects of age-related degradation using existing and enhanced analytical methods. In 
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addition, the Phase II effort included developing recommendations to the NRC staff for making 
risk-informed decisions related to degradation of structures and passive components.  
 
Phase I: Assessment of Age-Related Degradation of NPP SPC 
 
The description and results of the Phase I effort are reported in NUREG/CR-6679. Three 
activities were performed in this assessment effort.  In the first activity, instances of age-related 
degradation were collected and evaluated. Licensee Event Reports, NRC generic communications, 
NUREG reports, and industry reports were reviewed to collect degradation data, which were 
stored in a database as summaries of important parameters.  Then, trending analyses were 
performed to evaluate the data and develop important observations. The trending analyses 
provided conclusions such as what SPCs were most susceptible to age-related degradation, the 
most common aging mechanisms and aging effects, and the trend of the degradation occurrences 
over time.  The second activity included the compilation of additional technical information 
related to aging such as NRC requirements/guidance, NRC programs, industry programs, 
degradation information from other countries, and other reports/papers on aging degradation.  The 
third activity was a scoping study to identify those SPCs that warrant further detailed evaluation 
in Phase II. The scoping study was performed based on four key factors: degradation occurrences, 
seismic risk significance, adequacy of existing NRC and industry programs, and importance to 
current licensing basis/license renewal. The results of the scoping study determined that of the 18 
original SPCs included in the research program, the five SPCs that should be included in the 
Phase II effort for more detail study are concrete structures (other than containment), buried 
piping, flat bottom atmospheric tanks, anchorages, and masonry walls. 
 
It should be emphasized that a very extensive degradation reference database was created during 
the Phase I work which is presented in Appendix B to NUREG/CR-6679.  This database covered 
the codes, industry standards, guidelines, NUREG reports, technical papers, presentations (at 
conferences), regulatory documents, and other reports that were collected and reviewed in Phase I. 
The regulatory documents included Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs); NRC generic 
correspondences such as Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEs), Information Notices (INs), 
Generic Letters (GLs), etc.; NRC inspection reports; NRC regulatory guides; and NRC SECY 
papers.  The reference database included over 160 documents in total, each of which consists of 
the type of document, the identification or ID (document no.), title of the document, date of 
publication, author/organization, a summary description, types of components covered, and 
potential aging issues identified in that document. 
 
Phase II: Detailed Evaluations of Identified Components for Assessment of the Effects of 
Age-Related Degradation on SPCs 
 
Of the five components that were identified during Phase I that warrant further detailed 
evaluation in Phase II, studies for two of them were completed. A detailed study was performed 
for reinforced concrete elements and buried piping and the results of these studies were presented 
in two NUREG reports.  The objectives of the detailed studies in Phase II were to develop and 
improve analytical methods that can be used to assess the effects of age-related degradation on 
the structural performance of the SPCs, quantify the impact of age-related degradation of 
structures and passive components on overall plant risk, and develop degradation acceptance 
criteria that can be used to assist the staff  in making risk-informed decisions for age-degraded 
SPCs. 
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Reinforced Concrete Components  
 
NUREG/CR-6715 summarizes BNL’s study that addressed the concerns related to aging 
degradation of reinforced concrete structures at NPPs.  The aging effects due to reinforced 
concrete degradation mechanisms were studied and the corresponding analytical methods and 
degradation acceptance limits for concrete flexural and shear wall members were developed.  
Fragility modeling procedures for undegraded and degraded reinforced concrete structural 
components subjected to earthquake loadings were studied.  These probability-based quantitative 
methods provided a basis for evaluation of reinforced concrete structures in nuclear plants for 
continued service and for development of guidelines for in-service inspection and maintenance.  
Probability-based degradation acceptance criteria (DAC) were also developed to assist the NRC 
staff in making risk-informed decisions regarding degradation of reinforced concrete components. 
 
Buried Piping 
 
NUREG/CR-6876 presents the results of the second detailed study performed by BNL which 
addressed the effects of degradation on buried piping.  The purpose of this study was similar to 
the concrete study, which is to develop analytical methods that can be used to assess the effects of 
aging degradation of buried piping and to develop degradation acceptance criteria (DAC) that can 
be used to assess the condition of degraded buried piping.  A risk-informed approach was taken to 
evaluate the most common aging effects in buried piping, which consists of general wall thinning 
and localized loss of material/pitting.  Degradation over time was included in the methodology 
development.  Fragility modeling procedures for degraded buried piping were developed and the 
effect of degradation on fragility and core damage frequency (CDF) was determined.  The 
development of DAC considered the effects of degradation over time so that the number of years 
required for the buried pipe to reach a level of degradation that represents a potentially significant 
plant risk can be determined.  NUREG/CR-6876 included necessary conditions for the usage of 
DAC, including the types of buried piping systems, configurations, materials, applicable pipe 
loads (e.g., pressure, surcharge, live load, etc.) and other conditions.  It was recognized in this 
study that seismic induced stresses in buried piping are self-limiting since deformations or strains 
are limited by seismic motion of the surrounding media.  DAC and related methodology 
developed in this report were intended to provide guidance to the NRC staff for making timely 
assessment whether observed degraded conditions potentially have an immediate significant 
effect on plant risk.  However, as is the case in the concrete study, the DAC are not intended for 
industry applications as a tool to justify existing degraded conditions. 
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3 LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS 
Licensee event reports (LERs) are one of the first sources utilized for collecting and reviewing 
age-related degradation occurrences of structures and passive components (SPCs) at nuclear 
power plants (NPPs) in the U.S.  LERs, which are governed by 10 CFR 50.73, are considered to 
be a consistent and complete source of information for obtaining degradation records.  This 
section describes the list of SPCs in more detail, methods used to identify and retrieve LERs, 
development of an LER review assistance program, summary of results, and trending analysis.  
Reviews and findings using other sources are documented in Section 4 of this report.   
3.1 Structure and Passive Component List 
Based on the discussions between BNL and KAERI, a list of structures and passive components 
(SPCs) introduced in Section 1 were established as a combination of a list of structure and 
components provided by KAERI and a list of 18 components reported in NUREG/CR-6679.  
Eight component categories from NUREG/CR-6679, namely the cable tray systems, conduit 
systems, cooling tower, electrical conductors, HVAC duct, insulation/seal, structural seismic gap, 
and water-control structures, are not included in this search effort because they are not considered 
to be risk significant according to the component list provided by KAERI. 
 
This section describes the selected SPCs in more detail by including their subcomponents and the 
information relevant to later discussion in this report.   
 
Anchorage 
Anchorage covers all structural components that serve as a connection between a concrete 
element and a piece of equipment. Anchorages include embedded anchors, expansion anchors, 
grout (used beneath baseplates), and steel embedments.   
 
Concrete 
The concrete category includes reinforced concrete buildings, water intake structures, pump 
house, underground structures, concrete walls/floors/ceilings/mats/foundations, canals, fuel pools, 
pits, pedestals, prestressed concrete structures, manholes.  It also includes masonry walls and 
block walls. 
 
Containment 
Containment is a special type of structure in nuclear power plants used as a final barrier to 
prevent the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a postulated accident 
that may occur inside the containment.  Therefore, the containment is not categorized as either 
concrete or structural steel components.  The containment category includes the steel shell or 
concrete shell, prestressing system if applicable, penetrations, torus (if applicable), bellows, liners, 
and supports. The prestressing system includes tendons, tendon anchorages, and grease used in 
the tendon conduits to prevent degradation of the tendons. 
 
Exchanger 
The exchanger category includes steam generator, heat exchanger, condenser (including ice 
condensers used in the design of some US plants), and supports. 
 
Filter 
Filters include mechanical & HVAC - screens, separators, strainers, absorbers, relevant supports, 
and housings.  It should be noted that the subcomponents for filters do not include regular 
maintenance items which are examined or replaced on a regular basis.  
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Piping system 
Piping systems include piping, underground piping, fittings, small bore piping & tubing, sleeves, 
and pipe supports.  Hydraulic or mechanical assemblies of snubbers are not considered since they 
are active components and subject to periodic inspection and maintenance if needed.  
 
RPV  
Subcomponents of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) include the shell, internals, passive 
components for control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs), and relevant supports.  Although 
pressurized, RPVs are distinguished as an individual component from other vessels because of 
their unique and important roles in nuclear power plants. 
 
Structural steel 
The structural steel category includes steel frames, trusses, platforms, supports, bolts, nuts,  studs, 
fasteners, liners, doors, covers, hatches, and support to all types of equipment.  
 
Tank 
Tanks are those vessels that are subject only to atmospheric pressure.  
 
Vessel 
Vessels are pressurized, and include subcomponents pressurizer, other pressurized vessels, and 
their supports. 
 
Degradation occurrences included in this report do not necessarily correlate to the number of 
degraded elements at a specific plant and date.  If several degraded elements are found at the 
same plant and the same date, they are grouped into one degradation occurrence if they are the 
same subcomponent.  
 
It should be noted that the subcomponents in some of these component categories are not always 
the same as those used for NUREG/CR-6679.  In particular, the penetrations under the 
containment category and the piping, fittings, small bore piping, tubing, and sleeves under the 
piping system category, were removed from further review (after some initial tabulation in 
NUREG/CR-6679) because they were being addressed by other existing NRC programs.  In 
addition, the 105 degraded piping system components reported in NUREG/CR-6679 were only a 
part of all degradations that actually occurred, because the total number of piping system 
degradation occurrences were found to be too numerous.  For this research, the counting of the 
degradation occurrences using LERs was more thorough in the sense that none was intentionally 
discarded.  These differences were taken into account in the statistical comparison and the 
trending analysis. 
 
For each component where degradation was identified, a degradation occurrence record (DOR) 
was developed. The DOR includes the following fields in the database: ML number, LER 
reference number, Event Date, Plant Name, Docket Number, System, Component, Subcomponent, 
Aging Effects, Aging Mechanisms, How Identified, Evaluation Method, and Repair method. 
These fields are explained in the subsections below. 
3.2 Licensee Event Reports 
Since this research must be based on publicly available information, LERs were chosen to be one 
of the primary sources for review. The LERs were also selected as the primary source for the 
following reasons: standardized requirement in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, continuous in 
time, completeness of information, good coverage of significant events, well formatted, and easy 
accessibility. 
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Since January 1, 1984, an LER is required by 10 CFR 50.73 to be submitted within 60 days after 
the occurrence of a significant event, following an immediate notification (required by 10 CFR 
50.72).  Each LER and its revisions are generally required to address specific events and plant 
conditions.  Unrelated events or conditions, including cases of the same or similar components 
but different causes or separate events/activities, should be reported in different LERs.  Voluntary 
LERs are encouraged to be submitted even if the events are not required by 10 CFR 50.73 and 
other requirements, but are believed by the licensee to be safety significant.  An LER may be 
canceled by letter provided that the cancellation has a sound and logical basis.  
 
LERs have been used by the NRC staff to study potentially generic safety problems, and 
assess trends and patterns of operational experience, as well as in other applications 
[NUREG-1022].  As specifically required by 10 CFR 50.73, a licensee shall report the 
following items when writing LERs: 
 
1. Plant shutdown by technical specifications 
2. Operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications 
3. Deviation from technical specifications under 10 CFR 50.54 (x) 
4. Degraded or unanalyzed condition 
5. External threat or hampering 
6. System actuation  
7. Event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function 
8. Common-cause inoperability of independent trains or channels 
9. Radioactive release 
10. Internal threat or hampering 
11. Transport of a contaminated person offsite 
12. News release or notification of other government agency 
13. Loss of emergency preparedness capabilities 
14. Single cause that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety functions of trains 
or channels in different systems 
 
For each of these 14 reportable items, NUREG-1022 provides detailed description, 
discussion, and many application examples.  
 
LERs are also required by 10 CFR 50.73 to contain a brief abstract; a clear, specific, and narrative 
description of the event; an assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the event; 
corrective actions; and references to any previous similar events.  In addition, LERs start with a 
signed cover letter and usually have a very instructive title.  Most LERs utilize NRC FORMs 
366/366A/366B, which include information such as facility name, docket number, event date, 
LER number, report date, etc.  Compared to other sources of information as described in 
NUREG/CR-6679, LERs have the advantage of information completeness and rule-based format, 
which can facilitate automation in their processing. 
3.3 Keyword Search Approach through NRC ADAMS System  
The LERs used in NUREG/CR-6679 were processed through the Sequence Coding & Search 
System (SCSS) that was created and maintained for the NRC by the Nuclear Operations Analysis 
Center at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).  This database system contains over 
35,000 LERs from 1980 to 1997, of which NUREG/CR-6679 covered the period of 1985 to 1997.  
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SCSS provides a searchable way to process the LERs.  However, this system is not accessible 
anymore which precludes its use in this search effort.  Development of a system similar to SCSS 
would require a sizable effort beyond the available resources for this project.  Therefore, the 
identification and review process of recent LERs will be based on the NRC ADAMS system.   
3.3.1 NRC ADAMS System  
Quoting from the NRC website, “The Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS) is an information system that provides access to all image and text documents that the 
NRC has made public since November 1, 1999, as well as bibliographic records (some with 
abstracts and full text) that the NRC made public before November 1999.  The NRC continues to 
add several hundred new documents daily.  ADAMS permits full-text searching and enables users 
to view document images, download files, and print locally.” 
 
More specifically, public documents since November 1, 1999 are provided in the NRC ADAMS 
system as image and text files through the publicly available records system (PARS); public 
documents before that date are mostly provided only as bibliographic records through the public 
legacy library (PLL).  Web-based access and Citrix-based access are the two methods for using 
ADAMS, the former with a web-based search engine for documents after November 1999 and the 
latter with the downloadable Citrix software.  Excellent help documents are provided on the NRC 
website for usage of these two methods.  Because PLL does not include full text for all records 
and does not include recent records, web-based ADAMS access, i.e., PARS, was chosen in this 
research.  Moreover, NUREG/CR-6679 covered LERs between 1985 and 1997; utilization of 
PARS fortunately extended that period after 1999 with just 1998 omitted.  However, since the 
search of degradation occurrences aims at identifying any trend shift, omitting one year does not 
statistically affect the conclusion. 
 
The NRC ADAMS system features simple and advanced search methods, additionally with a full 
range of sorting and other result representation options.  It has three query methods, namely 
Concept, Boolean, and Pattern modes.  Detailed instruction on the usage of these modes and 
comparisons of their advantages are available through the ADAMS help documents.  The search 
results can be further filtered and refined to obtain records that are more relevant.  In ADAMS 
system, any of its documents can be identified by a unique accession number (MLxxxxxxxxx).   
3.3.2 Development of the Keyword Search Approach 
Using the advanced search method with “LER” as the document type field, a total of 4323 LERs 
had been found through PARS, as of 04/16/2008 (many new documents including new LERs are 
constantly collected in the ADAMS system).  Since the number of LERs is too large to be 
reviewed with the allowable resources, various query methods and associated options were 
initially explored to identify an appropriate method to process the LERs for identification of 
degradation occurrences of the SPCs.  This subsection is a brief summary of the development of 
the keyword search approach, which serves as the justification of the applicability of this method.  
 
All three query modes of the ADAMS system were evaluated to identify the best search strategy. 
Both the Concept mode and the Boolean mode returned virtually the entire set of LERs using an 
extensive list of aging/degradation related keywords (with appropriate Boolean operators), such 
as: aging, degradation, deterioration, corrosion, cracking, failure, spalling, rupture, peeling, 
thinning, “loss of material,” “excessive deformation,” wear, “loss of preload,” “stress 
relaxation,” “water accumulation,” fouling, plugging, loosening, leaking, wear, pwscc, scc, igscc, 
iga, tgscc, odscc, hsc, embrittlement, organism, erosion, vibration, “chemical attack”, fatigue, 
and rust.  The use of quotes was required when using multiple words within a single phrase. 
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Pattern search had many unrelated expansion of the original search terms, and therefore, was 
judged no better than the previous two modes.  Therefore, the decision was made to develop 
keywords for each of the 10 component categories. In addition, the exploration also showed that 
the keywords in the “Filter with” field appeared to be an appropriate approach.   
 
The options for using the ADAMS system were chosen to be: 
 
Filter With Field:  keywords with Boolean operations 
Document Type:  LER 
Number of Docs to Retrieve:  99999 
Number of Docs to Display:  99999 
Sort by:  Document Date in Descending Order 
 
The result fields for the returned document records include: Title, Accession Number (ML #), 
Docket Number, Document Number, Estimated Page Count, and Document Summary.  
 
By trial and error, the keywords used in the “Filter With” field for the Anchorage were selected to 
be anchor* or grout or “steel embedment.”  The use of the star character permits retrieval of 
various forms of the word anchor such as anchors, anchorage, anchored, or anchoring. Using this 
keyword set, ADAMS returned 80 LERs, which were judged to be a reasonable number that can 
be reviewed within the project resource limit provided other component categories would return 
similar number of LERs. The degree of coverage of these 80 LERs over the entire potential 
degradation occurrences of anchorages were not known.  
 
Similarly, using a keyword set of concrete or masonry or rebar, 99 LERs were returned by the 
ADAMS system for the concrete component category.  However, this keyword list was not 
considered to cover the entire population of this category in the ADAMS database. For example, 
more than 2000 LERs were returned using a much more rigorous enumeration of the possible 
subcomponents, which were formed as a Boolean expression: (concrete or intake or pumphouse 
or underground or mat or mats or foundation or canal or pit or pedestal or prestress or manhole 
or masonry or block or pool) and (crack or degradation or aging or deterioration or corrosion or 
failure or spalling or rupture or peeling or wear or preload or relaxation or fouling or plugging 
or leaking or embrittle or erosion or chemical or attack or fatigue or rust).  
 
From the trial results for the anchorage and the concrete component categories, there were two 
issues in this keyword approach: (1) the number of returned LERs and (2) the degree of coverage 
of the component population.  One may get a reasonable number of LERs to process but leave the 
coverage in question, or achieve a high confidence in population coverage but retrieve too many 
LERs that cannot be processed within the resources available to perform this research study.  
Another problem is that some LERs may be returned for more than one component categories and 
therefore will need to be reviewed multiple times.  The resultant total number of LERs reviewed 
may be even larger than the total number of LERs (4323) for a fair coverage of the population.  In 
summary, this keyword approach appeared to be an art of balance in creating an appropriate list 
of keywords: it can either (1) reduce the number of returned LERs to a reasonable level for 
processing but with the potentially degraded coverage or, (2) increase the coverage level of the 
population but with too many returned LERs to be processed.  In the meantime, developing the 
keyword list required repetitive accesses of the ADAMS system to check the returned LER list 
and represented a sizable effort.   
 
Therefore, the development of the keyword search approach was determined to be inefficient and 
was stopped after the concrete component category.  Accordingly, all LERs after 1999 were 
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reviewed individually so that a full coverage was achieved and any LER was avoided being 
reviewed more than once.  
3.4 Development of LER Reading Assistance Tool 
3.4.1 Summary of the Development Process  
The initial approach for processing every individual LER is first to retrieve all LERs, sorted by 
document date in descending order, through the ADAMS system and then to review them in that 
order.  This approach required bookkeeping each current LER being reviewed and retrieving the 
list of all LERs after each interruption such as computer shutdown at the end of each day, work 
breaks during the day, and internet/web server issues.  On average, each LER has about five to six 
pages, with the longest being 311 pages.  After an initial experiment for the first a day or so, it 
was estimated that each LER requires about 5 minutes to review which is equivalent to reviewing 
96 LERs/day.  The total estimated effort could be 45 days, which would result in no time for 
database development, statistical analysis, and annual report preparation.  This difficulty led to 
the development of computerized tools to assist the LER review.  
 
Since the NRC ADAMS system may not be accessible at all time, for example, the ADAMS 
server may be down or the internet connection may be lost unexpectedly, all LERs were 
downloaded at once and the review was carried out locally.  Only the text files (in HTML format) 
were downloaded in order to facilitate the computer assistance in processing and to avoid the 
unnecessary download time and consuming a large amount of disk space if the image files were 
downloaded.  The actual retrieval of the 4323 HTML files utilizes an in-house web crawler, 
which was developed in Python (computer language) and was capable to automatically login the 
ADAMS system, submit the advanced search form, and retrieve the HTML files.  There were a 
small number of LERs that could not be downloaded automatically and were logged by the spider 
for manual download.  The entire retrieval process took about three hours and the downloaded 
files consumed 116 MB of disk space. 
 
As the HTML files include a lot of tags that are not meaningful, the HTML files are then 
translated into pure text files by trimming out these tags and some other irrelevant text.  The 
resulting text files have a total size of 73 MB on a disk.   
 
Figure 3-1 through Figure 3-4 show a sample LER in text format, showing its beginning part, 
abstract part, cause part, and action part, respectively.  These various parts are common for most 
LERs as required by the 10 CFR 50.73, and are used to speed up the review of these LERs.  In 
contrast, Figure 3-5 shows the image of the same LER, with the NRC form 366 that shows the 
abstract part.   
 
Compared to image files (pdf or tiff format), text files have the advantages of being: locally 
available; easy for computers to process; relatively easy to decode the LER number, event date, 
plant name, and docket number from these text LERs; and easy to locate the four helpful sections 
in the LERs (cause, title, abstract, and corrective action).  However, the text files are no better 
than the image files than the pdf files to human readers.  In addition, a small number of LERs are 
only available in image format.  The goal of developing an assistance tool for LER processing 
was to (1) automatically decode relevant information such as LER number, event date, plant 
name, and docket number, (2) automatically color-code the four sections, (3) automatically 
identify the plant type, (4) automatically color-code the entire text such that reading of the LER is 
more effective, and (5) manage the saved degradation occurrences.  This tool can effectively 
process all text LERs and can retrieve an image file from the NRC ADAMS system on rare cases 
where a text LER is not available locally or not sufficient to make a decision.   
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Because of our extensive experience in developing Python programs, the initial development of 
the assistance tool, so called LER Reader, required only an effort of 4 days (including the 
development of the web crawler); later improvement of the LER Reader involved more time 
during the processing of the LERs.  This development ended up with 1009 lines of hand written 
codes and thousands of lines of generated codes.  It should be noted that the improvement of the 
tools does not require a reprocessing of the reviewed LERs because the LER Reader only assists 
us to review but not to make the decisions.  The improvement was intended to increase the review 
speed not to lower the quality of the review.  
3.4.2 Introduction of the LER Reader GUI  
Figure 3-6 shows the annotated graphical user interface (GUI) of the LER Reader.  The large box 
labeled as “LER Text” on the right hand side is used to display the parsed LER texts; while those 
tables, boxes, and buttons on the left hand side provide the controlling functionalities.  The table 
on the upper-left corner labeled as “Degradation Occurrence Record (DOR)” is used to enter the 
DORs either automatically by the LER Reader or manually, depending on the fields.   
 
Tool Set One includes buttons and a text box to control the process of LERs.  Clicking “Reload 
Terms” reload the component list, system list, subcomponent list, aging effects list, and aging 
mechanism list, each of which is stored in one text file.  Button “Save” is for saving the DOR 
filled in the table.  The text box with “-1” indicates the current LER id within the range of 0 to 
4322.  Button “Next ML” advances to next LER and triggers the auto parsing of the new LER.   
Buttons “I” and “O” can be used to zoom in or out the LER text, i.e., to increase or decrease the 
font size for the LER text.  Button “>Pdf” can be used to retrieve from the NRC website and 
show the corresponding pdf file as needed for rare cases.  The four buttons “>Title”, “>Abstract”, 
“>Cause”, and “>Action” are intended to jump in the “LER Text” box to the corresponding 
section of the LER text.  A few convenient short cut commands for these navigation functions are 
also available by pressing the right mouse button.  Pressing the middle mouse button reformats 
the text for better readability.  
  
The text box labeled as “LER Title and Plant Type” shows the title of the LER and the decoded 
plant type, which can be “PWR”, “BWR”, or “???”.  A plant type of “???” indicates either this 
LER is not about any of the 104 NPPs in the US or the LER Reader cannot determine the plant 
type.  
 
The text box labeled as “Saved Recorded Statistics and Other Information” is used to show 
various information or result of the LER Reader.   Figure 3-7 shows the DOR statistics shown in 
this box. 
 
Tool Set Two includes a status label for the number of save DORs and two buttons for control of 
the display of saved DORs in the text box below.  The button “Refresh” is required to click if the 
user wants to browse through the saved DORs; the simple summary of the saved DORs will be 
shown in the text box below after this button is clicked.  Clicking “Next Saved LER” iterates 
through the saved DORs. 
3.4.3 Application of the LER Reader 
Upon loading an LER by clicking the “Next ML” button, the LER Reader does the following 
steps: 
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1. Parse the LER to obtain the LER Reference number, event date, plant name, and the 
docket number; unsuccessful items will appear as empty in the DOR table. 
2. Parse the LER to locate the positions of the Title, Abstract, Cause, and Corrective Action; 
unsuccessful items will have a default value 0, which is the start of the text LER. 
3. Jump to the Cause section in the “LER Text” box, which may show the beginning of the 
LER if the parsing of the Cause section failed in step 2. 
4. Check if the DOR was already saved in the database, which may use a revision of the 
current LER; a warning dialog will show if an existing DOR is found. 
5. Show the title and the plant type. 
6. Colorize the LER text; yellow suggests the LER is about something not related to 
degradation of SPCs while red suggests it is related to degradation. 
 
The procedure to review an LER starts with loading an LER by clicking the “Next ML” button.  
Upon successful loading, one may read the entire LER for identification of any degradation 
occurrences.  However, the utilization of the LER Reader to speed up the review process requires 
the following suggested steps: 
 
1. Advance to next LER if a dialog shows a DOR existed in the database. 
2. Read the title and the plant type; if the plant type is “???”, the LER is most likely not 
related to the NPP.  The title is usually very instructive. 
3. Read the Cause section and other sections if needed for any recordable DOR; click the 
right mouse button to iterate through the four sections in the order of Cause, Title, 
Abstract, and Corrective Actions; or scroll through the whole LER. 
4. If the LER text is not meaningful, try to directly load the PDF file from the NRC website 
by clicking “>Pdf”, or by visiting the NRC ADAMS system directly with the ML number.  
Copying the HTML content from the NRC website to the “LER Text” box will trigger 
the LER Reader to parse and save it automatically. 
 
Figure 3-8 through Figure 3-16 show various use scenarios of the LER Reader.  It is obvious that 
colorizing LERs as described previously greatly increases the absorption of information for the 
users.  The nature of the event can be determined by looking at the highlighted words or phrases, 
after a brief experience of the colorized LERs.   
 
For the majority of cases, the correct LER reference number, event date, plant name, and docket 
number can be determined automatically by the LER Reader. There is no need for the user to 
identify this information in the LER and then enter these values into the table.  The LER Reader 
can appropriately colorize the relevant words and phrases and can correctly identify all or most of 
the four important sections.  The reviewer usually does not need to scroll through the whole LER 
to find all the necessary information.  
 
The combination of the LER Reader and the associated LER text files saved a lot of manual 
accesses to the ADAMS system and avoided the time consuming download of the image files.  
There was also no need to carefully maintain the order of the 4323 LERs and to keep track of the 
current LER after resuming from an interruption.   
 
During review of the LERs, all DORs were saved to a text file, which later can be imported into 
an Microsoft (MS) Access database for statistical analysis.  
 
Compared to the estimated speed of reviewing 96 LERs/day for the approach that utilizes the 
NRC ADAMS system directly, review of 200 to 300 LERs/day was achieved on average using 
the LER Reader approach.  The total amount of time including the program development was 
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about half of the original estimate of 45 days.  As the experience in using the LER Reader and in 
reviewing LERs grew, the process of identifying and tabulating applicable LERs became faster.  
Indeed, more than 350 LERs were processed on the last day.  Had more LERs been available for 
processing, the saving by the LER Reader approach would be more significant. In addition, the 
use of the LER Reader ensures much greater accuracy since much of the data was automatically 
transcribed into the database once the user noted the applicability of the LER. 
3.5 Results Assessment 
3.5.1 Database Integration 
The text file of DORs saved by the LER Reader were imported as the DOR table to an MS 
Access database, which include the fields: ML number, LER Reference number, Event Date, 
Plant Name, Docket Number, System, Component, Subcomponent, Aging Effects, Aging 
Mechanisms, How Identified, Evaluation Method, and Repair method.   
 
During the trending analysis to be presented later in this report, there was a need to compute the 
plant age when a particular degradation event occurred.  To this end, the date that the construction 
permit (CP) was issued was selected as the starting time of the plants.  The CP date and the 
operation license (OL) date were obtained from the U.S. NRC 2007-2008 Information Digest, 
Appendix A [NUREG-1350, 2007].  A database table was then created for all 104 operating 
NPPs in the U.S. by incorporating the plant information from the NRC website and these CP and 
OL dates.  The fields of this table include plant name, docket number, reactor type, location, 
owner/operator, NRC region, CP issued, and OL issued, as shown in Table 3-1.  The NRC 
regions showing the NPP distribution in the U.S. are shown in Figure 3-17.  
 
The DOR table and the U.S. plant information table are related by the docket numbers.  
Additional queries, reports, forms, macros, and pages were created to assist the database 
integration and statistical analysis.  In order to perform the trending analysis, the database used in 
NUREG/CR-6679 was updated to include the plant information table.  A number of PivotTables 
in MS Excel were utilized to connect to the databases and to generate data during the statistical 
analysis.  
3.5.2 DOR Assessment 
DORs are summarized in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3, presenting the primary information and the 
secondary information for the DORs, respectively.  The two tables are one-to-one correlated by 
the field ID.  The primary information table includes fields ID, component, subcomponent, 
system, aging effects, aging mechanics, plant and event date, which are significant in describing a 
DOR.  The secondary information table provides supplemental information for the DORs, which 
consists of how identified, evaluation method, repair method, docket number, LER reference 
number, and ML number, and also includes ID, component, and subcomponent for easy 
identification.  DORs in the primary information table are in the alphabetical order of the fields 
component, subcomponent, and system, which together identify the specific SPCs.  DORs in the 
secondary information table are in the ascending order of ID.  An entry of “NA” in these tables 
signifies that there was no or insufficient information available in the LER for that entry.  
Although a docket number can be used to uniquely identify a plant or a particular unit in a plant if 
there are multiple units at the site, the plant name and the unit number are still provided in these 
tables for convenient reference.  Table 3-4 shows the abbreviations used for the aging mechanism 
field.   
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In the DOR tables, there are three entries under an additional component category “other”, which 
includes those DORs that were determined not suitable for any of the 10 SPC categories.  
Excluding these three entries, A total of 223 DORs were identified from the LERs for the period 
of 1999 to the present (4/16/2008), including just a few from 1998 as well.  
  
Figure 3-18 shows the distribution of the SPC degradation occurrences by component categories, 
with the number of the degradation occurrences annotated over the bars.  As would be expected, 
the piping systems have the most degradation occurrences reported in the LERs, about 36% of the 
total DORs.  Exchangers and RPVs have the next two largest number of degradation occurrences, 
representing about 22% and 17% of the total DORs, respectively.  The other seven component 
categories represent less than 25% of the total DORs; they are vessels, filters, containments, 
structural steel, tank, concrete, and anchorage in descending order of the number of degradation 
occurrences.  It should be noted that the number of degradation occurrences for a particular 
category is also a function of the quantity of components in that category that is present at a plant. 
So for example, the number of degradation occurrences for piping was expected to be large, 
because there are many piping systems at a NPP and many of these piping systems can be quite 
long.  
 
The total number of DORs for structural type components, i.e., containments, structural steel, 
concrete, and anchorages, is only 18, about 8% of all DORs.  However, this does not necessarily 
indicate that there have been fewer degradations occurring in these structures.  Rather, it is 
because of the nature of the structural degradation and the nature of LER reporting requirement 
that are judged to result in fewer instances of degradation.  As described previously, LERs report 
any degradation situations that seriously affect the plant safety or result in any unanalyzed 
conditions that could significantly compromise the plant safety.  The events reported in LERs are 
often from operating experiences.  Structural degradations usually have less immediate impact on 
plant safety, and therefore, are less likely to be observed and reported in LERs.  However, 
structural degradations can be significant risk factors to plant safety when a severe environmental 
event, for example, a large earthquake, occurs.  Most structural degradations can be found in 
literatures that involved results from special inspection efforts.  For example, NUREG-1522 
covers data obtained from walkdowns conducted at six older vintage plants [NUREG-1522, 
1995].  
 
Other distributions over various measures are provided in the next subsection, with comparisons 
to data reported in NUREG/CR-6679.  
3.6 Trending Analysis 
To evaluate the possible trends in degradation occurrence data, the DORs in the past decade 
(approximately 1999 to 2008 collected in this study) and those reported in NUREG/CR-6679 
(approximately 1985 to 1997) were compared.  In order to make a sound comparison, a few 
differences between the current data collection using the recent LERs and those reported in 
NUREG/CR-6679 should be noted. These are highlighted in the following: 
 
1. Difference in Information Sources: unlike the current set of data collected in this study 
which rely on LERs 1999-2008, NUREG/CR-6679 covered a larger set of information 
sources, which included LERs 1985-1997, NUREGs, NRC/IE Information notices, 
Correspondences, Generic Letters, NRC Bulletins, IR Circulations, SECY documents, 
and other publicly available documents. 
2. Difference in LER retrieval methods: one-by-one evaluation for LER 1999-2008 versus 
computer based search for LER 1985-1997 through SCSS at ORNL. 
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3. Difference in component lists: 10 component categories for current collection versus 18 
component categories for NUREG/CR-6679. 
4. Difference in subcomponent lists:  all SPCs for current collection versus reduced scope 
for NUREG/CR-6679 (e.g., piping, fittings, small bore piping & tubing, sleeves, 
penetrations, etc.). 
 
These differences were considered in the comparisons presented in the trending analysis.  
Hereafter, the various comparisons utilize either the original data from NUREG/CR-6679 that 
includes all sources or only those related to LER 1985-1997 for consistency with the data 
collected in this research.  The corresponding labels in the figures to be introduced are self-
explained regarding their information sources.  
 
Figure 3-19 shows the distributions of the degradation occurrences by components for three series 
of data: LER 1999-2008, NUREG/CR-6679, and LER 1985-1997, respectively.  The bar chart is 
in the same order as reported in NUREG/CR-6679.  Similarly, Figure 3-20 shows a normalized 
version of the same figure with the total numbers of DORS in each series as the basis.  
Considering LER 1999-2008 and NUREG/CR-6679, exchangers, piping system, and RPVs are 
the first three categories with the greatest number degradation occurrences.  Since the piping 
system DORs for LER 1985-1997 were determined to be very large and did not include all of the 
occurrences in the SCSS database, the actual number of DORs of piping system for LER 1985-
1997 are artificially low.  These figures also show that filters were the second largest category 
using LER 1985-1997.  Both LER data series confirm the observation in the previous section that 
LERs do not report many structural DORs, especially containment, concrete, and anchorage.  
 
Figure 3-21 shows the distribution comparison of the SPC degradation occurrences over time, 
with the top figure showing the two series from NUREG/CR-6679 and with the bottom figure 
showing the series representing LER 1999-2008.  First of all, the strong correlation over the years 
between the two series from NUREG/CR-6679 indicates that LER 1985-1997 represent a 
significant portion of the NUREG/CR-6679 data.  Regardless of the partial years 1997, 1998, and 
2008, the yearly DORs varies somewhat in cycles, which might correspond to inspection intervals 
that often are scheduled at refueling or are required by special NRC mandatory inspection 
requirements.  On a yearly basis, there appear to be slightly more DORS from LER 1998-2008 
than from LER 1985-1997.  This observation may be due to the difference in reviewing LERs; 
the computer search approach for LER 1985-1997 may not have the same level of coverage of the 
degradation population as the one-by-one review approach for LER 1999-2008. 
 
Excluding the three partial years, DORs from LER 1985-1996 and LER 1999-2007 are correlated 
to their plant ages at event (PAAE), which is defined as (Event Date – CP Issued Date).  Table 
3-5 and Table 3-6 show the number of DORs and the number of NPP units that these DORs 
belong to as a function of PAAE, for LER 1999-2007 and LER 1985-1996, respectively.  Taking 
the row of a PAAE equal to 33 as an example, it shows that there were 20 NPP units which had 
30 DORs at the time that these units were 33 years old as defined by PAAE.  The fourth columns 
in these two tables list the average number of DORs that were obtained by dividing the number of 
DORs by the number of affected NPP units. 
 
Figure 3-22 visualizes the number of DORs and the number of associated NPP units distributed 
over the PAAE.  For both data series LER 1985-1996 and LER 1999-2007, the distributions show 
central peaks at 24 years and 33 years (PAAE), respectively, on curves related to DOR 
distribution and NPP unit distribution.  These peaks and the hill shape distributions may suggest 
the distribution of construction time of the U.S. NPP population.  As the two data series are 
approximately apart by 10 years, the associated curves show similar shifts, in particular with the 
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peaks apart by 9 years.  It is important to note that the upward shift between the two series shows 
the increase of the numbers of DORs and the affected units, indicating increasing age-related 
degradations.  The peaks increase from 22 to 30 (36%) for the number of DORs and from 15 to 
20 (33%) for the number of affected NPP units.  The overall shift in the hill shape appears to 
represent linear increases in the numbers of DORs and affected NPP units.  It should be noticed 
that the smaller numbers of DORs and affected NPP units at higher PAAE than the peak PAAE 
do not indicate there were less degradation for older plants, rather there were a smaller number of 
older plants in the operating NPP fleet.  A similar observation occurs for the lower PAAE 
because there were fewer relatively younger plants during the 1999-2007 review period.  
 
Figure 3-23 shows the numbers of DORs and the associated NPP units with the two data series 
combined.  The combination was achieved by adding the related numbers for the overlapped 
PAAEs.  The trend lines considered data up to a PAAE of 36 years, which was selected because 
shortly after this PAAE, the number of DORs and plants drops off rapidly which if included 
would skew the resulting trend lines.  The trend lines show that both the number of DORs and the 
numbers of associated NPP units increase as PAAE increases. In addition, the increase in the 
number of DORs rises faster than the increase in the number of NPP units. 
 
Figure 3-24 shows the relation of the average degradation occurrences with PAAE.  As an 
example, the peak point in this figure shows that for plants at an age of 34 years, about 1.8 DORs 
per plant were reported in LERs.  The dotted line designates the series LER 1985-1996 while the 
solid line represents the series LER 1999-2007.  It appears that the average number of DORs per 
plant increase as the plant gets older, with a slightly higher rate for older plants as shown by the 
steeper slope using LER 1999-2007.  The slightly higher degradation rate using more recent 
LERs reflects the fact that older plants show in general more degradation occurrences, and may 
reflect as well the lowered coverage of the possible degradation population by limiting the 
number of DORs in NUREG/CR-6679 (e.g. piping system) and potentially by using the 
computerize search approach for LER 1985-1997.  By literally reading the two trend lines, the 
older plants (using LER 1999-2007) appear to have about 3 times more average DORs than the 
younger plants (using LER 1985-1997); however, this observation may not fully represent the 
real situation because of the differences in processing the two LER series.  In addition, this 
observation may not be true for structural type components, as the data from LERs are less 
representative of the structural components.  The variations in these two curves are judged to be 
relatively large due to the fact that these degradations are rare events and the number of DORs is 
relatively small.  
 
Figure 3-25 shows the relationship of the average DORs per plant to the PAAE using the 
combined data series.  The trend line in Figure 3-25 shows that combining the two series results 
in a slightly increasing average degradations per plant over PAAE and is essentially an average of 
the prior two trend lines shown in Figure 3-24. 
 
Figure 3-26 shows the comparison for the distributions of the SPC degradation occurrences with 
respect to major aging effects among the three data series for steel components (more precisely 
metal components).  Cracking is the most predominant aging effect for all three data series.  
Failure is the second most significant aging effect for LER 1998-2008 because it includes a 
number of aging effects that do not fall into any listed categories.  DORs with aging effects of 
loss of material and wall thinning appear to be obtained from information sources other than 
LERs.  
 
Figure 3-27 shows the comparison of the distributions of the SPC degradation occurrences by 
major aging mechanisms among the three data series.  SCC is the most significant aging 
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mechanism for all data series.  Compared to the two NUREG/CR-6679 data series, LER 1999-
2008 shows a large DOR contribution from fatigue, which is the second most significant 
degradation for this series.  This may be due to the possibility that some components are 
approaching their fatigue life as NPPs get older.  Moisture, organisms, chemical attack, and 
foreign object are shown to be less important mechanisms for LER 1998-2008; lessons learned 
from the past may have helped to avoid such aging mechanisms. 
  
Figure 3-28 shows the comparison of the distributions of the SPC degradation occurrences by 
cracking type among the three data series.  Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) is 
the most common cracking type for both LER data series, partly indicating the preferences of the 
LER reporting system.  On the other hand, intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) was 
found to be the most common cracking type for the NUREG/CR-6679 data series, but it was a 
much less common cracking type for the other two LER data series. This suggests that other 
information sources provided those extra IGSCC DORs for the NUREG/CR-6679 data series.    
 
Figure 3-29 shows the comparison of distributions of the SPC degradation occurrences by system 
types among the three data series.  It is obvious using all series that the system most vulnerable to 
degradation is the reactor coolant system (RCS), as expected because the RCS includes many 
subcomponents that are constantly subjected to harsh environments such as high temperature, 
high pressure, high fluid velocity, boron acid, radiation, etc. 
 
 
 
30 
Table 3-1  U.S. 104 Operating Nuclear Power Plants 
Plant Name Docket Reactor 
Type 
Location Owner/Operator NRC 
Region
CP Issued OL Issued 
Oyster Creek 5000219 BWR 9 MI S of Toms River,  NJ Exelon Generation Co., LLC 1 12/15/1964 7/2/1991
Nine Mile Point 1 5000220 BWR 6 MI NE of Oswego,  NY Constellation Energy 1 4/12/1965 12/26/1974
Dresden 2 5000237 BWR 9 MI E of Morris,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 1/10/1966 2/20/1991
Ginna 5000244 PWR 20 MI NE of Rochester,  NY Constellation Energy 1 4/25/1966 9/19/1969
Indian Point 2 5000247 PWR 24 MI N of New York City,  NY Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 1 10/14/1966 9/28/1973
Dresden 3 5000249 BWR 9 MI E of Morris,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 10/14/1966 1/12/1971
Turkey Point 3 5000250 PWR 25 MI S of Miami,  FL Florida Power & Light Co. 2 4/27/1967 7/19/1972
Turkey Point 4 5000251 PWR 25 MI S of Miami,  FL Florida Power & Light Co. 2 4/27/1967 4/10/1973
Quad Cities 1 5000254 BWR 20 MI NE of Moline,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 2/15/1967 12/14/1972
Palisades 5000255 PWR 5 MI S of South Haven,  MI Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 3 3/14/1967 2/21/1971
Browns Ferry 1 5000259 BWR 10 MI NW of Decatur,  AL Tennessee Valley Authority 2 5/10/1967 12/20/1973
Browns Ferry 2 5000260 BWR 10 MI NW of Decatur,  AL Tennessee Valley Authority 2 5/10/1967 8/2/1974
Robinson 2 5000261 PWR 26 MI from Florence,  SC Progress Energy 2 4/13/1967 9/23/1970
Monticello 5000263 BWR 30 MI NW of Minneapolis,  MN Nuclear Management Co. 3 6/19/1967 1/9/1981
Quad Cities 2 5000265 BWR 20 MI NE of Moline,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 2/15/1967 12/14/1972
Point Beach 1 5000266 PWR 13 MI NNW of Manitowoc,  WI FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC 3 7/19/1967 10/5/1970
Oconee 1 5000269 PWR 30 MI W of Greenville,  SC Duke Energy Power Company, 
LLC 
2 11/6/1967 2/6/1973
Oconee 2 5000270 PWR 30 MI W of Greenville,  SC Duke Energy Power Company, 
LLC 
2 11/6/1967 10/6/1973
Vermont Yankee 5000271 BWR 5 MI S of Brattleboro,  VT Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 1 12/11/1967 2/28/1973
Salem 1 5000272 PWR 18 MI S of Wilmington,  DE PSE&G Nuclear 1 9/25/1968 8/13/1976
Diablo Canyon 1 5000275 PWR 12 MI WSW of San Luis Obispo, 
CA 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 4 4/23/1968 11/2/1984
Peach Bottom 2 5000277 BWR 17.9 MI S of Lancaster,  PA Exelon Generation Co., LLC 1 1/31/1968 10/25/1973
Peach Bottom 3 5000278 BWR 17.9 MI S of Lancaster,  PA Exelon Generation Co., LLC 1 1/31/1968 7/2/1974
Surry 1 5000280 PWR 17 MI NW of Newport News,  VA Dominion Generation 2 6/25/1968 5/25/1972
Surry 2 5000281 PWR 17 MI NW of Newport News,  VA Dominion Generation 2 6/25/1968 1/29/1973
Prairie Island 1 5000282 PWR 28 MI SE of Minneapolis,  MN Nuclear Management Co. 3 6/25/1968 4/5/1974
Fort Calhoun 5000285 PWR 19 MI N of Omaha,  NE Omaha Public Power District 4 6/7/1968 8/9/1973
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Plant Name Docket Reactor 
Type 
Location Owner/Operator NRC 
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CP Issued OL Issued 
Indian Point 3 5000286 PWR 24 MI N of New York City,  NY Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 1 8/13/1969 12/12/1975
Oconee 3 5000287 PWR 30 MI W of Greenville,  SC Duke Energy Power Company, 
LLC 
2 11/6/1967 7/19/1974
Three Mile Island 1 5000289 PWR 10 MI SE of Harrisburg,  PA Exelon Generation Co., LLC 1 5/18/1968 4/19/1974
Pilgrim 1 5000293 BWR 4 MI SE of Plymouth,  MA Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 1 8/26/1968 9/15/1972
Browns Ferry 3 5000296 BWR 10 MI NW of Decatur,  AL Tennessee Valley Authority 2 7/31/1968 8/18/1976
Cooper 5000298 BWR 23 MI S of Nebraska City,  NE Nebraska Public Power District 4 6/4/1968 1/18/1974
Point Beach 2 5000301 PWR 13 MI NNW of Manitowoc,  WI FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC 3 7/25/1968 3/8/1973
Crystal River 3 5000302 PWR 7 MI NW of Crystal River,  FL Progress Energy 2 9/25/1968 1/28/1977
Kewaunee 5000305 PWR 27 MI E of Green Bay,  WI Dominion Generation 3 8/6/1968 12/21/1973
Prairie Island 2 5000306 PWR 28 MI SE of Minneapolis,  MN Nuclear Management Co. 3 6/25/1968 10/29/1974
Salem 2 5000311 PWR 18 MI S of Wilmington,  DE PSE&G Nuclear 1 9/25/1968 5/20/1981
Arkansas Nuclear 1 5000313 PWR 6 MI WNW of Russellville,  AR Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 4 12/6/1968 5/21/1974
D.C. Cook 1 5000315 PWR 11 MI S of Benton Harbor,  MI Indiana/Michigan Power Co. 3 3/25/1969 10/25/1974
D.C. Cook 2 5000316 PWR 11 MI S of Benton Harbor,  MI IndianaMichigan Power Co. 3 3/25/1969 12/23/1977
Calvert Cliffs 1 5000317 PWR 40 MI S of Annapolis,  MD Constellation Energy 1 7/7/1969 7/31/1974
Calvert Cliffs 2 5000318 PWR 40 MI S of Annapolis,  MD Constellation Energy 1 7/7/1969 8/13/1976
Hatch 1 5000321 BWR 11 MI N of Baxley,  GA Southern Nuclear Operating Co., 
Inc. 
2 9/30/1969 10/13/1974
Diablo Canyon 2 5000323 PWR 12 MI WSW of San Luis Obispo, 
CA 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 4 12/9/1970 8/26/1985
Brunswick 2 5000324 BWR 2 MI N of Southport,  NC Progress Energy 2 2/7/1970 12/27/1974
Brunswick 1 5000325 BWR 2 MI N of Southport,  NC Progress Energy 2 2/7/1970 11/12/1976
Sequoyah 1 5000327 PWR 9.5 MI NE of Chattanooga,  TN Tennessee Valley Authority 2 5/27/1970 9/17/1980
Sequoyah 2 5000328 PWR 9.5 MI NE of Chattanooga,  TN Tennessee Valley Authority 2 5/27/1970 9/15/1981
Duane Arnold 5000331 BWR 8 MI NW of Cedar Rapids,  IA Florida Power & Light Co. 3 6/22/1970 2/22/1974
FitzPatrick 5000333 BWR 8 MI NE of Oswego,  NY Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 1 5/20/1970 10/17/1974
Beaver Valley 1 5000334 PWR 17 MI W of McCandless,  PA FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. 1 6/26/1970 7/2/1976
Saint Lucie 1 5000335 PWR 12 MI SE of Ft. Pierce,  FL Florida Power & Light Co. 2 7/1/1970 3/1/1976
Millstone 2 5000336 PWR 3.2 MI WSW of New London,  CT Dominion Generation 1 12/11/1970 9/26/1975
North Anna 1 5000338 PWR 40 MI NW of Richmond,  VA Dominion Generation 2 2/19/1971 4/1/1978
North Anna 2 5000339 PWR 40 MI NW of Richmond,  VA Dominion Generation 2 2/19/1971 8/21/1980
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Fermi 2 5000341 BWR 25 MI NE of Toledo,  OH Detroit Edison Co. 3 9/26/1972 7/15/1985
Davis-Besse 5000346 PWR 21 MI ESE of Toledo,  OH FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. 3 3/24/1971 4/22/1977
Farley 1 5000348 PWR 18 MI SE of Dothan,  AL Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 2 8/16/1972 6/25/1977
Limerick 1 5000352 BWR 21 MI NW of Philadelphia,  PA Exelon Generation Co., LLC 1 6/19/1974 8/8/1985
Limerick 2 5000353 BWR 21 MI NW of Philadelphia,  PA Exelon Generation Co., LLC 1 6/19/1974 8/25/1989
Hope Creek 1 5000354 BWR 18 MI SE of Wilmington,  DE PSE&G Nuclear 1 11/4/1974 7/25/1986
San Onofre 2 5000361 PWR 4 MI SE of San Clemente,  CA Southern California Edison Co. 4 10/18/1973 9/7/1982
San Onofre 3 5000362 PWR 4 MI SE of San Clemente,  CA Southern California Edison Co. 4 10/18/1973 9/16/1983
Farley 2 5000364 PWR 18 MI SE of Dothan,  AL Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 2 8/16/1972 3/31/1981
Hatch 2 5000366 BWR 11 MI N of Baxley,  GA Southern Nuclear Operating Co., 
Inc. 
2 12/27/1972 6/13/1978
Arkansas Nuclear 2 5000368 PWR 6 MI WNW of Russellville,  AR Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 4 12/6/1972 9/1/1978
McGuire 1 5000369 PWR 17 MI N of Charlotte,  NC Duke Energy Power Company, 
LLC 
2 2/23/1973 7/8/1981
McGuire 2 5000370 PWR 17 MI N of Charlotte,  NC Duke Energy Power Company, 
LLC 
2 2/23/1973 5/27/1983
La Salle 1 5000373 BWR 11 MI SE of Ottawa,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 9/10/1973 4/17/1982
La Salle 2 5000374 BWR 11 MI SE of Ottawa,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 9/10/1973 2/16/1983
Waterford 3 5000382 PWR 20 MI W of New Orleans,  LA Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 4 11/14/1974 3/16/1985
Susquehanna 1 5000387 BWR 7 MI NE of Berwick,  PA PPL Susquehanna, LLC 1 11/2/1973 11/12/1982
Susquehanna 2 5000388 BWR 7 MI NE of Berwick,  PA PPL Susquehanna, LLC 1 11/2/1973 6/27/1984
Saint Lucie 2 5000389 PWR 12 MI SE of Ft. Pierce,  FL Florida Power & Light Co. 2 5/2/1977 6/10/1983
Watts Bar 1 5000390 PWR 10 MI S of Spring City,  TN Tennessee Valley Authority 2 1/23/1973 2/7/1996
Summer 5000395 PWR 26 MI NW of Columbia,  SC South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. 2 3/21/1973 11/12/1982
Columbia 
Generating Station 
5000397 BWR 12 MI NW of Richland,  WA Energy Northwest 4 3/19/1973 4/13/1984
Shearon Harris 1 5000400 PWR 20 MI SW of Raleigh,  NC Progress Energy 2 1/27/1978 1/12/1987
Nine Mile Point 2 5000410 BWR 6 MI NE of Oswego,  NY Constellation Energy 1 6/24/1974 7/2/1987
Beaver Valley 2 5000412 PWR 17 MI W of McCandless,  PA FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. 1 5/3/1974 8/14/1987
Catawba 1 5000413 PWR 6 MI NW of Rock Hill,  SC Duke Energy Power Company, 
LLC 
2 8/7/1975 1/17/1985
Catawba 2 5000414 PWR 6 MI NW of Rock Hill,  SC Duke Energy Power Company, 
LLC 
2 8/7/1975 5/15/1986
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Grand Gulf 1 5000416 BWR 25 MI S of Vicksburg,  MS Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 4 9/4/1974 11/1/1984
Millstone 3 5000423 PWR 3.2 MI WSW of New London,  CT Dominion Generation 1 8/9/1974 1/31/1986
Vogtle 1 5000424 PWR 26 MI SE of Augusta,  GA Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 2 6/28/1974 3/16/1987
Vogtle 2 5000425 PWR 26 MI SE of Augusta,  GA Southern Nuclear Operating Co. 2 6/28/1974 3/31/1989
Perry 1 5000440 BWR 7 MI NE of Painesville,  OH FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. 3 5/3/1977 11/13/1986
Seabrook 1 5000443 PWR 13 MI S of Portsmouth,  NH Florida Power & Light Co. 1 7/7/1976 3/15/1990
Comanche Peak 1 5000445 PWR 4 MI N of Glen Rose,  TX TXU Generating Company LP 4 12/19/1974 4/17/1990
Comanche Peak 2 5000446 PWR 4 MI N of Glen Rose,  TX TXU Generating Company LP 4 12/19/1974 4/6/1993
Byron 1 5000454 PWR 17 MI SW of Rockford,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 12/31/1975 2/14/1985
Byron 2 5000455 PWR 17 MI SW of Rockford,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 12/31/1975 1/30/1987
Braidwood 1 5000456 PWR 24 MI SSW of Joilet,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 12/31/1975 7/2/1987
Braidwood 2 5000457 PWR 24 MI SSW of Joilet,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 12/31/1975 5/20/1988
River Bend 1 5000458 BWR 24 MI NNW of Baton Rouge,  LA Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 4 3/25/1977 11/20/1985
Clinton 5000461 BWR 6 MI E of Clinton,  IL Exelon Generation Co., LLC 3 2/24/1976 4/17/1987
Wolf Creek 1 5000482 PWR 3.5 MI NE of Burlington,  KS Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating 
Corp. 
4 5/31/1977 6/4/1985
Callaway 5000483 PWR 10 MI SE of Fulton,  MO Ameren UE 4 4/16/1976 10/18/1984
South Texas 1 5000498 PWR 12 MI SSW of Bay City,  TX STP Nuclear Operating Co. 4 12/22/1975 3/22/1988
South Texas 2 5000499 PWR 12 MI SSW of Bay City,  TX STP Nuclear Operating Co. 4 12/22/1975 3/28/1989
Palo Verde 1 5000528 PWR 36 MI W of Phoenix,  AZ Arizona Public Service Co. 4 5/25/1976 6/1/1985
Palo Verde 2 5000529 PWR 36 MI W of Phoenix,  AZ Arizona Public Service Co. 4 5/25/1976 4/24/1986
Palo Verde 3 5000530 PWR 36 MI W of Phoenix,  AZ Arizona Public Service Co. 4 5/25/1976 11/25/1987
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Table 3-2  Degradation Occurrence Records (Primary Information) 
ID COMPONENT SUBCOMPONENT SYSTEM AGING EFFECTS AGING MECHANISMS PLANT EVENT 
DATE 
89 Anchorage Nut RHRSW - residual heat 
removal service water 
Loss of material Corrosion Hatch 1 11/17/2003
136 Concrete Floor Radwaste building cable 
spreading room (CSR) 
Cracking Spallation Columbia Generating 
Station 
5/3/2002
203 Concrete Walls & floors Various structures Cracking & spalling NA D.C. Cook 2 5/29/2000
23 Containment CAC cooling coil / fitting CAC - Containment air 
cooler 
Wall thinning Corrosion Palisades 1/19/2007
27 Containment CAC cooling coil / fitting CAC - Containment air 
cooler 
Wall thinning Erosion Palisades 11/1/2006
25 Containment CAC cooling coil / fitting CAC - Containment air 
cooler 
Wall thinning Erosion Palisades 11/29/2006
215 Containment Liner Containment Degraded weld repair NA D.C. Cook 1 1/17/2000
213 Containment Liner Containment Pitting Corrosion D.C. Cook 1 3/5/1998
55 Containment Small bore piping & 
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Vibration Hope Creek 1 6/7/2005
56 Containment Test cap Containment Missing Vibration Oyster Creek 7/12/2005
47 Containment Torus Containment Cracking Fatigue FitzPatrick 6/27/2005
115 Exchanger CAC components Containment Fouling, pitting, 
rusting 
Corrosion Davis-Besse 3/8/2002
48 Exchanger CAC cooling coil Containment Wall thinning Erosion Palisades 10/9/2005
87 Exchanger Condenser (including 
ice) & supports 
Condenser and condensate 
system 
Failure Erosion Duane Arnold 11/25/2003
108 Exchanger Condensor / piping RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Loss of material Corrosion Saint Lucie 2 4/1/2003
50 Exchanger Condensor / Small bore 
piping & tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Cooper 9/23/2005
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113 Exchanger Condensor / tubing RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Tear of plug Under investigation Palo Verde 1 3/27/2003
51 Exchanger Door Containment Failure Corrosion McGuire 1 9/17/2005
73 Exchanger Elbow CFCU - containment fan coil 
unit 
Wall thinning Erosion Prairie Island 2 11/17/2004
195 Exchanger ESW room cooler ESW - essential service 
water 
Fouling Macrofouling by Asiatic 
clamshells 
Callaway 9/14/2000
24 Exchanger Exchanger CCW - component cooling 
water 
Failure Unknown Calvert Cliffs 1 1/17/2007
103 Exchanger Heat exchanger CSS - containment spray Fouling Corrosion Catawba 1 5/11/2003
93 Exchanger Heat exchanger CSS - containment spray Fouling Corrosion Catawba 1 10/9/2003
22 Exchanger Heat exchanger EW - Essential cooling water Fouling Inorganic fouling Palo Verde 2 12/22/2006
155 Exchanger Heat exchanger SWS - service water system Loss of material NA Crystal River 3 10/4/2001
45 Exchanger Heat exchanger / Soft 
iron gasket 
RHRSW - residual heat 
removal service water 
Loss of material Corrosion Browns Ferry 2 4/16/2005
179 Exchanger Inlet-sie tubesheet RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Fouling Corrosion at nearby pipe D.C. Cook 1 2/15/2001
77 Exchanger Nozzle weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Catawba 2 9/16/2004
57 Exchanger Piping CCW - component cooling 
water 
Disintegration Unknown South Texas 2 7/11/2005
53 Exchanger Piping weld Condenser and condensate 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Turkey Point 4 12/25/2004
54 Exchanger Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Palisades 9/1/2005
63 Exchanger Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Wolf Creek 1 4/15/2005
167 Exchanger Radiator cooling fin EDG - emergency diesel 
generator 
Excessive 
deformation 
Corrosion Saint Lucie 1 5/22/2001
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138 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
CCW - component cooling 
water 
Cracking SCC Kewaunee 5/5/2002
52 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
EDG - emergency diesel 
generator 
Cracking Vibration River Bend 1 9/9/2005
49 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC Diablo Canyon 1 11/11/2005
82 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Diablo Canyon 1 4/8/2004
40 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking SCC Diablo Canyon 2 5/3/2006
119 Exchanger Steam deflector plate RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Broken Fatigue Duane Arnold 2/1/2003
157 Exchanger Steam generator -
nozzle to vessel weld 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Catawba 2 9/19/2001
126 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking NA Oconee 2 10/31/2002
202 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODIGA/ODSCC Kewaunee 5/15/2000
226 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC Comanche Peak 1 10/4/1999
117 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC Comanche Peak 1 10/6/2002
222 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC South Texas 2 10/24/1999
173 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC South Texas 2 3/19/2001
191 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC & PWSCC Diablo Canyon 1 10/28/2000
120 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC & PWSCC Diablo Canyon 2 2/13/2003
121 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC & PWSCC Diablo Canyon 2 2/13/2003
176 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC / PWSCC Comanche Peak 1 4/2/2001
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217 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking ODSCC / PWSCC Farley 2 11/1/1999
185 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Indian Point 2 2/15/2000
205 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Indian Point 2 3/23/2000
180 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Indian Point 2 3/23/2000
142 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking at tube 
support plate 
ODSCC Diablo Canyon 1 5/19/2002
131 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Defective NA Callaway 11/5/2002
208 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Degradation IGA/SCC Turkey Point 3 3/11/2000
210 Exchanger Steam generator -
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Rupture PWSCC Indian Point 2 2/15/2000
8 Exchanger Tube plug AR - Condenser air removal Failure Corrosion / Galvanic 
interaction 
Palo Verde 2 10/6/2007
216 Filter Charcoal Control room makeup and 
cleanup filtration 
Degradation Aging/end of life South Texas 1 8/12/1999
190 Filter Charcoal ECF - emergency 
containment filter 
Failure Aging/end of life Turkey Point 4 10/5/2000
223 Filter Charcoal SBGT - standby gas 
treatment 
Degradation NA FitzPatrick 10/14/1999
225 Filter Damper CR - control room Failure Gradual loosening of a 
set screw 
Three Mile Island 1 3/10/1999
43 Filter Damper Emergency exhaust system Failure Ice load Callaway 3/10/2006
214 Filter Nuts holding in 
Charcoal tray 
ECCS Pump room exhaust 
filtration 
Loosening NA Calvert Cliffs 1 1/28/2000
98 Filter Screens CW/ESW - Circulating water 
and ESW 
Failure Corrosion D.C. Cook 1 4/24/2003
165 Filter Screens SWS - service water system Failure Organisms - fish Point Beach 2 6/27/2001
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36 Filter Sealant (RTV) CREFS - Control room 
emergency filtration 
Failure Aging/degraded Point Beach 1 5/30/2006
161 Filter Strainer basket ESW - essential service 
water 
Failure NA D.C. Cook 1 8/29/2001
160 Filter Strainer basket ESW - essential service 
water 
Failure NA D.C. Cook 2 8/29/2001
106 Filter TWS - traveling water 
screen 
CW/ESW - Circulating water 
and ESW 
Failure Corrosion D.C. Cook 1 4/24/2003
164 Other Flood panel NA Deterioration NA Prairie Island 1 7/10/2001
114 Other Gypsum board 
assembly 
Fire barrier penetration Surface cracking Aging/degraded/vibratio
n 
Monticello 3/13/2003
125 Other Static line hanger 345 KV transmission line Failure Mechanical wear Palisades 12/1/2002
34 Piping system Cooling coil SWS - service water system Cracking Erosion Duane Arnold 6/30/2006
163 Piping system Cooling coil SWS - service water system Loss of material Flow induced erosion Vermont Yankee 9/25/2001
158 Piping system Drain trap outlet plug HPCI - high pressure coolant 
injection 
Failure FAC - Flow Accelerated 
Corrosion 
Duane Arnold 9/2/2001
30 Piping system Elbow HPCI/RCIC Cracking Erosion Peach Bottom 2 10/7/2006
211 Piping system Elbow RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Thermal fatigue Oconee 1 2/16/2000
33 Piping system Fitting EDG - emergency diesel 
generator 
Cracking Fatigue Kewaunee 8/17/2006
14 Piping system Fitting EHC - electro hydraulic 
control system 
Cracking Mechanical loads Browns Ferry 1 5/24/2007
197 Piping system Fitting EHC - electro hydraulic 
control system 
Leak NA FitzPatrick 8/27/2000
26 Piping system Fitting HVAC - Heating, ventilation 
and air conditioning 
Loosening Vibration Dresden 2 11/8/2006
86 Piping system Fitting RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Oconee 1 1/8/2004
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193 Piping system Fitting RR - reactor recirculation Cracking Fatigue Dresden 3 3/21/1999
13 Piping system Hose RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking IGSCC Clinton 6/18/2007
78 Piping system Nozzle CCW - component cooling 
water 
Cracking Fatigue Diablo Canyon 1 7/21/2004
70 Piping system Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Calvert Cliffs 2 2/26/2005
224 Piping system Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 1 10/2/1999
172 Piping system Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 1 3/31/2001
109 Piping system Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 3 3/29/2003
169 Piping system Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Saint Lucie 1 4/14/2001
91 Piping system Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Waterford 3 10/24/2003
5 Piping system nozzle-to-elbow 
dissimilar metal butt 
weld 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Loss of material PWSCC Davis-Besse 1/4/2008
39 Piping system Nozzle-to-elbow weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Davis-Besse 3/18/2006
181 Piping system Nozzle-to-pipe weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Summer 10/12/2000
149 Piping system Pipe-to-elbow weld SWS - service water system Loss of material Erosion Indian Point 2 10/29/2001
20 Piping system Piping Auxiliary steam piping 
system 
Plugging Corrosion Quad Cities 2 2/28/2007
32 Piping system Piping Condenser and condensate 
system 
Broken Fatigue Davis-Besse 9/6/2006
177 Piping system Piping EDG - emergency diesel
generator 
Cracking Fatigue Grand Gulf 1 2/19/2001
67 Piping system Piping ESW - essential service 
water 
Wall thinning Under-deposit corrosion 
and Microbiologically 
Callaway 3/26/2005
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influenced corrosion 
(MIC) 
107 Piping system Piping HPCI - high pressure coolant 
injection 
Cracking Mechanical loads Duane Arnold 4/20/2003
7 Piping system Piping HPCI - high pressure coolant 
injection 
Leaking Corrosion Browns Ferry 3 11/30/2007
19 Piping system Piping HPCI - high pressure coolant 
injection 
Wall thinning FAC - Flow Accelerated 
Corrosion 
Dresden 3 3/2/2007
187 Piping system Piping Main generator hydrogen 
cooling 
Cracking Fatigue Arkansas Nuclear 1 1/5/2001
204 Piping system Piping Moisture separator reheater Rupture FAC - Flow Accelerated 
Corrosion 
Callaway 8/11/1999
194 Piping system Piping RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Broken Fatigue Columbia Generating 
Station 
9/18/2000
139 Piping system Piping RHR - residual heat removal Cracking TGSCC - chemical 
attack 
Surry 2 4/13/2002
116 Piping system Piping SWS - service water system Fouling, pitting, 
rusting 
Corrosion Davis-Besse 3/8/2002
2 Piping system Piping UHS - ultimate heat sink Wall thinning/Failure General and pitting 
corrosion 
Byron 1 10/19/2007
3 Piping system Piping UHS - ultimate heat sink Wall thinning/Failure General and pitting 
corrosion 
Byron 2 10/19/2007
200 Piping system Piping weld CCSW - containment cooling 
service water 
Leak NA Dresden 2 6/28/2000
133 Piping system Piping weld ECCS - emergency core 
cooling system 
Cracking Fatigue Millstone 2 8/3/2002
198 Piping system Piping weld EHC - electro hydraulic 
control system 
Leak NA FitzPatrick 8/27/2000
129 Piping system Piping weld HPI - high pressure injection Cracking Fatigue w/ initiating 
defects 
Arkansas Nuclear 1 10/5/2002
134 Piping system Piping weld RCP - reactor coolant pump Cracking Fatigue Calvert Cliffs 1 7/24/2002
75 Piping system Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Hope Creek 1 10/10/2004
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85 Piping system Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Palo Verde 1 2/3/2004
71 Piping system Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Saint Lucie 2 2/10/2005
72 Piping system Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue South Texas 2 2/9/2005
81 Piping system Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Summer 3/30/2004
44 Piping system Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Vogtle 2 2/1/2006
88 Piping system Piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Wolf Creek 1 11/17/2003
58 Piping system Piping weld RHR SDC- RHR shutdown 
cooling 
Cracking Fatigue FitzPatrick 7/4/2005
127 Piping system Piping weld RR - reactor recirculation Cracking Fatigue Dresden 3 10/8/2002
152 Piping system Piping weld RR - reactor recirculation Cracking Fatigue Hope Creek 1 10/10/2001
66 Piping system Piping weld RS - Recirculation system Cracking Fatigue Hope Creek 1 3/27/2005
68 Piping system Piping weld RS - Recirculation system Cracking Fatigue Susquehanna 2 3/20/2005
83 Piping system Piping weld RS - Recirculation system Cracking IGSCC Quad Cities 2 3/9/2004
123 Piping system Piping weld RS - Recirculation system Cracking Vibration Dresden 3 12/7/2002
46 Piping system Piping weld SDCS - Shutdown cooling 
system 
Cracking Fatigue San Onofre 2 1/11/2006
220 Piping system Piping weld Steam Generator Channel 
Head Drain Isolation 
Cracking NA Point Beach 1 11/4/1999
137 Piping system Piping weld SWS - service water system Wall thinning Corrosion Indian Point 3 6/7/2002
11 Piping system Piping/Elbow HPCI - high pressure coolant 
injection 
Wall thinning/leaking Erosion Dresden 2 7/26/2007
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6 Piping system Reactor coolant pump 
seal weld 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking/leaking Fatigue Saint Lucie 2 12/21/2007
150 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Containment Broken Mechanical loads Vermont Yankee 10/25/2001
207 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Control room air conditioning 
chiller 
Leak Wear/deterioration Oconee 1 3/9/2000
201 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
EHC - electro hydraulic 
control system 
Cracking Corrosion fatigue Robinson 2 6/21/2000
104 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
EHC - electro hydraulic 
control system 
Cracking Fatigue River Bend 1 2/22/2003
9 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
EHC - electro hydraulic 
control system 
Cracking/leaking Mechanical wear Browns Ferry 1 9/3/2007
206 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Electric board room air 
conditioning unit 
Broken Aging & fatigue Watts Bar 1 1/2/1999
219 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Extraction Steam System 
Moisture Separator 
Reheater Drain Tank 
Failure Wear FitzPatrick 11/5/1999
111 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
PCIS - primary containment 
isolation system 
Cracking Fatigue Peach Bottom 2 4/12/2003
65 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Loss of material TGSCC Salem 2 4/4/2005
146 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
RSS - recirculation spray 
system 
Fouling Corrosion Beaver Valley 2 1/11/2002
12 Piping system Snubber EDG - emergency diesel 
generator 
Cracking Temperature - heat 
treatment 
Palisades 2/22/2007
18 Piping system Socket weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Hatch 2 3/9/2007
10 Piping system Socket weld fitting RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking/leaking Fatigue (high cycle) Saint Lucie 2 8/18/2007
209 Piping system Suction line weld Charging pump Cracking NA Waterford 3 3/6/2000
122 Piping system Support HPCI - high pressure coolant 
injection 
Failure Hydrodynamic transient 
/ water hammer 
Dresden 3 7/5/2001
186 Piping system Support Main generator hydrogen 
cooling 
Failure Vibration Arkansas Nuclear 1 1/5/2001
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124 Piping system Thermal sleeve HPI - high pressure injection Cracking Fatigue Davis-Besse 11/29/2002
76 Piping system Underground piping AFW - auxiliary feedwater Wall thinning Galvanic corrosion Surry 2 5/21/2004
35 Piping system Valve-piping weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Nine Mile Point 1 6/11/2006
212 Piping system Weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Arkansas Nuclear 1 2/15/2000
189 RPV CRD - housing RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking TGSCC Palisades 11/2/1999
80 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Point Beach 1 5/6/2004
174 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Arkansas Nuclear 1 3/24/2001
128 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Arkansas Nuclear 1 10/7/2002
79 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Arkansas Nuclear 1 4/30/2004
156 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Crystal River 3 10/1/2001
143 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Davis-Besse 2/27/2002
183 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 1 12/4/2000
99 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 1 9/23/2003
168 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 2 4/28/2001
130 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 2 10/15/2002
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59 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 3 2/18/2001
175 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 3 2/18/2001
148 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 3 11/12/2001
112 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 3 5/2/2003
74 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palisades 10/16/2004
153 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Three Mile Island 1 10/12/2001
145 RPV CRDM - upper housing RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking TGSCC Palisades 6/21/2001
151 RPV CRDM penetration RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Surry 1 10/28/2001
170 RPV CRDM Seal housing PCS - primary coolant 
system 
Cracking TGSCC Palisades 3/31/2001
221 RPV CRDM Seal housing RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking TGSCC Palisades 10/16/1999
162 RPV Feedwater nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Fouling Inorganic fouling Vermont Yankee 8/21/2001
16 RPV Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Byron 2 4/9/2007
141 RPV Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Oconee 1 4/1/2002
105 RPV Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Saint Lucie 2 4/30/2003
100 RPV Nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking SCC South Texas 1 4/12/2003
21 RPV Nozzle weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking IGSCC Duane Arnold 2/18/2007
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218 RPV Nozzle-safe end weld RR - reactor recirculation Cracking IGSCC Duane Arnold 11/5/1999
95 RPV Nozzle-to-cap weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking IDSCC - Interdendritic 
SCC 
Pilgrim 1 10/1/2003
118 RPV Penetration RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC North Anna 1 3/4/2003
132 RPV Penetration RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC with initial hot-
short cracking 
North Anna 2 9/14/2002
60 RPV Piping RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 2 4/23/2005
31 RPV Piping RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 2 10/7/2006
41 RPV Piping weld CS - core spray Cracking IGSCC Brunswick 1 3/21/2006
42 RPV Sleeve HPI - high pressure injection Cracking Fatigue Davis-Besse 11/29/2002
101 RPV Steam dryer RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Fatigue Quad Cities 2 6/12/2003
135 RPV Steam dryer RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Failure Fatigue Quad Cities 2 7/11/2002
154 RPV Thermocouple (T/C) 
nozzles 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Three Mile Island 1 10/12/2001
102 RPV Vent line RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking Corrosion and fatigue Quad Cities 1 5/20/2003
171 Structural steel Bolt EFW - emergency feedwater Loosening Vibration Three Mile Island 1 2/1/2001
159 Structural steel Door Containment Failure NA D.C. Cook 2 1/23/2001
184 Structural steel Door Fire protecton Failure Corrosion and dirt 
buildup 
Kewaunee 1/18/2001
166 Structural steel Door Turbine Driven Auxiliary 
Feedwater Pump enclosuer 
door 
Degraded closure 
mechanism 
NA Millstone 2 6/12/2001
182 Structural steel Pump hold-down beam RS - Recirculation system Failure IGSCC Quad Cities 1 1/9/2002
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178 Structural steel Screw RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Failure PWSCC Summer 4/13/1999
196 Structural steel Weld CREACUS - control room 
emergency cleanup 
Cracking NA San Onofre 2 9/1/2000
17 Tank Filter tanks and internal 
components 
SWS - service water system Cracking Corrosion Kewaunee 5/30/2006
147 Tank Floating cover CST - condensate storage 
tank 
Deterioration Wear accelerated by 
Nitrogen 
Callaway 12/3/2001
61 Tank Piping weld ECCS - emergency core 
cooling system 
Cracking SCC - Chemical attack Salem 1 4/19/2005
28 Tank SLC tank SLC - standby liquid control Cracking SCC - Chemical attack Quad Cities 1 10/12/2006
1 Tank Tank shell - sensor 
connection 
SLC - standby liquid control Cracking TGSCC Dresden 2 1/18/2007
15 Vessel Nozzle weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking IDSCC - Interdendritic 
SCC 
Pilgrim 1 4/26/2007
29 Vessel Nozzle-safe end weld RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Wolf Creek 1 10/11/2006
90 Vessel Pressurizer RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Three Mile Island 1 11/4/2003
97 Vessel Pressurizer - filters and 
screens 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Failure Corrosion Davis-Besse 4/10/1998
144 Vessel Pressurizer - heater 
sleeve penetrations 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Millstone 2 2/19/2002
199 Vessel Pressurizer heater 
sleeves 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Arkansas Nuclear 2 7/30/2000
192 Vessel Pressurizer heater 
sleeves 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 2 10/4/2000
188 Vessel Pressurizer heater 
sleeves 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Waterford 3 10/17/2000
96 Vessel Pressurizer nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Crystal River 3 10/4/2003
38 Vessel Pressurizer nozzle RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC San Onofre 3 3/29/2006
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94 Vessel Pressurizer sleeves RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Millstone 2 10/11/2003
92 Vessel Pressurizer sleeves RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Waterford 3 10/26/2003
4 Vessel Resistance 
Temperature Detector 
RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Leaking Mechanical joints not 
intact 
Turkey Point 3 9/8/2007
37 Vessel Sleeve RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking IGSCC Braidwood 1 4/25/2006
140 Vessel Sleeve RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Arkansas Nuclear 2 4/15/2002
69 Vessel Sleeve RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Arkansas Nuclear 2 3/9/2005
64 Vessel Sleeve RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Millstone 2 4/10/2005
110 Vessel Sleeve RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 3 3/29/2003
84 Vessel Sleeve RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 3 2/29/2004
62 Vessel Sleeve RCS - reactor coolant 
system 
Cracking PWSCC Waterford 3 4/19/2005
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Table 3-3  Degradation Occurrence Records (Secondary Information) 
ID COMPONENT SUBCOMPONENT HOW 
IDENTIFIED 
EVALUATION 
METHOD 
REPAIR METHOD DOCKET REF ML NUMBER
1 Tank Tank shell - sensor 
connection 
Maitenance Visual Replacement 5000237 LER 07-001-01 ML080910066
2 Piping system Piping Cleaning of 
corrosion 
Visual Replacement 5000454 LER 07-002-01 ML080660544
3 Piping system Piping Cleaning of 
corrosion 
Visual Replacement 5000455 LER 07-002-01 ML080660544
4 Vessel Resistance 
Temperature Detector 
Refueling 
outage 
Visual Replacement 5000250 LER 07-004-01 ML080720677
5 Piping system nozzle-to-elbow 
dissimilar metal butt 
weld 
Refueling 
outage 
Visual Repair 5000346 LER 08-001-00 ML080640204
6 Piping system Reactor coolant pump 
seal weld 
Maintenance Visual / Liquid 
penetrant 
Replacement of the seal package 5000389 LER 07-002-00 ML080580311
7 Piping system Piping Maintenance/Vis
ual 
Visual Replacement 5000296 LER 07-004-00 ML080290046
8 Exchanger Tube plug Soidium level 
high in steam 
generator 
N/A Replaced/ Will determine for 
alternative (material) tube plug 
5000529 LER 07-003-00 ML073480125
9 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Video Monitoring Visual Replacement of fretted EHC tubing 
and installed a wood isolation block 
5000259 LER 07-008-00 ML073090091
10 Piping system Socket weld fitting Unidentified 
leakage/walk 
down 
Visual Repalce seal injection piping 5000389 LER 07-001-00 ML072970529
11 Piping system Piping/Elbow Visual Visual Replacement 5000237 LER 07-003-00 ML072750663
12 Piping system Snubber Test visual replacement 5000255 LER 07-006-00 ML072500072
13 Piping system Hose Alarms Visual Replacement 5000461 LER 07-003-00 ML072350078
14 Piping system Fitting Alarms 
indicating an 
EHC leak 
Visual Replacement of tube 5000259 LER 07-002-00 ML072040345
15 Vessel Nozzle weld Repair Ultra-sonic testing A full structural weld overlay 5000293 LER 07-003-00 ML071840196
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16 RPV Nozzle Inspection at 
refuel outage 
Liquid penetrant 
test (PT) 
examination 
Repair 5000455 LER 07-001-00 ML071590211
17 Tank Filter tanks and internal 
components 
N.A. Inspection Replaced 5000305 LER 06-005-00 ML071640378
18 Piping system Socket weld Leaking Visual Replaced 5000366 LER 07-004-00 ML071230404
19 Piping system Piping N/A Visual Replacement 5000249 LER 07-001-00 ML071280263
20 Piping system Piping Pressure 
controller failed 
Troubleshooting Debris removed 5000265 LER 07-001-00 ML071280295
21 RPV Nozzle weld scheduled 
examination 
UT - Ultrasonic 
test 
overlay flawed weld with material 
resistant to SCC 
5000331 LER 07-003-00 ML071150319
22 Exchanger Heat exchanger NRC Final 
significance 
determination 
letter 
N.A. Cleaned 5000529 LER 06-006-01 ML070950342
23 Containment CAC cooling coil / 
fitting 
leaking visual Plugging tubes to isolate the H-
bend flaw 
5000255 LER 07-002-00 ML070871046
24 Exchanger Exchanger Leaking N.A. Replacement 5000317 LER 07-001-00 ML070810509
25 Containment CAC cooling coil / 
fitting 
Leaking Visual plugging tubes to isolate the H-bend 
flaw 
5000255 LER 06-008-00 ML070370354
26 Piping system Fitting Failed to 
maintain control 
room 
temperature 
Visual Repaired 5000237 LER 2006-005-
00 
ML070170356
27 Containment CAC cooling coil / 
fitting 
Leaking Visual Installing blanks on the inlet and 
outlet flanges of the cooling coil 
5000255 LER 06-006-00 ML063610189
28 Tank SLC tank Leaking Visual Remove source of chemical 5000254 LER 06-004-00 ML063530355
29 Vessel Nozzle-safe end weld In-service 
examination 
NA Weld overlay 5000482 LER 06-003-00 ML063490047
30 Piping system Elbow Leaking Visual Replacement 5000277 LER 06-003-00 ML063420059
50 
ID COMPONENT SUBCOMPONENT HOW 
IDENTIFIED 
EVALUATION 
METHOD 
REPAIR METHOD DOCKET REF ML NUMBER
31 RPV Piping In-service 
examination 
NA Removed and repaired by welding 5000529 LER 06-005-00 ML063450132
32 Piping system Piping air in-leakage Boroscope Plugged and capped 5000346 LER 06-003-00 ML063120173
33 Piping system Fitting Leaking NA Repaired 5000305 LER 06-009-01 ML071140152
34 Piping system Cooling coil Leaking Visual Repair 5000331 LER 06-003-00 ML062490486
35 Piping system Valve-piping weld Leaking Visual NA 5000220 LER 06-001-00 ML062290262
36 Filter Sealant (RTV) Scheduled test Penetration and 
system bypass test
Applying new RTV over degraded 
RTV 
5000266 LER 06-001-00 ML062200498
37 Vessel Sleeve Leaking Failure analysis 
throught test 
Plug and seal weld 5000456 LER 06-001-01 ML062000190
38 Vessel Pressurizer nozzle Inspection Visual Repaired with Inconel 690 material 5000362 LER 06-003-00 ML061500428
39 Piping system Nozzle-to-elbow weld Planed 
examination 
Ultrasonic exam A full structural weld overlay 5000346 LER 06-002-00 ML061440286
40 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Refueling Eddy current 
testing 
Removed from service by plugging 5000323 LER 06-002-00 ML061450136
41 RPV Piping weld Visual 
examination 
during refuel 
Ultrasonic test Structurally replace the weld with a 
clamp 
5000325 LER 06-002-00 ML061530280
42 RPV Sleeve Examingation 
with reactor 
defueled 
Borescope 
examination 
Replaced 5000346 LER 02-009-02 ML061420150
43 Filter Damper Post 
maintenance 
testing 
N.A. Repair 5000483 LER 06-003-00 ML061360329
44 Piping system Piping weld Increase in 
radioactivity 
Robotic camera Replaced 5000425 LER 06-001-00 ML060960448
45 Exchanger Heat exchanger / Soft 
iron gasket 
Leaking N.A. Iolated first and planned to repair 5000260 LER 05-004-01 ML060930599
46 Piping system Piping weld Leaking Laboratory 
analysis 
Replacement 5000361 LER 06-001-00 ML060680086
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47 Containment Torus Leaking Lab analysis and 
fracture mechanics 
eval 
ASME code repair of the Torus 
crack 
5000333 LER 05-003-01 ML053630257
48 Exchanger CAC cooling coil Leaking NA Plugging 5000255 LER 05-006-00 ML053430217
49 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Refueling Eddy current 
testing 
Removed from service by plugging 5000275 LER 05-001-00 ML053410394
50 Exchanger Condensor / Small bore 
piping & tubing 
Leaking NA Remove the slop drain lines from 
the condenser 
5000298 LER 05-004-00 ML053260429
51 Exchanger Door Testing during 
shutdown 
NA Cleaned and lubricated 5000369 LER 05-004-00 ML053410422
52 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
EDG inoperable NA Reparied using a new fitting 5000458 LER 05-003-00 ML053180172
53 Exchanger Piping weld NA NA Plugged 5000251 LER 04-004-01 ML053180169
54 Exchanger Piping weld Hydrogen leak NA Griding out the socket weld and re-
welding 
5000255 LER 05-005-00 ML053050420
55 Containment Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Drywell floor 
draing leakage 
Visual Removed 5000354 LER 05-003-01 ML052850369
56 Containment Test cap In-service test NA Installed a new cap 5000219 LER 05-003-00 ML052630373
57 Exchanger Piping NA NA Repaired 5000499 LER 05-004-00 ML052630031
58 Piping system Piping weld Leaking Visual Repairment and Installation of a 
shim plate 
5000333 LER 05-004-00 ML052510052
59 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Visual inspection Non-destrictive 
testing (Eddy 
current, ultrasonic, 
dye penetrant) 
Remove all crack and weld repair 5000287 LER 01-001-01 ML052380420
60 RPV Piping Preplanned in-
service 
exmamination 
Eddy current 
testing 
Machining 5000529 LER 05-001-00 ML051880073
61 Tank Piping weld Leaking NA Replaced 5000272 LER 05-002-00 ML051790154
62 Vessel Sleeve Leaking Visual inspection 
during refueling 
Repalcement 5000382 LER 05-001-00 ML051710355
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63 Exchanger Piping weld leaking Visual Machining and seal weld 5000482 LER 05-002-00 ML051720389
64 Vessel Sleeve leaking In-service visual 
inspection during 
refueling 
Encapsulates by a mechanical 
nozzle seal assembly 
5000336 LER 05-002-00 ML051650242
65 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Leaking Visual Replaced 5000311 LER 05-002-00 ML051650342
66 Piping system Piping weld Leaking Visual Affected pipe shortened to avoid 
resonance 
5000354 LER 05-002-00 ML051540027
67 Piping system Piping Leaking Ultrasonic Replaced 5000483 LER 05-002-00 ML051460343
68 Piping system Piping weld Leakage test Leakage test Removed and weld a plug 5000388 LER 05-001-00 ML051440352
69 Vessel Sleeve Visual inspection NDE Applied mechanical nozzle seal 
assemblies 
5000368 LER 05-001-00 ML051310236
70 Piping system Nozzle UT inspection UT inspection Overlay weld 5000318 LER 05-001-00 ML051180015
71 Piping system Piping weld Walkdown Walkdown Repaired and added tie-back 
support 
5000389 LER 05-001-00 ML051050350
72 Piping system Piping weld Leakage NA Cutting off and plugging 5000499 LER 1361-972-
72 
ML050980111
73 Exchanger Elbow Leaking NA NA 5000306 LER 04-001-01 ML050890314
74 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Leaking Ultrasonic/dye 
penetrant 
Half-nozzle removed and replaced 5000255 LER 04-002-00 ML043560278
75 Piping system Piping weld Steam leak NA Repaired 5000354 LER 04-010-00 ML043560178
76 Piping system Underground piping Leaking NA Rerouted 5000281 LER 04-001-01 ML043280416
77 Exchanger Nozzle weld Exam during 
refueling 
Visual Machining and welding in a new 
plug 
5000414 LER 04-001-00 ML043280501
78 Piping system Nozzle Leaking NA Replacement 5000275 LER 04-002-00 ML042790449
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79 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Inspection 
during refueling 
outage 
Ultrasonic Inside diameter temper bead half-
nozzle weld 
5000313 LER 04-002-00 ML041830363
80 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
NDE as required 
by the First 
Revised NRC 
Order 
Ultrasonic Weld 5000266 LER 04-001-00 ML050870170
81 Piping system Piping weld Leaking NA Installed new nozzle 5000395 LER 04-001-00 ML042740125
82 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Eddy current 
testing during no 
mode 
Eddy current 
testing 
Plugged 5000275 LER 04-001-00 ML041400030
83 Piping system Piping weld Scheduled 
inservice 
inspection 
Ultrasonic Overlay weld 5000265 LER 04-002-00 ML041390526
84 Vessel Sleeve Boric acid 
walkdown 
Visual Mechanical nozzle seal assembly 
(MNSA) 
5000530 LER 04-001-00 ML041270485
85 Piping system Piping weld NA NA Overlay weld 5000528 LER 04-001-00 ML041040027
86 Piping system Fitting Leaking NA New fitting installed 5000269 LER 04-001-00 ML040760839
87 Exchanger Condenser (including 
ice) & supports 
Air in-leakage NA Installed penetration weld 5000331 LER 03-006-00 ML040340345
88 Piping system Piping weld Leaking NA Shortened and welded 5000482 LER 03-004-00 ML040210791
89 Anchorage Nut NA Visual Replacement 5000321 LER 03-003-00 ML040210327
90 Vessel Pressurizer Inspection at 
refueling outage 
visual Replaced 5000289 LER 03-003-00 ML033580625
91 Piping system Nozzle Leakage found 
during refueling 
outage 
NA Welded repair 5000382 LER 03-003-00 ML033560242
92 Vessel Pressurizer sleeves Leakage found 
during refueling 
outage 
NA Mechanical nozzle seal assemblies 5000382 LER 03-003-00 ML033560242
93 Exchanger Heat exchanger Inspection NA To be replaced at next refueling 
outage 
5000413 LER 03-006-00 ML033500337
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94 Vessel Pressurizer sleeves Inspection Visual Mechanical nozzle seal assemblies 5000336 LER 03-004-00 ML033460378
95 RPV Nozzle-to-cap weld Planned 
inspection 
Visual Automated structural weld overlay 5000293 LER 03-006-00 ML033360733
96 Vessel Pressurizer nozzle Inspection Visual "Halfnozzle" technique 5000302 LER 03-003-00 ML033320052
97 Vessel Pressurizer - filters and 
screens 
NA NA Replaced 5000346 LER 98-002-01 ML033170198
98 Filter Screens Fish impinging NA Replaced 5000315 LER 03-003-01 ML033180115
99 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Scheduled 
inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual Reactor vessel head retired and 
replaced 
5000269 LER 03-002-00 ML033090486
100 RPV Nozzle Leaking Ultrosonic Half-nozzles and weld 5000498 LER 03-003-01 ML032950483
101 RPV Steam dryer Inspection NA Repair (no detail) 5000265 LER 03-004-00 ML032461172
102 RPV Vent line Leaking Ultrasonic Replaced 5000254 LER 03-001-00 ML032120510
103 Exchanger Heat exchanger NA NA Chemically cleaned 5000413 LER 03-004-00 ML031970061
104 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Leaking NA Modified to increase tubing wall 
thickness 
5000458 LER 03-001-01 ML031820539
105 RPV Nozzle Inspection at 
refuleling outage
Ultrasonic Removed lower portion and 
relocated boundary weld 
5000389 LER 03-002-00 ML031900041
106 Filter TWS - traveling water 
screen 
Main feed pump 
condenser 
fouling by fish 
NA Replaced with stainless steel 
panels 
5000315 LER 03-003-00 ML031820557
107 Piping system Piping Leaking Visual Replaced 5000331 LER 03-004-00 ML031760687
108 Exchanger Condensor / piping Air in-leakage NA Replaced during refueling outage 5000389 LER 03-001-00 ML031550064
109 Piping system Nozzle Leakage found 
during refueling 
outage 
NA Replaced 5000530 LER 03-002-00 ML031540552
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110 Vessel Sleeve Leakage found 
during refueling 
outage 
NA Replaced 5000530 LER 03-002-
00A 
ML031540552
111 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
NA NA Replaced and added additional 
supports 
5000277 LER 03-001-00 ML031490372
112 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual Reactor vessel head retired 5000287 LER 03-001-00 ML031490044
113 Exchanger Condensor / tubing Leaking NA Replaced 5000528 LER 03-002-00 ML031400058
114 Other Gypsum board 
assembly 
Waldown Visual Cosmetically repaired 5000263 LER 03-001-00 ML031400643
115 Exchanger CAC components NA NA Refurbishment/replacement 5000346 LER 02-008-01 ML031330192
116 Piping system Piping NA NA Refurbishment/replacement 5000346 LER 02-008-
01A 
ML031330192
117 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Scheduled 
surveillance at 
refueling outage 
Eddy current ply 
point testing data 
Plugging or sleeving 5000445 LER 02-002-01 ML031210481
118 RPV Penetration Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual Reactor head replaced 5000338 LER 03-001-00 ML031200697
119 Exchanger Steam deflector plate Conductivity 
alarm 
NA Broken deflector plate replaced and 
repaired valve and plugged tubes 
5000331 LER 03-001-00 ML030920458
120 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Inspection Eddy current Plugging 5000323 LER 03-001-00 ML030780463
121 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Inspection Eddy current Plugging 5000323 LER 03-001-00 ML030780463
122 Piping system Support NA NA Repaired 5000249 LER 02-005-01 ML030590240
123 Piping system Piping weld Leaking NA Minimized welding residual stress 
and eleminated mechanically 
induced stress 
5000249 LER 02-006-00 ML030430376
124 Piping system Thermal sleeve Examination 
with reactor 
defueled 
Borescope Replaced 5000346 LER 02-009-00 ML030370013
125 Other Static line hanger NA NA Replaced 5000255 LER 02-002-00 ML030300342
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126 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
In-situ pressure 
testing 
In-situ pressure 
testing 
Plugging 5000270 LER 02-003-00 ML023600191
127 Piping system Piping weld Leaking NA Replaced 5000249 LER 02-003-00 ML023520043
128 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual Partially removed and applied new
weld 
5000313 LER 02-003-00 ML023400549
129 Piping system Piping weld Inspection at 
refueling outage 
NA Replaced with an enhanced 
configuration 
5000313 LER 02-004-00 ML023400485
130 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Required 
inspection per 
NRC Bulletin 
2001-01 
Visual Repair (no detail) 5000270 LER 02-002-00 ML023470024
131 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Inspection at 
refueling outage 
NA Plugged 5000483 LER 2002-011-
00 
ML023310226
132 RPV Penetration Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual + NDE Replacement of RPV head 5000339 LER 02-001-00 ML023180480
133 Piping system Piping weld Increasing 
radiation trend 
Visual Affected welds and elbows replaced 5000336 LER 02-004-00 ML022840184
134 Piping system Piping weld Low level alarm NA NA 5000317 LER 02-003-00 ML022630111
135 RPV Steam dryer NA NA Replaced with thicker plate 5000265 LER 02-003-00 ML022610332
136 Concrete Floor Leaking NA Seal 5000397 LER 02-003-00 ML022270273
137 Piping system Piping weld Leaking RT - Radiographic 
testing 
Grinding out degraded area and 
weld buildup 
5000286 LER 02-001-00 ML022000155
138 Exchanger Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Leaking Laboratory 
analysis 
Installed sleeves 5000305 LER 02-002-00 ML021920465
139 Piping system Piping Leaking Scanning electron 
microscope 
Replaced 5000281 LER 02-001-00 ML021710180
140 Vessel Sleeve Leaking Visual Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly 5000368 LER 02-001-00 ML021680047
141 RPV Nozzle Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Ultrasonic NA 5000269 LER 02-003-00 ML021570019
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142 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Eddy current 
testing 
Eddy current 
testing 
Plugged 5000275 LER 02-002-00 ML021560548
143 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Ultrosonic exam Ultrosonic exam NA 5000346 LER 02-002-00 ML021220082
144 Vessel Pressurizer - heater 
sleeve penetrations 
Leaking Visual Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly 5000336 LER 02-001-00 ML021210508
145 RPV CRDM - upper housing Leaking NDE Replaced 5000255 LER 01-004-01 ML020870353
146 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Degraded flow NA Cleaned 5000412 LER 02-001-00 ML020710575
147 Tank Floating cover Failure of motor 
driven auxiliary 
feedwater pump 
NA CST cover removed 5000483 LER 02-001-01 ML020720446
148 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Visual inspection 
at refueling 
outage 
Ultrasonic Repaired 5000287 LER 01-003-00 ML020350290
149 Piping system Pipe-to-elbow weld Leaking Visual Replacement of elbow 5000247 LER 01-006-00 ML020090594
150 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Pump noise Visual Replaced 5000271 LER 01-005-00 ML020240466
151 RPV CRDM penetration Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual Repaired 5000280 LER 01-003-00 ML020520345
152 Piping system Piping weld Leaking Radiographic 
examination 
Weld removed and replaced 5000354 LER 01-006-00 ML020220237
153 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Leaking Liquid penetration 
test 
Machined and applied new weld 5000289 LER 01-002-00 ML020160399
154 RPV Thermocouple (T/C) 
nozzles 
Leaking Liquid penetration 
test 
Plugged 5000289 LER 01-002-
00A 
ML020160399
155 Exchanger Heat exchanger Elevated 
radionuclide 
activity in SW 
NA Isolated using plugs 5000302 LER 01-003-00 ML020430199
156 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Visual inspection Ultrasonic Ambient temperature temper bead 
repair technique 
5000302 LER 01-004-00 ML020160225
157 Exchanger Steam generator - 
nozzle to vessel weld 
Walk down at 
refueling outage 
Visual and 
penetrant test 
Removed old weld (Alloy 600) and 
applied new weld (Inconel 52/152) 
5000414 LER 803-831-
36 
ML020030237
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158 Piping system Drain trap outlet plug Steam leaking NA Replaced 5000331 LER 01-004-00 ML020310457
159 Structural steel Door Airlock door 
failed during 
removal of plant 
equipment 
Visual Repaired 5000316 LER 2001-002-
01 
ML020240312
160 Filter Strainer basket Surveillance test NA Replaced 5000316 LER 01-003-00 ML020220028
161 Filter Strainer basket Surveillance test NA Replaced 5000315 LER 01-003-00 ML020220028
162 RPV Feedwater nozzle Out of 
calibration 
NA NA 5000271 LER 01-004-00 ML013650369
163 Piping system Cooling coil Leaking NA Replacement 5000271 LER 20012009 ML070670447
164 Other Flood panel Preventive 
maintenance 
NA Repair 5000282 LER 01-003-00 ML012610162
165 Filter Screens Water level 
decreased 
NA NA 5000301 LER 01-002-00 ML012330129
166 Structural steel Door NA NA Weld buildup 5000336 LER 01-006-00 ML012320075
167 Exchanger Radiator cooling fin Leaking NA Replacement of radiator 5000335 LER 01-006-00 ML012050195
168 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Visual inspection 
at refueling 
outage 
Dye-penetrant test Machining and weld 5000270 LER 01-002-00 ML011830021
169 Piping system Nozzle Leaking Visual Replacement 5000335 LER 01-003-00 ML011700213
170 RPV CRDM Seal housing Inspection at 
refueling outage 
NA Installed new Inconel housing 5000255 LER 001-002-
00 
ML011560030
171 Structural steel Bolt Pump 
inoperable 
NA Tightened 5000289 LER 01-001-01 ML011500423
172 Piping system Nozzle Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Eddy current 
testing 
Cut and plug 5000528 LER 01-001-00 ML011500148
173 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Eddy current exam Plugging 5000499 LER 01-003-00 ML011420313
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174 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Visual inpsection 
at refueling 
outage 
Liquid penetrant 
exam 
Embedded flaw repair 5000313 LER 01-002-00 ML011350195
175 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Visual inspection 
at planned 
maintenance 
outage 
Eddy current 
examination, 
ultrasonic, dye 
penetrant 
Remove crack indications and weld 
repair 
5000287 LER 01-001-00 ML011140213
176 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Eddy current and 
point testing 
Plugged 5000445 LER 01-004-00 ML011100238
177 Piping system Piping Leaking NA Repaired 5000416 LER 01-001-00 ML011140218
178 Structural steel Screw Difficulty in full 
gripper 
engagement 
Ultrasonic, visual, 
and spring scale 
inspection 
Changed nozzles 5000395 LER 99-004-02 ML011090006
179 Exchanger Inlet-sie tubesheet Low condenser 
vacuum 
NA Removed debris 5000315 LER 001-001-
00 
ML011020251
180 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Primary to 
secondary leak 
Eddy current 
inspection 
Plugged or repaired 5000247 LER 00-003-01 ML010890367
181 Piping system Nozzle-to-pipe weld Leaking Dye 
penetrant/Ultrasoni
c 
Weld repair 5000395 LER 00-008-01 ML010790459
182 Structural steel Pump hold-down beam Jet pump failure NA Replaced 5000254 LER 02-001-00 ML020850677
183 RPV CRDM - control rod 
drive mechanism 
(nozzle) 
Boric acid 
deposit 
Video 
inspection/eddy 
current/dye 
penetrant/ultrasoni
c 
welded plug 5000269 LER 00-006-01 ML010710015
184 Structural steel Door Failed to close NA Lubricating and cycling 5000305 LER 01-001-00 ML010580336
185 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Primary to 
secondary leak 
NA NA 5000247 LER 00-001-01 ML010580294
186 Piping system Support Pipe leaking NA Repaired and reinforced 5000313 LER 00-001-00 ML010400162
187 Piping system Piping Pipe leaking Visual Repaired 5000313 LER 00-001-
00A 
ML010400162
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188 Vessel Pressurizer heater 
sleeves 
Leakage 
discovered at 
refueling outage 
NA Pluuged 5000382 LER 00-011-00 ML003770501
189 RPV CRD - housing Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual/dye 
penetrant/eddy 
current/ultrasonic 
Repaired 5000255 LER 99-004-01 ML003769646
190 Filter Charcoal Penetration test 
at refueling 
outage 
Penetration test Replaced 5000251 LER 00-003-00 ML003768557
191 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Eddy current 
testing 
Eddy current 
testing 
Plugged 5000275 LER 00-010-00 ML003768576
192 Vessel Pressurizer heater 
sleeves 
Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual Cut and weld a plug 5000529 LER 00-004-00 ML003768542
193 Piping system Fitting Leaking NA Replaced 5000249 LER 99-003-02 ML003765638
194 Piping system Piping Offgas 
condenser low-
level alarm 
NA Re-welded 5000397 LER 00-007-00 ML003762455
195 Exchanger ESW room cooler Degraded ESW 
flow 
Flow testing Clearwell cleaned and chemically 
treated 
5000483 LER 00-006-00 ML003760465
196 Structural steel Weld NA NA Repaired 5000361 LER 949-368-
62 
ML003756122
197 Piping system Fitting NA NA NA 5000333 LER 00-010-00 ML003756877
198 Piping system Piping weld NA NA NA 5000333 LER 00-010-
00A 
ML003756877
199 Vessel Pressurizer heater 
sleeves 
Inspection 
outage 
Eddy 
current/Ultrasonic 
Repaired for limited service life 5000368 LER 2000-001-
00 
ML003747697
200 Piping system Piping weld Test NA NA 5000237 LER 00-002-00 ML003738091
201 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Leaking NA Repaired and improved support 5000261 LER 2000-001-
00 
ML003735247
202 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
In-service 
inspection 
Eddy current Plugged or repaired 5000305 LER 920-388-
25 
ML003725181
203 Concrete Walls & floors Visual NA Repair 5000316 LER 00-003-00 ML051030057
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204 Piping system Piping Pipe rupture NA Replaced with Chromium-
Molybdenum piping 
5000483 LER 1999-003-
01 
ML003712775
205 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Leaking Eddy current Plugged or repaired 5000247 LER 00-03 ML003712955
206 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Chiller tripped NA Repaired 5000390 LER 81-20 ML003708293
207 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Leaking NA Fitting tightened 5000269 LER 50-26 ML003701577
208 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Eddy current Plugged 5000250 LER 2000-001-
00 
ML003705889
209 Piping system Suction line weld Leaking NA Repaired 5000382 LER 00-003-00 ML003703686
210 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Primary to 
secondary 
leaking 
NA Plugged 5000247 LER 00-001-00 ML020350573
211 Piping system Elbow Leaking Visual & laboratory 
examination 
Elbow replaced 5000269 LER 2000-001-
00 
ML003694353
212 Piping system Weld Leaking NDE & Laboratory 
analysis 
Weld pad buildup and fillet weld 5000313 LER 2000-003-
00 
ML003693846
213 Containment Liner Inspection Visual & magnetic 
particle exam 
Replacement of degraded seal 5000315 LER 98-011-03 ML003695085
214 Filter Nuts holding in 
Charcoal tray 
Surveillance test Visual Tightened 5000317 LER 410-495-
20 
ML003687837
215 Containment Liner Inspection NA Repair 5000315 LER 00-001-00 ML003687066
216 Filter Charcoal Sample analysis 
per surveillance 
requirement 
Laboratory 
analysis 
Replacement 5000498 LER 99-007-01 ML003674168
217 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Eddy current 
inspection 
Eddy current 
inspection 
Plugged 5000364 LER 99-002-00 ML993480199
218 RPV Nozzle-safe end weld Ultrasonic 
examination at 
refuelling outage
Ultrasonic NA 5000331 LER 99-00 ML993500158
219 Piping system Small bore piping & 
tubing 
Excessive water 
inventory in 
ESSMSRD tank 
NA Repaired 5000333 LER 99-012-00 ML993470148
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220 Piping system Piping weld Leaking Dye penetrant Ground out and re-welded 5000266 LER 1999-012-
00 
ML993420164
221 RPV CRDM Seal housing Inspection at 
refueling outage 
Visual & dye 
penetrant & eddy 
current exam 
Repaired 5000255 LER 99-00 ML993420206
222 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Inspection Eddy current plugged 5000499 LER 99-007-00 ML993140290
223 Filter Charcoal Surveillance test Tested by vendor Replaced 5000333 LER 99-009-00 ML993250125
224 Piping system Nozzle Walkdown at 
refueling outage 
Visual Cut off the existing nozzle and 
installed new nozzle 
5000528 LER 99-006-00 ML993140352
225 Filter Damper Negative 
pressure in CR 
Visual Temporary mechanical modification 
to secure the manual balancing 
damper 
5000289 LER 99-003-01 ML993140218
226 Exchanger Steam generator - 
tubing 
Eddy current 
testing 
Eddy current 
testing 
Plugged 5000445 LER 98-006-00 ML993080064
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Table 3-4  Abbreviation for Aging Mechanisms 
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION 
IGSCC Intergranular stress corrosion cracking 
IDSCC Interdendritic SCC 
HSC Hydrogen stress corrosion 
TGSCC Transgranular SCC 
SCC Stress corrosion cracking 
PWSCC Primary water SCC 
IGA Intergranular attack 
ODSCC Outer diameter SCC 
ODIGA Outer diameter IGA 
FAC Flow accelerated corrosion 
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Table 3-5  Number of DORs and NPP Units by PAAE for LER 1999-2007 
LER 1999-2007 
PAAE DORs NPP Units DORs/NPP Units 
23 2 2 1.000 
24 4 4 1.000 
25 3 3 1.000 
26 11 9 1.222 
27 10 9 1.111 
28 11 10 1.100 
29 10 8 1.250 
30 11 7 1.571 
31 21 15 1.400 
32 19 14 1.357 
33 30 20 1.500 
34 22 12 1.833 
35 18 15 1.200 
36 16 14 1.143 
37 10 10 1.000 
38 7 5 1.400 
39 6 5 1.200 
40 7 5 1.400 
41 5 4 1.250 
 
Table 3-6  Number of DORs and NPP Units by PAAE for LER 1985-1996 
LER 1985-1996 
PAAE DORs NPP Units DORs/NPP Units 
8 1 1 1.00 
12 3 3 1.00 
13 2 2 1.00 
14 5 4 1.25 
15 4 3 1.33 
16 11 10 1.10 
17 11 10 1.10 
18 12 9 1.33 
19 9 8 1.13 
20 11 11 1.00 
21 11 10 1.10 
22 13 10 1.30 
23 8 8 1.00 
24 22 15 1.47 
25 15 11 1.36 
26 10 9 1.11 
27 8 7 1.14 
28 6 6 1.00 
29 8 6 1.33 
30 1 1 1.00 
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Figure 3-1  A Sample LER in Text Format (Beginning Part) 
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Figure 3-2  A Sample LER in Text Format (Abstract Part) 
 
Figure 3-3  A Sample LER in Text Format (Cause Part) 
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Figure 3-4  A Sample LER in Text Format (Action Part) 
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Figure 3-5  A Sample LER in PDF Format (Abstract Part) 
69 
 
Figure 3-6  The Annotated LER Reader Graphical User Interface 
 
 
 
Figure 3-7  DOR Statistics in the LER Reader 
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Figure 3-8  An LER Related to Valve 
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Figure 3-9  An LER and its DOR (Saved) 
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Figure 3-10  An LER Required Careful Review 
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Figure 3-11  An LER Possibly Related to a Design Problem (Required Careful Review) 
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Figure 3-12  An LER Related to Human Error and Electric Parts 
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Figure 3-13  An LER with an Existing DOR 
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Figure 3-14  An LER with Two DORs 
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Figure 3-15   An LER Related to Human Error and Connectors 
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Figure 3-16  An LER Related to Concrete Degradation  
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Figure 3-17  Distribution of 104 Operating US NPPs in Four NRC Regions [NRC Website] 
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Figure 3-18  Distribution of SPC Degradation Occurrences over Component Category 
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Figure 3-19  Distribution Comparison of SPC Degradation Occurrences over Component 
 
 
 
Figure 3-20  Comparison of Normalized Distribution of SPC Degradation Occurrences over 
Component 
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Figure 3-21  Distribution Comparison of SPC Degradation Occurrences over Time 
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Figure 3-22  Number of Degradation Occurrences and NPP Units with Plant Age at Event 
 
 
Figure 3-23  Number of Degradation Occurrences and NPP Units with PAAE for Combined Data 
Series 
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Figure 3-24  Average Degradation Occurrences with Plant Age at Event  
 
Figure 3-25  Relation of Average DORs per Plant versus PAAE with Combined Data Series 
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Figure 3-26  Distribution Comparison of SPC Degradation Occurrences over Aging Effect (for 
Steel Component) 
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Figure 3-27  Distribution Comparison of SPC Degradation Occurrences over Aging Mechanism 
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Figure 3-28  Distribution Comparison of SPC Degradation Occurrences over Cracking Type 
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Figure 3-29  Distribution Comparison of SPC Degradation Occurrences over System 
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4 GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS AND LRAS 
In addition to recent LERs, selected generic communications and license renewal applications 
(LRAs) were also reviewed to identify the characteristics of the age-related degradation of 
structures and passive components (SPC).  Generic communications reviewed included Generic 
Letters (GL), Bulletins (BL), and Information Notices (IN) issued by the US NRC.  Since these 
documents may not include all information needed for the degradation occurrence record (DOR) 
or may include duplicate DORs with respect to LERs, the findings are not incorporated into the 
same DOR tables described in Section 3 of this report.  Therefore, the degradation information 
obtained from NRC generic communications is evaluated and described separately in this section 
of the report. 
 
LRAs were also reviewed under this study because they provide useful information about aging 
degradation of SPCs. These applications are required to include information about aging by 
regulations (10 CFR 50.73) which cover the submittal of LRAs. These regulations specifically 
require applicants to describe their operating experience regarding age-related degradation for the 
various SPCs.  
4.1 Generic Letters, Information Notices, and Bulletins 
Generic communications are publicly available documents through the NRC web site. Generic 
communications are the NRC's primary method of communicating a common need or resolution 
approach to an issue or providing guidance on issues pertaining to a matter of regulatory interest. 
Generic communications also allow the NRC to communicate and share industry experiences and 
send information to specific classes of licensees and interested stakeholders. The type of generic 
communication issued is determined during NRC evaluations of the operating nuclear industry 
and regulatory activities. Once issued, a generic communication is placed in the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) as an official NRC record. The generic 
communication is then electronically sent out to subscribers and posted to the NRC external Web 
site. 
 
Three types of generic communications were reviewed in this study. They consist of Generic 
Letters (GLs), Bulletins (BLs), and Information Notices (INs). GLs are NRC communications to 
licensees for the purpose of transmitting important information and usually require action or 
response. BLs address significant issues of great urgency and usually require action or response. 
INs relate to safety, safeguards, or environmental issues on which licensees consider action as 
appropriate. 
 
Similar to the review effort of LERs, the focus in this research study was on recent GLs, BLs, and 
INs, within the general time periods of 1997 through the first part of 2008. Since degradation 
occurrences did not occur or were not identified on the NRC web site for some of these years, the 
actual periods of degradation were 1997 to 2006 for GLs, 2001 to 2004 for BLs, and 1998 to 
2007 for INs.  All of the generic communications during these periods were reviewed to identify 
and document aging degradation for the ten categories of structures and passive components 
(SPCs) listed in Section 3.1. Document titles were instructive in determining which documents 
should be retrieved for more careful review.  A total of 46 generic communication documents 
were reviewed, including 7 GLs, 6 BLs, and 33 INs.   
 
The seven reviewed GLs are listed in the following using their index numbers and titles (in 
descending order of time): 
 
1. 2006-01, “Steam generator tube integrity and associated technical specifications” 
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2. 2004-02, “Potential impact of debris blockage on emergency recirculation during design 
basis accidents at pressurized-water reactors” 
3. 2004-01, “Requirements for steam generator tube inspection” 
4. 98-04, “Potential for Degradation of the Emergency Core Cooling System and the 
Containment Spray System After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident Because of Construction 
and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment” 
5. 97-06 (1997), “Degradation of Steam Generator Internals”  
6. 97-05 (1997), “Steam Generator Tube Inspection Techniques”  
7. 97-01 (1997), “Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel 
Closure Head Penetrations” 
 
 
Similarly, the six reviewed BLs are listed below (in descending order of time): 
 
1. 2004-01, “Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of 
Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water 
Reactors” 
2. 2003-02, “Leakage from Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor 
Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity” 
3. 2003-01, “Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at 
Pressurized-Water Reactors” 
4. 2002-02, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection 
Programs” 
5. 2002-01, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary Integrity” 
6. 2001-01, “Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration 
Nozzles” 
 
 
The 33 reviewed INs are listed as well (in descending order of time): 
 
1. 2007-37, “Buildup of Deposits in Steam Generator” 
2. 2007-21, “Pipe Wear Due to Interaction of Flow-induced Vibration and Reflective Metal 
Insulation” 
3. 2006-27, “Circumferential Cracking in the Stainless Steel Pressurizer Heater Sleeves of 
Pressurized Water Reactors” 
4. 2006-17, “Recent Operating Experience of Service Water Systems Due to External 
Conditions” 
5. 2006-08, “Secondary Piping Rupture at the Mihama Power Station in Japan” 
6. 2006-01, “Torus Cracking in a BWR Mark I Containment” 
7. 2004-21, “Additional Adverse Effect of Boric Acid Leakage: Potential Impact on Post-
Accident Coolant pH” 
8. 2004-11, “Cracking in Pressurizer Safety and Relief Nozzles and in Surge Line Nozzle” 
9. 2004-09, “Corrosion of Steel Containment and Containment Liner” 
10. 2004-08, “Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Attributable to Propagation of 
Cracking in Reactor Vessel Nozzle Welds” 
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11. 2004-05, “Spent Fuel Pool Leakage to Onsite Groundwater” 
12. 2004-01, “Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Recirculation Line Orifice Fouling - Potential 
Common Cause Failure” 
13. 2003-13, “Steam Generator Tube Degradation at Diablo Canyon” 
14. 2003-11s1 and original 2003-11, “Leakage Found on Bottom-Mounted Instrumentation 
Nozzles” 
15. 2003-08, “Potential Flooding Through Unsealed Concrete Floor Cracks” 
16. 2003-05, “Failure to Detect Freespan Cracks in PWR Steam Generator Tubes” 
17. 2003-02, “Recent Experience With Reactor Coolant System Leakage And Boric Acid 
Corrosion” 
18. 2002-26 s1, s2, and original 2002-26, “Additional Flow-Induced Vibration Failures after 
a Recent Power Uprate” 
19. 2002-02 s1, “Recent Experience With Plugged Steam Generator Tubes” 
20. 2002-21 s1 and original 2002-21, “Axial Outside-Diameter Cracking Affecting 
Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubing” 
21. 2002-13, “Possible Indicators of Ongoing Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation” 
22. 2002-11, “Recent Experience with Degradation of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head” 
23. 2002-02, “Recent Experience with Plugged Steam Generator Tubes” 
24. 2001-16, “Recent Foreign and Domestic Experience with Degradation of Steam 
Generator Tubes and Internals” 
25. 2001-09, “Main Feedwater System Degradation in Safety-Related ASME Code Class 2 
Piping Inside the Containment of a Pressurized Water Reactor” 
26. 2001-05, “Through-Wall Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head 
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3” 
27. 2000-17 s1, s2, and original 2000-17, “Crack in Weld Area of Reactor Coolant System 
Hot Leg Piping at V. C. Summer” 
28. 2000-09, “Steam Generator Tube Failure at Indian Point Unit 2” 
29. 1999-10, Rev. 1 and 1999-10, “Degradation of Prestressing Tendon Systems in 
Prestressed Concrete Containments” 
30. 1998-45, “Cavitation Erosion of Letdown Line Orifices Resulting in Fatigue Cracking of 
Pipe Welds” 
31. 1998-27,  “Steam Generator Tube End Cracking” 
32. 1998-26, “Settlement Monitoring and Inspection of Plant Structures Affected by 
Degradation of Porous Concrete Subfoundations” 
33. 1998-11, “Cracking of Reactor Vessel Internal Baffle Former Bolts in Foreign Plants” 
 
A summary for each of these documents is presented in Table 4-1, which includes additional 
information under the heading “Topic” and “SPC Affected.”  Table 4-2 summarizes for each type 
of generic communication the number of generic communications that address a particular 
component / subcomponent, and Table 4-3 aggregates the results in Table 4-2 by removing the 
types of generic communications.  It should be noted that the number of generic communications 
addressing a component is different from the number of degradation occurrences because one 
generic correspondence may refer to multiple events with regard to one component.  As can be 
seen from Table 4-3, steam generators (exchangers), RPVs, and Piping systems are the top three 
components with the greatest number of generic correspondences, which are about 28%, 28%, 
and 15% of the total 46 documents.   Although these numbers do not equal to what have been 
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found using LERs as described in Section 3, for reasons as stated above, they constitute a total of 
71%, which is very similar to 75%  found in Section 3.  There are 6 generic correspondences on 
structural type components (containment, concrete, spent fuel pool), which is about 13% of the 
total number of reviewed generic correspondences.  This ratio is just slightly higher than the 8% 
as determined in Section 3, indicating that generic communications addressed more structural 
type components. 
 
In summary, the results of the review of generic letters generally confirm what has been found or 
explained in Section 3 for LER evaluations. 
4.2 License Renewal Applications  
The Atomic Energy Act and NRC regulations limit commercial power reactor licenses to an 
initial 40 years but also permit such licenses to be renewed. This original 40-year term for reactor 
licenses was based on economic and antitrust considerations - not on limitations of nuclear 
technology. Due to this selected period, however, some structures and components may have 
been engineered on the basis of an expected 40-year service life. Since the expense of design and 
construction of NPPs has been so great, it is generally much more cost effective to extend the 
operating life of a NPP beyond the 40-year license given to plants. Therefore, the NRC has 
established a timely license renewal process and clear requirements for renewing the operating 
license of NPPs. These requirements are codified in 10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal 
of Operating Licenses For Nuclear Power Plants" and 10 CFR Part 51, "Environmental Protection 
Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions.” These requirements 
assure safe plant operation for the extended plant life. Renewal of license, when approved is 
granted for an additional 20 years. 
 
Documents related to LRA are useful because they identify applicable aging effects and operating 
experience which would describe aging degradation of structures and components at the plants.  
At the NRC website, there were 24 completed (reviewed and approved) applications for license 
renewal. These are presented below. 
 
? Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2  
? Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3  
? Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1  
? Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2  
? Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4  
? North Anna, Units 1 and 2, and Surry, Units 1 and 2  
? Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3  
? St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2  
? Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1  
? McGuire, Units 1 and 2, and Catawba, Units 1 and 2  
? H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 
? R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1  
? V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1  
? Dresden, Units 2 and 3, and Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2  
? Farley, Units 1 and 2  
? Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2  
? D.C. Cook, Units 1 and 2  
? Millstone, Units 2 and 3  
? Point Beach, Units 1 and 2 (BWR) 
? Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, and 3  
? Brunswick, Units 1 and 2  
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? Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2  
? Monticello  
? Palisades (PWR) 
 
There are also 12 LRAs under review at the time that this study was performed and these are 
listed below. 
 
? Oyster Creek - Application received July 22, 2005  
? Pilgrim 1 - Application received January 27, 2006  
? Vermont Yankee - Application received January 27, 2006  
? James A. FitzPatrick - Application received August 1, 2006  
? Susquehanna - Application received September 15, 2006  
? Wolf Creek - Application received October 4, 2006  
? Harris - Application received November 16, 2006  
? Indian Point - Application received April 30, 2007  
? Vogtle - Application received June 29, 2007  
? Beaver Valley - Application received August 28, 2007  
? Three Mile Island, Unit 1 - Application received January 8, 2008  
? Prairie Island - Application received April 15, 2008 
 
Since each LRA is quite large and the total number of LRAs are too numerous to review in the 
current study, two LRAs were selected for review in this study. The criteria used for selection of 
the two LRAs are as follows: 
 
? One of each PWR & BWR 
? Recent LRA - more likely to reflect knowledge gained from prior LRA submittals & 
comments from NRC 
? More complete information on Operating Experience 
? More detailed 
 
Using these criteria, the two LRAs selected are Palisades (PWR) and Point Beach Units 1 & 2 
(BWR).  The content of LRAs is listed below, with a partial aging management program list 
shown under the heading Appendix. As indicated earlier, this information is specifically required 
by 10 CFR Part 54. More information about LRAs and the content of the application is given in 
Section 2.1 of this report. 
 
? Administrative Information 
? Scoping and Screening Methodology for Identifying Structures and Components Subject to 
Aging Management Review, and Implementation Results 
? Aging Management Review Results 
? Time-Limited Aging Analyses 
? Appendix – Aging Management Programs 
Alloy 600 Inspection Program  
ASME Section XI, Subsections IWB, IWC, IWD, IWF Inservice Inspection Program 
Bolting Integrity Program 
Boric Acid Corrosion Program 
Buried Services Corrosion Monitoring Program 
Closed Cycle Cooling Water Program 
Containment Inservice Inspection Program 
Containment Leakage Testing Program 
Others 
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For each Aging Management Program (AMP) included in an LRA, there is an “Operating 
Experience” discussion that is very informative for aging-related degradation review.  However, 
the information presented in these operating experience discussions is not as detailed as in the 
LERs. 
 
Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 present a detailed review of these two LRAs, which include summaries 
of the AMP and operating experiences.  The operating experience for each AMP discusses 
industry-wide observations and plant specific issues.  The information presented in Tables 4-4 
and 4-5 are summaries of the actual publicly available LRAs presented on the NRC web site. 
These summaries are excerpts of the AMPs and operating experience obtained from the LRAs 
and are shortened/edited to convey the important elements needed for this study. As the 
information is not considered complete enough for a direct comparison to the results using LERs, 
information in these two tables are used qualitatively.  As can be seen in the tables, degradation in 
components related to piping systems, RPVs, and exchangers occur more often than the other 
components being studied.  This observation is consistent with the results from the review of 
LERs because the industry and plant-specific operating experience on aging in the LRAs was 
most likely already in the LERs that the plant(s) submitted in the past. However, the LRAs would 
have identified additional cases of degradation if they would have occurred. 
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Table 4-1   NRC Generic Communications for Information Related to Aging Degradation  
[Available on the NRC Web Site] 
 
Type No. Title Topic SPC Affected 
Generic 
Letter 
(GL) 
2006-01 Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Integrity 
and 
Associated 
Technical 
Specificati
ons 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is concerned that current TS requirements may not 
be sufficient to ensure that steam generator (SG) tube integrity can be maintained in accordance with 
current licensing and design basis. The NRC is, therefore, issuing this GL to request that addressees 
either submit a description of their program for ensuring SG tube integrity for the interval between 
inspections or adopt alternative TS requirements for ensuring SG tube integrity. Alternative TS 
requirements that address the staff’s concerns with the existing TS were developed by the industry and 
found acceptable by the staff. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• NRC Information Notice 2005-09, “Indications in Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator 
Tubes and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds,” April 7, 2005 (ML050530400). 
• NRC Information Notice 2004-17, “Loose Part Detection and Computerized Eddy Current Data 
Analysis in Steam Generators,” August 25, 2004 (ML042180094). 
• NRC Information Notice 2004-16, “Tube Leakage due to a Fabrication Flaw in a Replacement Steam 
Generator,” August 3, 2004 (ML041460357). 
• NRC Information Notice 2004-10, “Loose Parts in Steam Generators,” May 4, 2004 
(ML041170480). 
• NRC Generic Letter 2004-01, “Requirements for Steam Generator Tube Inspections,”August 30, 
2004 (ML042370766). 
Steam 
generators 
GL 2004-02 Potential 
Impact of 
Debris 
Blockage 
on 
Emergency 
Recirculati
on during 
Design 
Basis 
Accidents 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to: 
(1) Request that addressees perform an evaluation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and 
containment spray system (CSS) recirculation functions in light of the information provided in this 
letter and, if appropriate, take additional actions to ensure system function. Additionally, addressees 
are requested to submit the information specified in this letter to the NRC. This request is based on the 
identified potential susceptibility of pressurized-water reactor (PWR) recirculation sump screens to 
debris blockage during design basis accidents requiring recirculation operation of ECCS or CSS and 
on the potential for additional adverse effects due to debris blockage of flowpaths necessary for ECCS 
and CSS recirculation and containment drainage. 
(2) Require addressees to provide the NRC a written response in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f). 
 
Strainers 
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Type No. Title Topic SPC Affected 
at 
Pressurized
-Water 
Reactors 
Discussion 
Following the resolution of USI A-43 in 1985, several events challenged the conclusion that no new 
requirements were necessary to prevent the clogging of ECCS strainers at operating BWRs: 
- On July 28, 1992, at Barseback Unit 2, a Swedish BWR, the spurious opening of a pilot-operated 
relief valve led to the plugging of two containment vessel spray system suction strainers with mineral 
wool and required operators to shut down the spray pumps and backflush the strainers. 
- In 1993, at Perry Unit 1, two events occurred during which ECCS strainers became plugged with 
debris. On January 16, ECCS strainers were plugged with suppression pool particulate matter, and on 
April 14, an ECCS strainer was plugged with glass fiber from ventilation filters that had fallen into the 
suppression pool. On both occasions, the affected ECCS strainers were deformed by excessive 
differential pressure created by the debris plugging. 
- On September 11, 1995, at Limerick Unit 1, following a manual scram due to a stuck-open 
safety/relief valve, operators observed fluctuating flow and pump motor current on the A loop of 
suppression pool cooling. The licensee later attributed these indications to a thin mat of fiber and 
sludge which had accumulated on the suction strainer. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• Bulletin 2003-01, “Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design-
Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors,” June 9, 2003. 
• Bulletin 96-03, “Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in 
Boiling-Water Reactors,” May 6, 1996. 
• Bulletin 95-02, “Unexpected Clogging of a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Strainer While 
Operating in the Suppression Pool Cooling Mode,”October 17, 1995. 
• Bulletin 93-02, “Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers,” May 11, 1993. 
• Bulletin 93-02, Supplement 1, “Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers,” 
February 18, 1994. 
• Generic Letter 98-04, “Potential for Degradation of the Emergency Core Cooling System and the 
Containment Spray System After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident Because of Construction and 
Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment,”July 14, 1998. 
• Generic Letter 97-04, “Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core 
Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps,” October 7, 1997. 
• Generic Letter 85-22, “Potential For Loss of Post-LOCA Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation 
Debris Blockage,” December 3, 1985. 
• Generic Letter 91-18, Rev. 1, “Information to Licensees Regarding NRC Inspection Manual Section 
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Type No. Title Topic SPC Affected 
on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions,” October 8, 1997. 
• Information Notice 97-13, “Deficient Conditions Associated With Protective Coatings at Nuclear 
Power Plants,” March 24, 1997. 
• Information Notice 96-59, “Potential Degradation of Post Loss-of-Coolant Recirculation Capability 
as a Result of Debris,” October 30, 1996. 
• Information Notice 96-55, “Inadequate Net Positive Suction Head of Emergency Core Cooling and 
Containment Heat Removal Pumps Under Design Basis Accident Conditions,” October 22, 1996. 
• Information Notice 96-27, “Potential Clogging of High Pressure Safety Injection Throttle Valves 
During Recirculation,” May 1, 1996. 
• Information Notice 96-10, “Potential Blockage by Debris of Safety System Piping Which Is Not 
Used During Normal Operation or Tested During Surveillances,” February 13,1996. 
• Information Notice 95-47, “Unexpected Opening of a Safety/Relief Valve and Complications 
Involving Suppression Pool Cooling Strainer Blockage,” October 4, 1995. 
• Information Notice 95-47, Revision 1, “Unexpected Opening of a Safety/Relief Valve and 
Complications Involving Suppression Pool Cooling Strainer Blockage,” November 30,1995. 
• Information Notice 95-06, “Potential Blockage of Safety-Related Strainers by Material Brought 
Inside Containment,” January 25, 1995. 
• Information Notice 94-57, “Debris in Containment and the Residual Heat Removal System,” August 
12, 1994. 
• Information Notice 93-34, “Potential for Loss of Emergency Cooling Function Due to a Combination 
of Operational and Post-LOCA Debris in Containment,” April 26, 1993. 
• Information Notice 93-34, Supplement 1, “Potential for Loss of Emergency Cooling Function Due to 
a Combination of Operational and Post-LOCA Debris in Containment,”May 6, 1993. 
• Information Notice 92-85, “Potential Failures of Emergency Core Cooling Systems Caused by 
Foreign Material Blockage,” December 23, 1992. 
• Information Notice 92-71, “Partial Plugging of Suppression Pool Strainers at a Foreign BWR,” 
September 30, 1992. 
• Information Notice 89-79, “Degraded Coatings and Corrosion of Steel Containment Vessels,” 
December 1, 1989. 
• Information Notice 89-79, Supplement 1, “Degraded Coatings and Corrosion of Steel Containment 
Vessels,” June 29, 1990. 
• Information Notice 89-77, “Debris in Containment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen 
Configurations,” November 21, 1989. 
• Information Notice 88-28, “Potential for Loss of Post-LOCA Recirculation Capability Due to 
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Type No. Title Topic SPC Affected 
Insulation Debris Blockage,” May 19, 1988. 
GL 2004-01 Requireme
nts for 
Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Inspec 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to 
(1) advise addressees that the NRC’s interpretation of the technical specification (TS) requirements in 
conjunction with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, raises questions as to whether certain licensee steam 
generator (SG) tube inspection practices ensure compliance with these requirements, 
(2) request that addressees submit a description of the tube inspections performed at their plants, 
including an assessment of whether these inspections ensure compliance with the TS requirements in 
conjunction with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, 
(3) request that addressees who conclude they are not in compliance with the SG tube inspection 
requirements contained in their TS in conjunction with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, propose plans for 
coming into compliance with these requirements, and 
(4) request addressees to submit a tube structural and leakage integrity safety assessment that 
addresses any differences between their practices and the NRC’s position regarding the requirements 
of the TS in conjunction with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. A safety assessment should be submitted 
for all areas of the tube required to be inspected by the TS where flaws have the potential to exist and 
inspection techniques capable of detecting these flaws are not being used. This assessment should 
include an evaluation of whether the inspection practices rely on an acceptance standard different from 
the TS acceptance standards and whether the technical basis for these inspection practices constitutes a 
change to the “method of evaluation” (as defined in 10 CFR 50.59) for establishing the structural and 
leakage integrity of the tube-to-tubesheet joint. 
 
Background: In 2002, the staff learned that several licensees were not fully implementing inspection 
methods capable of detecting circumferentially oriented cracks at all locations where the potential for 
such cracks exists and where, based on available evidence, there is reason to believe such cracks may 
be present. These licensees were performing full-length bobbin probe inspections of the tubes and 
were performing additional inspections using specialized probes to inspect for axial and 
circumferential cracks at certain locations, including the tube expansion transitions near the top of the 
tubesheet. The licensees conducted the specialized probe inspections at the tube expansion transitions 
in an area that extended from 2 inches above the top of the tubesheet to about 5 inches below the top 
of the tubesheet. At several facilities, circumferential cracks were identified (specific plants not 
identified in GL) at tube expansion transitions, as well as below the transitions near the bottom of the 
zone being inspected. These results indicate a potential for circumferential cracks to exist in the tubing 
below the zone inspected with the specialized probe. However, each licensee also performed an 
analysis indicating that circumferential cracks below the zone being inspected with the specialized 
probe would not be detrimental to tube structural and leakage integrity. These licensees concluded, 
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therefore, that additional inspections for circumferential cracks with the specialized probe were 
unnecessary. These analyses had not been provided to the NRC staff. 
GL 98-04 Potential 
for 
Degradatio
n of the 
Emergency 
Core 
Cooling 
System and 
the 
Containme
nt Spray 
System 
After a 
Loss-of-
Coolant 
Accident 
Because of 
Constructio
n and 
Protective 
Coating 
Deficiencie
s and 
Foreign 
Material in 
Containme
nt 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter for several reasons. It 
alerts addressees that foreign material continues to be found inside operating nuclear power plant 
containments. During a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (DB LOCA), this foreign material could 
block an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or safety-related containment spray system (CSS) 
flow path or damage ECCS or safety-related CSS equipment. In addition, construction deficiencies 
and problems with the material condition of ECCS systems, structures, and components (SSCs) inside 
the containment continue to be found. Design deficiencies also have been found which could degrade 
the ECCS or safety-related CSS. No action or information is requested regarding these issues. The 
NRC has issued many previous generic communications on this subject, as discussed later in this 
generic letter, and assumes that addressees have had adequate prior notice to consider possible actions 
at their facilities to address these concerns. 
 
The NRC is also issuing this generic letter to alert the addressees to the problems associated with the 
material condition of Service Level 1 (see definitions of Service Levels in Attachment 3 of GL) 
protective coatings inside the containment and to request information under 10 CFR 50.54(f) to 
evaluate the addressees' programs for ensuring that Service Level 1 protective coatings inside 
containment do not detach from their substrate during a DB LOCA and interfere with the operation of 
the ECCS and the safety-related CSS. The NRC intends to use this information to assess whether 
current regulatory requirements are being correctly implemented and whether they should be revised. 
 
Discussion 
Attachment 2 of the GL presents a tabulation of 57 operational events involving debris in the ECCS 
recirculation flow paths. This tabulation includes the plant name, the report (e.g., LER, IN, NRC 
Inspection Report) and a short description of the problem. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
20 Generic Communications listed related to ECCS and CSS sump and strainer blockage. 
ECCS and 
CSS sump & 
drainage 
blockage and 
Containment 
protective 
coating 
GL 97-06 
(1997) 
Degradatio
n of Steam 
Generator 
Internals 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to (1) again alert 
addressees to the previously communicated findings of damage to steam generator internals, namely, 
tube support plates and tube bundle wrappers, at foreign PWR facilities; (2) alert addressees to recent 
findings of damage to steam generator tube support plates at a U.S. PWR facility; (3) emphasize to 
addressees the importance of performing comprehensive examinations of steam generator internals to 
Steam 
Generators, 
including 
those at 
foreign 
facilities 
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ensure steam generator tube structural integrity is maintained in accordance with the requirements of 
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50; and (4) require all addressees to submit information that will enable 
the NRC staff to verify whether addressees' steam generator internals comply with and conform to the 
current licensing bases for their respective facilities. 
Background: Foreign authorities have reported various steam generator tube support plate 
damage mechanisms. The affected steam generators are similar, but not identical, to 
Westinghouse Model 51 steam generators. As previously documented in IN 96-09 and IN 96-
09, Supplement 1, one damage mechanism involved the wastage of the uppermost support 
plate caused by the misapplication of a chemical cleaning process. A second damage 
mechanism involved broken tube support plate ligaments at the uppermost, and sometimes 
at the next lower, tube support plates. The support plate ligaments broke near a radial 
seismic restraint and near an antirotation key; the damage apparently dates back to initial 
startup of the affected plants. According to foreign authorities, the ligaments may have 
broken because of excessive stress during the final thermal treatment of the monobloc steam 
generators, which in turn was caused by inadequate clearance for differential thermal 
expansion between the support plates, wrapper, and seismic restraints. 
As previously documented in IN 96-09, Supplement 1, a third damage mechanism involved 
wastage not associated with chemical cleaning and affected tube support plates at various 
elevations. This damage mechanism is active (progressive) and apparently involves a 
corrosion or erosion-corrosion mechanism of undetermined origin. 
GL 97-05 
(1997) 
Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Inspection 
Techniques 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to (1) emphasize to the 
addressees the importance of performing steam generator tube inservice inspections using qualified 
techniques in accordance with the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, and (2) require 
certain information from addressees to determine whether they are in compliance with the current 
licensing basis for their respective facilities given their steam generator tube inservice inspection 
practices.  
Background: Licensees have traditionally relied upon eddy-current inspection techniques to assess the 
condition of their steam generator tubes. Although the eddy- current method is a proven technique for 
detecting tube degradation, the ability to depth size indications is possible only for specific modes of 
degradation. Specifically, tube degradation from intergranular attack (IGA) and stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC), major modes of steam generator tube degradation, are difficult to size with eddy-
current inspection techniques because of a number of complicating variables. In one recent instance, a 
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licensee employed a technique to size the depths of IGA tube degradation based on tube specimens 
removed from two plants. However, pulled tube data analyzed after the initial application of the 
technique indicated that the method did not adequately estimate the true depth of the indications 
consistent with the criteria established for qualifying the sizing technique. 
GL 97-01 
(1997) 
Degradatio
n of 
Control 
Rod Drive 
Mechanism 
Nozzle and 
Other 
Vessel 
Closure 
Head 
Penetration
s 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to (1) request addressees 
to describe their program for ensuring the timely inspection of PWR control rod drive mechanism 
(CRDM) and other vessel closure head penetrations and (2) require that all addressees provide to the 
NRC a written response to the requested information. The information requested is needed by the NRC 
staff to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 14, and to 
determine whether an augmented inspection program, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii), is required. 
 
Background: 
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Vessel Closure Head Penetrations - Most PWRs have 
Alloy 600 CRDM nozzle and other vessel head closure penetrations (VHPs) that extend above the 
reactor pressure vessel head. The stainless steel housing of the CRDM is screwed and seal-welded 
onto the top of the nozzle penetration. The weld between the nozzle top and bottom pieces is a 
dissimilar metal weld, which is also called a bimetallic weld. The nozzles protrude below the vessel 
head, thus exposing the inside surface of the nozzles to reactor coolant. The CRDM nozzle and other 
VHPs are basically the same for all PWRs worldwide, which use a U.S. design (except in Germany 
and Russia). The areas of interest for potential cracking are the weld between the nozzle and reactor 
vessel head, and the portion of the nozzle inside the reactor vessel head above the nozzle-to- vessel 
weld. 
RPV – 
closure head 
penetrations 
Bulletin 
(BL) 
2004-01 Inspection 
of Alloy 
82/182/600 
Materials 
Used in the 
Fabrication 
of 
Pressurizer 
Penetration
s and 
Steam 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: (1) advise PWR licensees 
that current methods of inspecting Alloy 82/182/600 materials used in the fabrication of pressurizer 
penetrations and steam space piping connections may need to be supplemented with additional 
measures to detect and adequately characterize flaws due to primary water stress corrosion cracking 
(PWSCC), 
(2) request PWR addressees to provide the NRC with information related to the materials from which 
the pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections at their facilities were fabricated, 
(3) request PWR licensees to provide the NRC with information related to the inspections that have 
been and those that will be performed to ensure that degradation of Alloy 82/182/600 materials used in 
the fabrication of pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections will be identified, 
adequately characterized, and repaired, and 
Pressurizer 
and steam 
space piping 
connections 
used in PWR 
primary 
coolant 
systems 
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Space 
Piping 
Connection
s at 
Pressurized
-Water 
Reactors 
(4) require PWR addresses to provide a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(f)). 
 
Background: 
Operating experience has demonstrated that Alloy 82/182/600 materials exposed to primary coolant 
water (or steam) at the normal operating conditions of PWR plants have cracked due to PWSCC. The 
NRC has previously issued generic communications regarding the emergence of this phenomena, and 
its consequential effects, in other areas of PWR primary systems. NRC Bulletin 2001-01, 
“Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles,” addressed PWSCC 
of control rod drive mechanism penetrations and other penetrations in the RPV upper heads of PWRs. 
NRC Bulletin 2002-01, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary Integrity,” addressed the issue of boric acid corrosion of low alloy steel components as a 
result of leakage through PWSCC-induced flaws in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). 
NRC Bulletin 2002-02, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle 
Inspection Programs,” followed up on NRC staff concerns regarding the adequacy of visual 
examinations as a primary inspection method for the RPV upper head and RPV upper head 
penetrations. Finally, NRC Bulletin 2003-02, “Leakage From Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head 
Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,” addressed the potential for PWSCC of 
RPV bottom mounted instrumentation nozzles. Operating experience, both domestic and foreign, has 
demonstrated that Alloy 82/182/600 materials connected to a PWR’s pressurizer may be particularly 
susceptible to PWSCC. Since the late 1980's, approximately 50 Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves at 
Combustion Engineering-designed (CE-designed) facilities in the United States have shown evidence 
of RCPB leakage which has been attributed to PWSCC. The most recent events of this type occurred 
at Millstone, Unit 2, and Waterford, Unit 3, in October 2003, and at Palo Verde, Unit 3, 
in February 2004. All available evidence from finite element modeling studies and limited 
nondestructive evaluation (NDE) has suggested that these leakage events were the result of axially-
oriented PWSCC of the pressure boundary portion of these heater sleeves. However, NDE results from 
Palo Verde, Unit 2's fall 2003 refueling outage, on heater sleeves which had not shown evidence of 
leakage have demonstrated that circumferentially-oriented PWSCC can occur in the non-pressure 
boundary portion (i.e., above the J-groove attachment weld) of these components. Cracking in a TMI-1 
diaphragm plate was attributed to PWSCC in the heat affected zone of the seal weld. Boric acid 
corrosion of the low alloy steel strongback was also observed to have resulted from the leakage. 
 
Small diameter Alloy 82/182 instrument line penetrations have also shown evidence of PWSCC at 
many PWR facilities since the 1980's. For example, in October 2003, the Crystal River, Unit 3, 
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licensee reported RCPB leakage from three pressurizer upper level instrument tap nozzles, which are 
exposed to the steam space in the pressurizer. The leakage was attributed to PWSCC of Alloy 
82/182/600 material from which the connections were constructed. 
 
Finally, inspection results from September 2003 at Tsuruga, Unit 2, in Japan are relevant with respect 
to PWSCC in larger diameter, butt welded lines connected to the steam space of the pressurizer. 
Evidence of boron deposits on the surface of a pressurizer relief valve nozzle (inside diameter 130 
mm, or approximately 5 inches) led to the discovery of five axially-oriented flaws in the nickel-based 
alloy weld material used in the fabrication of the nozzle-to-safe end weld. Subsequent NDE performed 
on a safety valve nozzle of similar diameter resulted in the discovery of two additional flaws in its 
nozzle-to-safe end weld. Fractographic analysis of the flaw surfaces confirmed PWSCC as the 
mechanism for flaw initiation and growth. This event at Tsuruga, Unit 2 was similar to an event at 
Palisades in 1993 where leakage was observed and attributed to a circumferentially-oriented PWSCC 
flaw in a line leading to the unit’s power operated relief valves. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• Bulletin 2003-02, “Leakage From Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor 
Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,” August 21, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032320153) 
• Bulletin 2002-02, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle 
• Inspection Programs,” August 9, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022200494) 
• Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary Integrity,” March 18, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020770497) 
• Bulletin 2001-01, “Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles,” 
August 3, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML012080284) 
BL 2003-02 Leakage 
from 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Lower 
Head 
Penetration
s and 
Reactor 
Coolant 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) advise PWR addressees that current methods of inspecting the RPV lower heads may need to be 
supplemented with additional measures (e.g., bare-metal visual inspections) to detect reactor coolant 
pressure boundary (RCPB) leakage, 
(2) request PWR addressees to provide the NRC with information related to inspections that have been 
or will be performed to verify the integrity of the RPV lower head penetrations, and 
(3) require PWR addresses to provide a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(f)). 
 
Discussion 
The RPV and its head penetrations are an integral part of the RCPB, and their integrity is important to 
RPV – 
closure head 
penetrations 
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Pressure 
Boundary 
Integrity 
the safe operation of the plant. The recent identification of cracking and leakage from two bottom 
mounted instrumentation (BMI) penetrations at South Texas Project (STP) Unit 1 raises questions 
about potential degradation mechanisms which may be active in this area. In addition, licensee 
responses to the Bulletin 2002-01 followup RAIs raised questions about the adequacy of inspections 
performed by licensees to detect leakage from RPV lower head penetrations. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-13, “NRC Review of Responses to Bulletin 2002-01, ‘Reactor 
Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,’July 29, 2003 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML032100653) 
• Information Notice 2003-11 “Leakage Found on Bottom-Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles,” August 
13, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032250135) 
• Bulletin 2002-02, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection 
Programs,” August 9, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022200494) 
• Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary Integrity,” March 18, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020770497) 
• Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary 
Components in PWR Plants," March 17, 1988 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031130424) 
BL 2003-01 Potential 
Impact of 
Debris 
Blockage 
on 
Emergency 
Sump 
Recirculati
on at 
Pressurized
-Water 
Reactors 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) Inform addressees of the results of NRC-sponsored research identifying the potential susceptibility 
of pressurized-water reactor (PWR) recirculation sump screens to debris blockage in the event of a 
high-energy line break (HELB) requiring recirculation operation of the emergency core cooling system 
(ECCS) or containment spray system (CSS). 
(2) Inform addressees of the potential for additional adverse effects due to debris blockage of 
flowpaths necessary for ECCS and CSS recirculation and containment drainage. 
(3) Request that, in light of these potentially adverse effects, addressees confirm their compliance with 
10 CFR 50.46(b)(5) and other existing applicable regulatory requirements, or describe any 
compensatory measures implemented to reduce the potential risk due to post-accident debris blockage 
as evaluations to determine compliance proceed. 
(4) Require addressees to provide the NRC a written response in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f). 
 
Discussion 
See discussion in GL 2004-02 above. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
Strainers 
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See list in GL 2004-02 above. 
BL 2002-02 Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head and 
Vessel 
Head 
Penetration 
Nozzle 
Inspection 
Programs 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) Advise pressurized-water reactor (PWR) addressees that visual examinations, as a primary 
inspection method for the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head and vessel head penetration (VHP) 
nozzles, may need to be supplemented with additional measures (e.g., volumetric and surface 
examinations) to demonstrate compliance with applicable regulations. 
(2) Advise PWR addressees that inspection methods and frequencies to demonstrate 
compliance with applicable regulations should be demonstrated to be reliable and effective. 
(3) Request information from all PWR addressees concerning their RPV head and VHP nozzle 
inspection programs to ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. 
(4) Require all PWR addressees to provide written responses to this bulletin related to their inspection 
program plans. 
 
Discussion 
As a result of the circumferential cracking of VHP nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Station 3 and other 
PWR facilities, the RPV head material degradation at Davis-Besse, and the staff’s review of responses 
to NRC Bulletins 2001-01 and 2002-01, the NRC staff has a number of concerns about the inspection 
requirements and programs for RPV head and VHP nozzles. Based on the experience and information 
currently available concerning cracking and degradation, it may 
be necessary for inspection programs that rely on visual examinations to be supplemented with 
additional measures (e.g., volumetric and surface examinations) to demonstrate compliance with 
applicable regulations. 
 
The NRC has developed Web pages to keep the public informed of generic activities related to Alloy 
600 cracking and RPV head degradation: 
 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/alloy600.html 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/vessel-head-degradation.html 
 
Related Generic Communications 
See GL 2003-02 above. 
RPV head 
and vessel 
head 
penetrations 
BL 2002-01 Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to require pressurized-water 
reactor (PWR) addressees to submit: 
 
(1) information related to the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary including the reactor 
RPV and 
reactor 
coolant 
pressure 
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Degradatio
n and 
Reactor 
Coolant 
Pressure 
Boundary 
Integrity 
pressure vessel head and the extent to which inspections have been undertaken to satisfy applicable 
regulatory requirements, and  
(2) the basis for concluding that plants satisfy applicable regulatory requirements related to the 
structural integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and future inspections will ensure 
continued compliance with applicable regulatory requirements, and 
(3) a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of Title 10, Section 50.54(f), of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(f)) if they are unable to provide the information or 
they can not meet the requested completion dates. 
 
Discussion 
The reactor pressure vessel head is an integral part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and its 
integrity is important to the safe operation of the plant. The recent identification of thinning of the 
reactor pressure vessel head at Davis-Besse raises questions regarding licensees' practices for 
identifying and resolving degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, including licensees' 
models for assessing corrosion that is caused by contaminants such as boric acid in the operating 
environment of the reactor pressure vessel head, or erosion that is caused by flow through a through-
wall defect in a vessel head penetration nozzle. 
 
Since the NRC issued Information Notice 2002-11, additional information has become available 
concerning the condition of the reactor pressure vessel head at Davis-Besse. Specifically, the 3/8-inch 
stainless steel cladding near control rod drive mechanism nozzle 3 was found to be deflected upwards 
by about 1/8-inch over a 4-inch distance, indicating that the material had yielded. This is significant 
because the 3/8-inch cladding had essentially become the reactor coolant pressure boundary near the 
affected nozzle after the base material of the reactor pressure vessel head had degraded. In addition, 
two areas of less severe thinning have been detected near control rod drive mechanism nozzle 2. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• Information Notice 2002-11: "Recent Experience with Degradation of Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Head," March 12, 2002. [ADAMS Accession No. ML020700556]  
• Bulletin 2001-01: "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles," 
August 3, 2001. [ADAMS Accession No. ML012080284]  
• Information Notice 2001-05, "Through-Wall Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3," April 
30, 2001. [ADAMS Accession No. ML011160588]  
• Generic Letter 97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel 
boundary 
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Closure Head Penetrations," April 1, 1997.  
• Information Notice 96-11, "Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increases Potential for Stress Corrosion 
Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations," February 14, 1996.  
• Information Notice 86-108, Supplement 3, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure 
Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion," January 5, 1995.  
• NUREG/CR-6245, "Assessment of Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Drive Mechanism 
Nozzle Cracking," October 1994.  
• Information Notice 94-63, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Charging Pump Casing Caused by Cladding 
Cracks," August 30, 1994.  
• Information Notice 90-10, "Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of INCONEL 600," February 
23, 1990.  
• Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary 
Components in PWR Plants," March 17, 1988.  
• Information Notice 86-108, Supplement 2, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure 
Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion," November 19, 1987.  
• Information Notice 86-108, Supplement 1, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure 
Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion," April 20, 1987.  
• Information Notice 86-108, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting 
from Boric Acid Corrosion," December 29, 1986.  
• Bulletin 82-02, "Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of 
PWR Plants," June 2, 1982.  
• Information Notice 82-06, "Failure of Steam Generator Primary Side Manway Closure Studs," March 
12, 1982.  
• Information Notice 80-27, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Studs," June 11, 1980. 
BL 2001-01 Circumfere
ntial 
Cracking of 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head 
Penetration 
Nozzles 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) request that addressees provide information related to the structural integrity of the reactor pressure 
vessel head penetration (VHP) nozzles for their respective facilities, including the extent of VHP 
nozzle leakage and cracking that has been found to date, the inspections and repairs that have been 
undertaken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and the basis for concluding that their plans 
for future inspections will ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements, and  
(2) require that all addressees provide to the NRC a written response in accordance with the provisions 
of 10 CFR 50.54(f). 
 
Discussion 
RPV head 
penetrations 
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The recent discoveries of cracked and leaking Alloy 600 VHP nozzles, including control rod drive 
mechanism (CRDM) and thermocouple nozzles, at four pressurized water reactors (PWRs) have raised 
concerns about the structural integrity of VHP nozzles throughout the PWR industry. Nozzle cracking 
at Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1 (ONS1) in November 2000 and Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 
(ANO1) in February 2001 was limited to axial cracking, an occurrence deemed to be of limited safety 
concern in the NRC staff's generic safety evaluation on the cracking of VHP nozzles, dated November 
19, 1993. However, the discovery of circumferential cracking at Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 
(ONS3) in February 2001 and Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2 (ONS2) in April 2001 - particularly the 
large circumferential cracking identified in two CRDM nozzles at ONS3 - has raised concerns about 
the potential safety implications and prevalence of cracking in VHP nozzles in PWRs. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• Information Notice 2001-05, "Through-Wall Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3," April 
30, 2001. [ADAMS Accession No. ML011160588]  
• Generic Letter 97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel 
Closure Head Penetrations," April 1, 1997.  
• Information Notice 96-11, "Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increases Potential for Stress Corrosion 
Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations," February 14, 1996.  
• Information Notice 90-10, "Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of INCONEL 600," February 
23, 1990.  
• Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary 
Components in PWR Plants," March 17, 1988.  
• NUREG/CR-6245, "Assessment of Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Drive Mechanism 
Nozzle Cracking," October 1994. 
Informati
on 
Notices 
(IN) 
2007-37 Buildup of 
Deposits in 
Steam 
Generator 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert 
addressees to the potential for deposits to accumulate in their steam generators and potentially affect 
steam generator performance and tube integrity. The NRC expects that recipients of this IN will 
review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider taking actions, as appropriate, to 
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC 
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
Corrosion products can accumulate in the secondary side of the steam generator as a result of the 
gradual erosion and corrosion of secondary side components in a pressurized water reactor. This 
Steam 
Generators 
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accumulation of corrosion products results in the buildup of deposits on the tubes, tubesheets, and 
other secondary side steam generator structures (including the holes through which the tubes pass). 
Harmful contaminants can concentrate in these deposits and result in corrosion of the steam generator 
tubes. In addition, these deposits can affect the thermal performance of the steam generator (i.e., the 
ability to transfer heat from the primary-to-secondary side of the steam generator) and the thermal 
hydraulic characteristics of the steam generator (by changing the flow patterns within the steam 
generator). 
 
Between 2004 and 2006, three primary-to-secondary leaks occurred at the Cruas Nuclear Plant, a 
multi-unit site in France. The last primary-to-secondary leak occurred at Cruas Unit 4 in February 
2006 (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire 2006 Annual Report, http://annual-report.asn.fr/PDF/nuclear-
power-plants-EDF.pdf), and it was detected through the use of nitrogen-16 radiation monitors. The 
leak rate increased from very low levels to approximately 3 gallons per minute [600 liters per hour] in 
12 minutes. 
 
In the early 1990s, steam generator water level oscillations were observed at Surry Power Units 1 and 
2, near Newport News, Virginia. Due to the severity of these water level oscillations, the units 
operated at reduced power levels for varying periods of time. The cause of the steam generator water 
level oscillations was severe deposit buildup in the TSP quatrefoil-shaped holes. The licensee 
corrected the problem by performing chemical cleaning on all steam 
generators at both units to reduce the extent of deposits. 
IN 2007-21 Pipe Wear 
Due to 
Interaction 
of Flow-
induced 
Vibration 
and 
Reflective 
Metal 
Insulation 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert 
addressees that a licensee identified significant wear marks on the outside wall of chemical volume 
control system (CVCS) stainless steel piping, which was subject to flow-induced vibration conditions. 
The licensee determined that the wear marks were caused by the interaction between the piping base 
metal and the properly installed reflective metal insulation (RMI). The NRC expects that addressees 
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to 
identify and address similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC 
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
During a Catawba Unit 1 refueling outage conducted in the fall of 2006, the licensee identified 
multiple wear marks on CVCS field-run stainless steel piping (see Enclosure, Figure 1) that was 
downstream of the CVCS letdown orifices. The licensee determined that these marks were a result of 
abrasive wear between the stainless steel RMI end caps and the stainless steel piping. This abrasive 
wear was most probably caused by the known flow-induced vibration downstream of the letdown 
Piping 
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orifices combined with end cap to piping interaction. RMI is assembled by clipping short segments of 
insulation together. End caps are found at the intersection of each insulation segment, and these end 
caps are perpendicular to the pipe wall (see Enclosure, Figure 2). The licensee confirmed that the RMI 
end caps had been installed properly in accordance with plant procedures and vendor instructions. 
None of the wear marks around the 
piping were continuous for 360 degrees and most extended less than 180 degrees of the circumference. 
The deepest wear mark was one thirty-seconds of an inch. All of the CVCS piping with identified wear 
marks was located inside containment. 
IN 2006-27 Circumfere
ntial 
Cracking in 
the 
Stainless 
Steel 
Pressurizer 
Heater 
Sleeves of 
Pressurized 
Water 
Reactors 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to describe a 
recent experience in which a licensee attributed a circumferentially-oriented crack to intergranular 
stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in a stainless steel pressurizer heater sleeve in a PWR reactor 
coolant environment. The NRC expects that addressees will review the information for applicability to 
their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to identify and address similar problems. However, 
suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written 
response is required. 
 
Discussion 
During the spring 2006 outage at Braidwood, Unit 1, Exelon Generation Company (the licensee) found 
boron deposits in the pressurizer surge line area during insulation removal. The licensee determined 
that the leakage originated from the number 52 pressurizer heater (heater number 52) at the upper weld 
between the pressure tube and heater coupling. The licensee based this determination on deposit 
patterns, deposit chemical analysis, and rouging 
(i.e., rust) found in the convection cover insulation sleeve for heater number 52. Rouging could be 
caused by steam impingement on the stainless steel material. The licensee visually inspected all 78 
pressurizer heaters to determine the extent of the condition and determined that heater number 52 was 
the only source of boric acid leakage from the pressurizer. The licensee removed leaking coupling for 
heater number 52 from the system and plugged the tube. The licensee shipped the coupling to a testing 
facility to determine the cause of the 
failure. The results of the laboratory examinations to date suggest that the observed cracking in the 
sleeve occurred due to circumferentially-oriented IGSCC in the heat affected zone. 
Pressurizer 
heater 
sleeves 
IN 2006-17 Recent 
Operating 
Experience 
of Service 
Water 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform 
addressees of operating experience within the past few years affecting the operability of the service 
water system at several nuclear power plants. The NRC expects that recipients will review the 
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar 
problems. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific 
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action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
During 2004 through 2005, 15 events occurred related to blockages in service water systems. These 
events were primarily self-revealing. The various blocking agents included silt, sand, small rocks, 
grass or weeds, frazil ice, and small aquatic fauna, such as fish. All these events were of low safety 
significance but illustrate the susceptibility of the safety-significant service water system. For instance, 
in September 2005, NRC inspectors identified a condition at Fort 
Calhoun that allowed small rocks to regularly enter the raw water system, contribute to tripping of a 
pump and strainer motors, and interfere with traveling screen operation (NRC Inspection Report 50-
285/2005-11, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. 
ML052920543). In June 2005, NRC inspectors found a portion of a service 
water accumulator outlet line at Salem to be nearly full of silt (NRC Inspection 
Report 50-272/2005-03, ADAMS Accession No. ML052090344). Other occurrences are also 
described for Watts Bar and Cooper Nuclear nuclear plants. 
IN 2006-08 Secondary 
Piping 
Rupture at 
the 
Mihama 
Power 
Station in 
Japan 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) involving 
foreign operating experience to alert addressees of the root causes and lessons learned from a 
secondary piping rupture at the Mihama Power Station, Unit 3 (Mihama 3) in Japan. It is expected that 
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as 
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this 
information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is 
required. 
 
Discussion 
The Mihama 3, is an 826 Megawatts electric, 3-loop Westinghouse type pressurized-water reactor 
(PWR) owned by Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc., and licensed by the Japanese government. 
This unit has been in service since 1976. On August 9, 2004, a fire alarm annunciated in the central 
control room at Mihama 3. Upon investigation, operators discovered the area covered by the alarm 
was filled with steam. Suspecting that steam or high temperature water was leaking from the 
secondary piping, the operators began an emergency load reduction. While they were doing this, the 
reactor tripped automatically based on the steam flow from the 3A steam generator exceeding the 
feedwater flow to that steam generator. The rupture occurred in a 55.9 centimeter (cm) (22 inch) 
outside diameter pipe in the ‘A’ loop condensate system between the fourth feedwater heater and the 
deaerator, downstream of an orifice for measuring single-phase water flow. At the time of the 
secondary piping rupture, 105 workers were preparing for the periodic inspections to commence. The 
Secondary 
piping 
rupture 
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accident resulted in five deaths and six injuries. 
 
A microscopic inspection of the inside surface of the ruptured pipe revealed a fish scale-like pattern 
over almost the entire inner surface of the pipe downstream of the orifice, except at the bottom of the 
pipe. The thickness along the bottom of the pipe was found to be the nominal wall thickness. The 
inside surface of the bottom of the pipe was covered with a thick surface film. These conditions are 
characteristic of flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC). 
IN 2006-01 Torus 
Cracking in 
a BWR 
Mark I 
Containme
nt 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform the 
owners of BWR Mark I containments about the occurrence and potential causes of the through-wall 
cracking of a torus in a BWR Mark I containment. Recipients are expected to review the information 
for applicability to their facilities and consider appropriate actions to avoid similar problems. 
However, the measures suggested in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or 
written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
 
On June 27, 2005, with the plant operating at 100-percent power during a licensee inspection of 
reactor core isolation cooling system torus suction piping, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 
(FitzPatrick) personnel discovered a torus leak near a torus support. The plant’s torus is a large 
doughnut-shaped steel structure that is partially filled with water and designed to act as a pressure 
suppression chamber. The leak was located about 5 feet below the waterline and just below the high-
pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine exhaust pipe. The leak was characterized as a slight seepage 
with streaking and a small puddle below the leak. Subsequent nondestructive examination determined 
that the leakage was from a small through-wall torus crack which was x-shaped with an approximate 
4.6 inch maximum length. 
 
The FitzPatrick licensee performed a root cause investigation of the event, and after eliminating a 
number of possible causes, the licensee concluded that the most likely cause for the initiation and 
propagation of the crack was the hydrodynamic loads of the turbine exhaust pipe during HPCI 
operation coupled with the highly restrained condition of the torus shell at the torus column support. 
The licensee concluded that the crack was initiated by cyclic loading due to condensation oscillation 
during HPCI operation. 
Steel 
Containment 
- Torus 
IN 2004-21 Additional 
Adverse 
Effect of 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform 
addressees of potential adverse effects of boric acid leakage that may not have been previously 
considered and to reemphasize concerns regarding boric acid accumulations on reactor plant 
Potential 
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Boric Acid 
Leakage: 
Potential 
Impact on 
Post-
Accident 
Coolant pH 
equipment inside containment. The primary concern regarding boric acid leakage is corrosion of 
ferritic steel components. However, if boric acid deposits of sufficient magnitude are present in 
containment, dissolution of these deposits may also affect the pH of the reactor coolant in the 
containment sump. The NRC anticipates that recipients will review the information for applicability to 
their facilities and consider appropriate actions. However, suggestions contained in this IN do not 
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
During refueling outages throughout the 1990s, personnel at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant 
performed visual inspections of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head surface that was accessible 
through the service structure weep holes. Visual inspections performed below the RPV head insulation 
found some accumulation of boric acid deposits on the RPV head. The boric acid buildup was due to 
leaking control rod drive mechanism flanges and reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage. Many 
areas of the RPV head were not visible because of persistent boric acid deposits that the licensee did 
not clean. In addition to the significant buildup of boric acid on the reactor pressure vessel head, a 
substantial amount of boric acid built up inside the containment at Davis-Besse. 
Various 
Equipment 
IN 2004-11 Cracking in 
Pressurizer 
Safety and 
Relief 
Nozzles 
and in 
Surge Line 
Nozzle 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert 
addressees to cracking and leakage indications found on pressurizer safety and relief nozzles and in a 
surge line nozzle-to-safe end weld. It is expected that the recipients of this notice will review the 
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar 
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; 
therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
During an annual inspection in September of 2003, cracking and leakage were discovered on 
pressurizer safety and relief nozzles in Tsuruga Power Plant, Unit 2 (Tsuruga 2), in Japan. Tsuruga 2 is 
a four-loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) unit (similar to the PWRs in the U.S). Tsuruga 2, which 
started commercial operation in February 1987, was designed and fabricated by Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries. Full power for Tsuruga 2 is 1160 MWe. At 100% power, the average primary coolant 
temperature is 289 ºC (552 ºF) in the cold leg and 322 ºC (612 ºF) in the hot leg. 
 
During a refueling outage in October 2003, an indication was detected in a surge line nozzle-to-safe 
end dissimilar metal weld at Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI-1). TMI-1 is a Babcock and Wilcox 
pressurized water reactor which started commercial operation in September 1974. 
Pressurizer 
nozzles 
IN 2004-09 Corrosion The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees Steel 
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of Steel 
Containme
nt and 
Containme
nt Liner 
to recent occurrences of corrosion in freestanding metallic containments and in liner plates of 
reinforced and pre-stressed concrete containments. It is expected that recipients will review this 
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. However, the 
suggestions in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no 
specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
Inspections of containment at the floor level, as well as at higher elevations, have identified various 
degrees of corrosion and containment plate thinning. This is a partial listing of such occurrences. 
 
Corrosion of freestanding metallic containment 
• In July of 2002, at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, the NRC identified corrosion where the 
containment meets the floor. The licensee subsequently performed ultrasonic examinations to 
confirm that the freestanding metal containment had not been corroded below the minimum design 
thickness. The licensee subsequently installed a moisture barrier at the containment-to-floor junction 
to prevent moisture intrusion (NRC Inspection Report 50-346/02-09, ADAMS Accession No. 
ML022560237). 
• In May of 2002, at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, the NRC identified areas of the steel 
containment vessel (SCV) with degraded coatings and rust (NRC Inspection Report 50-328/02-02, 
ADAMS Accession No. ML022070149). One of the floor drains was clogged in the annulus area (1.5 
m [5 feet] wide) between the SCV and the reinforced concrete shield building. Localized water 
ponding at the clogged drain had come in contact with a section of the SCV, causing deterioration of 
the SCV coatings and rusting of the SCV. This SCV is restricted for access due to the close 
proximity between the SCV and the emergency gas treatment system (EGTS) duct work. After 
reviewing NRC Information Notice 89-79, the licensee had identified the problem in 1990, but the 
corrective action was inadequate. Since the identification in 2002, additional corrective actions have 
been implemented by the licensee. These actions consist of the removal of the EGTS duct work on 
both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to allow the SCV area behind the EGTS duct work to be cleaned and recoated. 
Also the licensee has identified this SCV area behind the EGTS duct work for periodic visual 
examination. 
• In November of 2001, at the Dresden Unit 2 Nuclear Power Station, the licensee identified an area of 
missing coating and primer encircling the drywell shell adjacent to the basement floor. The area was 
5-10 cm (2-4 inches) wide. In this area, the base metal of the drywell shell was found to be corroded. 
However, based on ultrasonic and visual examinations, the degraded area was found to be within the 
corrosion allowance for the drywell shell. The shell coating was repaired in this area to prevent 
Containment 
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further degradation (Inservice Inspection Summary Report, Fall 2001 Inspection Period, DAMS 
Accession No. ML020450608). 
 
Corrosion of containment liner plate 
• In March of 2001, at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, the licensee iscovered a hrough-wall hole 
in the containment liner plate. Surface preparation for further nspection of a weld repair of the liner 
plate dislodged the repair material, leaving a hole. The hole was repaired. However, further 
examination of the repair area indicated corrosion of the liner from the embedded side of the liner. 
The cause of this corrosion was found to be a wire brush handle lodged in the concrete at the 
interface with the liner. The licensee replaced an area about 30 cm (12 inches) square in the liner 
plate and performed a local leak rate test as part of the corrective action (AEP:NRC:2612-01: 
"Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for 
One-Time Extension of Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test Interval," November 11, 2002, 
ADAMS Accession No. ML023170524). 
• In February and March of 1998, at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, the licensee identified 
corrosion (pitting) of the containment liner at the moisture barrier seal areas of both units. At Unit 
1, the licensee identified more than 60 areas in which the thickness (1 cm [3/8 inch] nominally) of 
the steel liner plate had been reduced below the minimum design thickness value of (0.6 cm [0.25 
inch]). The licensee subsequently installed a new liner-to-floor moisture barrier seal (Licensee 
Event Report 50-315/98011-02, NUDOCS Accession No. 9809040123* and NRC Inspection 
Report 50-315/99026, ADAMS Accession No. ML003677533). 
• In fall 2003, at the Surry Power Station, Unit 2, NRC inspectors found degraded coatings and rust 
on the containment liner at the junction of the metal liner and interior concrete floor. The inspectors 
also discovered that the moisture barrier at the junction between the metal liner plate and interior 
concrete floor was degraded. Review of the records of previous inspections performed by licensee 
personnel in 2000, 2002, and 2003 revealed that the licensee had not identified the degraded 
moisture barrier (caulking), but had identified the degraded coatings. (NRC Inspection Report 50-
281/2003-05, ADAMS Accession No. ML040280056). 
• In October of 1999, at the Palisades Plant, the licensee discovered that a floor-to-liner moisture 
barrier seal had never been installed and used a thin metal blade as a probe, confirming the presence 
of moisture in the crevice. Subsequently, the licensee used a borescope to identify areas of liner 
corrosion. The licensee determined that the corrosion had not yet appreciably degraded the liner in 
this area and installed a new liner-to-floor moisture barrier seal. 
• In May of 1999, at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, the licensee identified three areas in 
the drywell liner where corrosion had penetrated the liner. These areas were at the 5.5, 16, and 21 m 
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(18, 52, and 70 feet) elevations. At the 16 m elevation, the wall had corroded from the outside to the 
inside surface. At the 21 m elevation, the wall had corroded from the inside to the outside surface. 
At the 5.5 m elevation, the direction of the through-wall corrosion could not be determined. The 
liner corrosion was a result of foreign materials embedded in the concrete containment adjacent to 
the liner. One hole in the liner was adjacent to a leather work glove found buried in the concrete, 
while the other two hole locations were adjacent to wood found buried in the concrete (NRC 
Inspection Report 50-324/99-03, NUDOCS No. 9906170114*). 
• In December, 1996, at the H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, an NRC inspector identified 
degraded caulking and insulation sheathing panels during a containment walkdown. The vertical 
portion of the containment liner at Robinson is protected by Vinylcel insulation, a polyvinyl 
chloride material, and a metal sheathing material. The licensee determined that a portion of this 
insulation sheathing material was loose and that some of the caulking between the sheathing panels 
was deteriorated. After examination during subsequent refueling outages, the licensee determined 
that the protective coating for the containment liner was degraded and that while some corrosion of 
the containment liner had occurred, the liner met design requirements. The licensee restored the 
coating and insulation panels (NRC Inspection Reports 50-261/96-14, NUDOCS Accession No 
9702110115* and 50-261/98-02, NUDOCS Accession No. 9805050171*). 
IN 2004-08 Reactor 
Coolant 
Pressure 
Boundary 
Leakage 
Attributabl
e to 
Propagatio
n of 
Cracking in 
Reactor 
Vessel 
Nozzle 
Welds 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees 
to cracking identified in the nozzle-to-cap weld of control rod drive (CRD) return line penetration N10 
at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim Station). The NRC expects recipients to review the 
information in this notice for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to 
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this 
information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, do not require any specific 
action or written response. 
 
Discussion 
During a planned outage on September 30, 2003, the licensee for Pilgrim Station began performing 
drywell inspections to identify and make necessary repairs to reduce drywell leakage. On October 1, 
2003, the licensee’s drywell inspections revealed leakage from the nozzle-to-cap weld area of 
penetration N10. The licensee concluded that the leakage was a contributor to the unidentified drywell 
leakage. 
RPV nozzle 
penetrations 
IN 2004-05 Spent Fuel 
Pool 
Leakage to 
Onsite 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform 
addressees of the recent identification of a longstanding leak to onsite groundwater from the spent fuel 
pool of an operating pressurized water reactor facility. It is expected that recipients will review the 
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar 
Spent fuel 
pool 
structure 
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Groundwat
er 
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; 
therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
On September 18, 2002, the licensee for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station identified evidence of 
radioactive water leakage through an interior wall located at the 24-meter (78-foot) elevation of the 
Unit 1 auxiliary building mechanical penetration room, a radiologically controlled area. 
 
The Salem Unit 1 fuel handling building (FHB) is a seismically qualified structure that contains the 
Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP). Unit 1 SFP support systems in the Unit 1 auxiliary building pass through 
adjacent building walls to the Unit 1 FHB. The walls are separated by a Styrofoam-filled 15-cm (6-
inch) seismic gap and the support systems traverse the seismic gap. The Unit 1 SFP is a concrete 
structure with a stainless steel liner. The SFP includes an integral liner leakage detection and collection 
system, consisting of an extensive network of collection lines running both horizontally and vertically 
within the narrow gap between the SFP liner and the concrete SFP structure. The collected liner 
leakage is discharged to a collection trough through 17 drain lines (tell-tale drains). The tell-tale drains 
provide a means to detect, monitor, and quantify potential leakage from the SFP liner. The collected 
leakage is subsequently directed to the liquid radioactive waste system for processing. 
 
The licensee’s reviews discovered that over the years since initial facility startup, materials such as 
boric acid residue and minerals accumulated within the leak collection and detection system and 
restricted the normal drainage of liquid. The reviews also found that a modification to the tell-tale 
drains in 1998 resulted in the inadvertent introduction of sealant into the tell-tale drains, further 
restricting the free drainage of leakage from the liner. As a result, through-liner leakage accumulated 
between the SFP liner and the concrete structure of the SFP. The accumulated water, containing 
tritium, subsequently migrated to other locations through penetrations, concrete construction joints, 
and cracks. The seismic gap was confirmed to contain water with radionuclides characteristic of Unit 1 
SFP water. The water is believed by the licensee to have made its way to the groundwater in the 
restricted area via the seismic gap. 
 
The licensee cleaned the tell-tale drains, improving the drainage of the accumulated water between the 
liner and spent fuel pool concrete structure and stopping the through-wall and penetration leakage. 
IN 2004-01 Auxiliary 
Feedwater 
Pump 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform 
addressees of the potential common cause failure of auxiliary feedwater pumps because of fouling of 
pump recirculation line flow orifices. It is expected that recipients will review the information for 
Filter –
plugging/foul
ing 
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on Line 
Orifice 
Fouling - 
Potential 
Common 
Cause 
Failure 
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. 
However, suggestions in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore no specific 
action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) is a two unit site. Each unit has a turbine-driven AFW pump 
(pumps 1P29 and 2P29) which can supply water to both steam generators. Additionally, the plant has 
two motor-driven AFW pumps (pumps P38A and P38B) each of which can be aligned to a steam 
generator in each unit. Each pump has a recirculation line back to the condensate storage tanks (CSTs) 
to ensure minimum flow to prevent hydraulic instabilities and dissipate pump heat. The recirculation 
line contained a pressure reducing, flow restricting orifice. 
 
The RO used a multi-stage, anti-cavitation trim package installed in the body of a globe valve to limit 
flow. This style of orifice or flow restrictor was installed in the AFW recirculation lines at PBNP in 
the past few years to eliminate cavitation caused by the old orifices. This type of flow restrictor used 
very small channels and holes in each stage combined with a tortuous path to limit flow and prevent 
cavitation. 
 
After removal of the orifice internals, partial blockage was observed in 24 of the 54 holes in the 
outermost sleeve. No particles were found on any of the inner sleeves. Samples of the particles 
removed from the orifice were retained for analysis. A boroscope inspection of the recirculation piping 
at the orifice location revealed no evidence of debris. Following cleaning and reassembly, the orifice 
was reinstalled and the P38A AFW pump was successfully retested. 
IN 2003-13 Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Degradatio
n at Diablo 
Canyon 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice to inform addressees 
about findings from a recent steam generator tube inspection at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 2 
(DCPP-2). The NRC anticipates that recipients will review the information for applicability to their 
facilities and consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, no specific 
action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
DCPP-2 has four Westinghouse model 51 steam generators (SGs), with 7/8 inch outside diameter 
(OD), mill-annealed Alloy 600 tubing and drilled hole carbon steel tube support plates. The model 51 
steam generator has 45 rows of tubes, with row 1 having the smallest bend radii in the U-bend area. 
During Operating Cycle 11, a small steam generator tube leak (less than or equal to approximately 6.5 
gallons per day) was present at DCPP-2. During the 2003 refueling outage, Pacific Gas & Electric 
Steam 
generators 
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(PG&E), the licensee for DCPP-2, performed SG secondary side pressure tests to locate the source of 
the SG leakage. Several potentially leaking SG tubes were identified and subsequent eddy current 
testing identified two contributing degradation modes: circumferential primary water stress corrosion 
cracking (PWSCC) in the U-bend region and axial outside diameter stress corrosion cracking 
(ODSCC) at the tube-to-tube support plate intersections. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
The following documents describe other recent reactor operating experience with steam generator 
tubes: 
• IN 2003-05, “Failure to Detect Freespan Cracks in PWR Steam Generator Tubes,” dated June 5, 
2003 
• IN 2002-02 and IN 2002-02 supplement 1, “Recent Experience With Plugged Steam Generator 
Tubes” dated January 8, 2002 and July, 17, 2002 
• IN 2002-21, “Axial Outside-Diameter Cracking Affecting Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam 
Generator Tubing” dated June 25, 2002 
• IN 2001-16, “Recent Foreign and Domestic Experience with Degradation of Steam Generator Tubes 
and Internals,” dated October 31, 2001 
• NRC Generic Letter 97-05, “Steam Generator Tube Inspection Techniques,” dated December 17, 
1997 
• Inspection Report 50-323/03-09, “Diablo Canyon Power Plant - NRC Special Team Inspection 
Report” dated May 8, 2003 (Adams ML031290198) 
IN 2003-
11s1 
and 
original 
2003-11 
Leakage 
Found on 
Bottom-
Mounted 
Instrument
ation 
Nozzles 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert 
addressees to indications of leakage in the form of boron deposits discovered on bottom mounted 
instrumentation (BMI) nozzles at South Texas Project Unit 1 (STP Unit 1). This supplement 
specifically provides additional information regarding the STP Unit 1 licensee’s root cause analyses, 
as discussed in licensee’s final licensee event report on this topic, dated October 15, 2003 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML032950483). It is expected that the recipients of this IN will review the information 
for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. 
However, suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or 
written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
An extensive description of the STP Unit 1 BMI penetration leakage event was given in IN 2003-11, 
“Leakage Found on Bottom-Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles,” dated August 13, 2003. The relevant 
pre-August 2003 information is summarized herein. In April 2003, the STP Unit 1 licensee identified 
RPV – 
instrumentati
on nozzles 
118 
Type No. Title Topic SPC Affected 
small boron deposits around two of the 58 STP Unit 1 BMI penetrations (penetrations 1 and 46), the 
only evidence of BMI nozzle penetration leakage reported by a U.S. facility to date. The STP Unit 1 
BMI penetrations were constructed from an drilled Inconel 600 bar stock connected to the reactor 
vessel lower head by an Inconel 82/182 J-groove weld. The licensee’s subsequent nondestructive 
examination (NDE) campaign, which included ultrasonic test (UT), visual, and eddy current testing, 
resulted in the identification of three axially oriented cracklike indications in the penetration 1 nozzle 
wall and two axially oriented cracklike indications in the penetration 46 nozzle wall. 
IN 2003-08 Potential 
Flooding 
Through 
Unsealed 
Concrete 
Floor 
Cracks 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform addressees of 
observed flooding in a room containing safety-related panels and equipment as a result of fire water 
seepage through unsealed concrete floor cracks. It is expected that recipients will review the 
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions as appropriate to avoid similar 
problems. However, suggestions contained in this NRC information notice are not NRC requirements; 
therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
On May 3, 2002, at Energy Northwest’s Columbia Generating Station, 15 to 20 gallons of water 
spilled from a firewater drain line onto the floor of the radwaste building 484' elevation cable 
spreading room. A small amount of this water leaked down into the remote shutdown room and the 
Division II switchgear room, which is located below the cable spreading room floor. The licensee 
determined that the pathway for the leakage was through cracks in the concrete floor. 
Concrete – 
floor - cracks 
IN 2003-05 Failure to 
Detect 
Freespan 
Cracks in 
PWR 
Steam 
Generator 
Tubes 
This information notice (IN) is being provided to inform licensees of a recent problem experienced at 
Comanche Peak Unit 1 concerning the detection of freespan outside diameter stress corrosion cracking 
(ODSCC) in steam generator (SG) tubes. This has led to tube integrity performance criteria not being 
met as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-06, “Steam Generator Program Guidelines.” The 
NRC anticipates that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and 
consider taking appropriate actions. However, suggestions contained in this IN do not constitute NRC 
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
Comanche Peak Unit 1 is a four-loop Westinghouse PWR with four Westinghouse Model D4 
recirculating SGs (1, 2, 3, 4). Each SG contains 4578 mill- annealed Alloy 600 tubes, which are 
nominally 0.750 inch in diameter and have a nominal wall thickness of 0.043 inch. The tubes are 
supported by a number of carbon steel tube support plates with circular holes and by V-shaped 
chrome-plated Alloy 600 anti-vibration bars (AVBs). Comanche Peak Unit 1 was shut down 
approximately 1 week prior to its scheduled refueling outage as a result of a primary-to-secondary 
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leak. A 5- to 15-gallon-per-day (gpd) leak was first observed in SG 2 on September 26, 2002. Over the 
next 2 days, the leakage spiked to higher values several times. On September 28, 2002, after a leakage 
spike to 52 gpd, the licensee elected to shut down the plant and to commence refueling (1RF09). After 
shutting down the plant, the licensee began inspecting the SG tubes with eddy current testing 
techniques. 
IIN 2003-02 Recent 
Experience 
With 
Reactor 
Coolant 
System 
Leakage 
And Boric 
Acid 
Corrosion 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform 
addressees of recently observed reactor coolant leakage at two pressurized water reactor facilities, one 
of which resulted in the subsequent degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head. It is expected that 
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as 
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions in this information notice are not NRC 
requirements; therefore no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
A number of mechanical and welded connections exist above the reactor pressure vessel head that, 
historically, have leaked at a number of plants. This leakage of borated water may lead to degradation 
of the low alloy steel reactor vessel head by boric acid corrosion. At Sequoyah Unit 2 (December 26, 
2002), the leakage resulted in relatively minor degradation of the reactor vessel head. At Comanche 
Peak Unit 1 (November 30, 2002), the leakage resulted in no apparent degradation of the RCS pressure 
boundary. In the Sequoyah Unit 2 and Comanche Peak Unit 1 events, the unidentified reactor coolant 
leakage had not shown a discernible increase from the very low levels that typically occur at a PWR 
facility. 
RPV – head 
connection/p
enetration 
IN 2002-26 
s1, s2, 
& 
original 
2002-26 
Additional 
Flow-
Induced 
Vibration 
Failures 
after a 
Recent 
Power 
Uprate 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this supplement to a previously issued 
information notice (IN) to alert addressees to the failure of the steam dryer and other plant components 
at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (QC-1), a boiling water reactor (BWR), during 
operations following a power uprate. The NRC expects that the recipients will review the information 
for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. 
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements. Therefore, no 
specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
As discussed in IN 2002-26, “Failure of Steam Dryer Cover Plate After a Recent Power Uprate” 
(ML022530291), a cover plate on the outside of the steam dryer at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, 
Unit 2 (QC-2), broke loose in June 2002 and caused pieces of the dryer to be swept down the main 
steamline. Before the unit was shut down in 2002, steam dryer degradation was indicated by an 
increase in moisture carryover and minor perturbations in reactor pressure, water level, and steam 
RPV – steam 
dryer cover 
plate, hood, 
& other areas 
– fatigue 
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flow. The licensee evaluated the cause of the steam dryer cover plate failure and determined that the 
failure of the plate was due to high-cycle fatigue. 
 
The second failure of the steam dryer in May 2003 at QC-2 was discussed in IN 2002-26, Supplement 
1, “Additional Failure of Steam Dryer After a Recent Power Uprate” (ML031980434). Inspection of 
the dryer revealed (1) through-all cracks (about 90 inches long) in the vertical and horizontal portions 
of the outer bank hood, 90-degree side, (2) one vertical and two diagonal internal braces detached from 
the outer bank hood, 90-degree side, (3) one severed vertical internal brace on the outer bank hood, 
270-degree side, and (4) three cracked tie bars on top of the dryer. The licensee believes the most 
probable cause of the failure of the steam dryer in QC-2 is low-frequency, high-cycle fatigue driven by 
flow induced vibrations associated with the higher steam flows present during EPU operating 
conditions. 
 
In late October 2003 at QC-1, the licensee observed changes in main steamline flows, steamline 
pressure drop, and increasing moisture carryover measurements. On November 12, the licensee shut 
down QC-1 to inspect the steam dryer and identified significant damage to several areas. 
IN 2002-02 
s1 
Recent 
Experience 
With 
Plugged 
Steam 
Generator 
Tubes 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform 
addressees of findings from recent inspections and examinations of steam generator tubes at Oconee 
Nuclear Station Unit 1 (ONS-1). The NRC anticipates that recipients will review the information for 
applicability to their facilities and consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. 
However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; 
therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
Potential severance of plugged steam generator tubes was discussed in IN 2002-02, “Recent 
Experience With Plugged Steam Generator Tubes,” (ML013480327) as a result of inspection findings 
at Three Mile Island Unit 1 (TMI-1) during the fall 2001 refueling outage. At TMI-1, a plugged tube, 
located on the periphery of the tube bundle, severed near the secondary side of the upper tubesheet and 
damaged four adjacent in-service (i.e., nonplugged) tubes. The preliminary laboratory investigation of 
the severed tube found signs of high cycle fatigue, ductile failure, and outside-diameter-initiated 
intergranular attack (IGA). In addition, the tube diameter was greater than the nominal tube diameter, 
indicating that the severed tube had swollen. The licensee determined that the most likely cause of 
failure was fatigue caused by flow-induced vibration of the swollen and restrained tube. 
 
On March 25, 2002, ONS-1 was shut down for a refueling outage. In addition to the standard steam 
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generator tube inspections, the licensee performed supplemental inspections of plugged tubes in both 
steam generators. These supplemental inspections were performed to address the TMI-1 plugged tube 
severance event (discussed in Information Notice 2002-02). While inspecting two tubes in the B steam 
generator, the licensee identified signs of wear on the outside tube surface near the secondary face of 
the lower tubesheet. The circumferential location of the wear on these two tubes indicated that the 
wear was most likely due to impact from an adjacent tube. Subsequent visual inspection from the 
secondary side of the steam generator indicated that tube one of the tubes was completely severed at 
the secondary side (i.e., top) of the lower tubesheet. 
IN 2002-
21, s1 & 
original 
02-21 
Axial 
Outside-
Diameter 
Cracking 
Affecting 
Thermally 
Treated 
Alloy 600 
Steam 
Generator 
Tubing 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this supplement to IN 2002-21 to inform 
addressees of the root cause assessment for the axially oriented outside-diameter crack indications in 
the thermally treated Alloy 600 steam generator (SG) tubing at Seabrook. It is expected that recipients 
will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to 
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC 
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
During the eighth refueling outage, 42 eddy current indications in 15 “low row” tubes (tubes in rows 1 
through 10) were identified and classified as potential axially oriented outside diameter stress 
corrosion cracks (ODSCC). All indications were in one steam generator and all indications were 
located in the region where the tube passes through a TSP (i.e., tube-to-tubesupport-plate intersection). 
Both hot and cold leg tubes were affected. No indications were observed at the top of the tubesheet. 
This issue was discussed in NRC IN 2002-21, “Axial Outside-Diameter Cracking Affecting Thermally 
Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubing”, issued June 25, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML021770094). 
Steam 
Generators 
IIN 2002-13 Possible 
Indicators 
of Ongoing 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head 
Degradatio
n 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice on recent Davis-Besse 
experience to alert addressees to possible indicators of reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation 
including degradation of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head material. The NRC anticipates that 
recipients will review this information for applicability to their facilities and consider taking 
appropriate actions. However, the suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute 
NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
The Davis-Besse nuclear power plant recently discovered a significant cavity in the RPV head on the 
downhill side of control rod drive nozzle number 3 and some head wastage behind nozzle number 2. In 
response, the NRC issued Information Notice 2002-11, "Recent Experience With Degradation of 
RPV head 
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Reactor Pressure Vessel Head," on March 12, 2002, and Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity," on March 18, 2002. NRC also 
sent an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to the plant to investigate the circumstances of the 
degradation of the RPV head material. Through the AIT, several possible indicators of reactor coolant 
pressure boundary degradation such as was observed at Davis-Besse were identified. These indicators 
include unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage and containment air cooler (CAC) and 
radiation element (RE) filter fouling. 
 
RCS leakage, boron deposits, and corrosion products like ferric oxide in CACs and RE filters may 
indicate degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary materials. These indicators do not 
provide clear evidence of the degradation; however, they may provide an opportunity for licensees to 
suspect that degradation is ongoing. The NRC understands that the indications at Davis-Besse were 
sometimes complicated by other events (e.g., flange leaks). Nonetheless, in combination with other 
indicators, they may provide insights into whether degradation of the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary materials is occurring. 
IN 2002-11 Recent 
Experience 
with 
Degradatio
n of 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice to inform addressees 
about findings from recent inspections and examinations of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head at 
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. It is expected that recipients will review the information for 
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. 
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no 
specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
On February 16, 2002, the Davis-Besse facility began a refueling outage that included inspection of 
the vessel head penetration (VHP) nozzles, which focused on the inspection of control rod drive 
mechanism (CRDM) nozzles, in accordance with the licensee's commitments to NRC Bulletin 2001-
01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles," which was 
issued on August 3, 2001. These inspections identified axial indications in three CRDM nozzles, 
which had resulted in pressure boundary leakage. Specifically, these indications were identified in 
CRDM nozzles 1, 2, and 3, which are located near the center of the RPV head. These findings were 
reported to the NRC on February 27, 2002, and supplemented on March 5 and March 9, 2002. The 
licensee decided to repair these three nozzles, as well as two other nozzles that had indications but had 
not resulted in pressure boundary leakage. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
RPV head 
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• Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles," 
August 3, 2001. 
• Bulletin 82-02, "Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of 
PWR Plants," June 2, 1982. 
• Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary 
Components in PWR Plants," March 17, 1988. 
• Generic Letter 97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzles and Other Vessel 
Closure Head Penetrations," April 1, 1997. 
• Information Notice 80-27, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Studs," June 11, 1980. 
• Information Notice 82-06, "Failure of Steam Generator Primary Side Manway Closure Studs," March 
12, 1982. 
• Information Notice 86-108, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting 
from Boric Acid Corrosion," December 29, 1986. 
• Information Notice 86-108, Supplement 1, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure 
Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion," April 20, 1987. 
• Information Notice 86-108, Supplement 2, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure 
Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion," November 19, 1987. 
• Information Notice 86-108, Supplement 3, "Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure 
Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion," January 5, 1995. 
• Information Notice 90-10, "Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of INCONEL 600," February 
23, 1990. 
• Information Notice 94-63, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Charging Pump Casing Caused by Cladding 
Cracks," August 30, 1994. 
• Information Notice 96-11, "Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increases Potential for Stress Corrosion 
Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations," February 14, 1996. 
Information Notice 2001-05, "Through-Wall Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3," April 
30, 2001.  
IN 2002-02 Recent 
Experience 
with 
Plugged 
Steam 
Generator 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice to inform addressees 
about findings from recent inspections and examinations of steam generator tubes at Three Mile Island 
Unit 1 (TMI-1). The NRC anticipates that recipients will review the information for applicability to 
their facilities and consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, 
suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no 
specific action or written response is required. 
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Tubes  
Discussion 
On October 8, 2001, TMI-1 was shut down for a refueling outage. While inspecting the tubes in the B 
Steam Generator, the licensee (AmerGen Energy Company, LLC) identified signs of wear near the 
upper tubesheet on the outer surface of four tubes on the periphery of the tube bundle. These wear 
indications did not appear to have been present during the prior steam generator tube inspections, 
which were performed approximately 2 years earlier. Given the pattern and location of the wear signs, 
the licensee suspected that a neighboring plugged tube had caused the wear. The licensee removed the 
upper plug in the suspected tube and performed a video inspection. The video inspection revealed that 
the tube was severed near the secondary face of the upper tubesheet and in physical contact with the 
drilled hole where the tube passed through the 15th support plate. Neighboring tubes were not in 
contact with the drilled holes at the point where they passed through the 15th support plate. 
IN 2001-16 Recent 
Foreign 
and 
Domestic 
Experience 
with 
Degradatio
n of Steam 
Generator 
Tubes and 
Internals 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice to inform addressees 
about findings from recent inspections of steam generator tubes and secondary-side internal 
components and structures. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability 
to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions 
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written 
response is required. 
 
Discussion 
 
Foreign Sludge Lancing Experience 
 
In 1998, a foreign reactor was shut down for a refueling outage. At the time of the shutdown, there was 
no evidence of primary-to-secondary leakage. During the outage, sludge lancing was performed 
followed by a bobbin coil probe inspection of 100% of the tubes in all four steam generators. The tube 
inspections revealed only minor wall thinning. However, during plant startup following the outage, a 
very small primary-to-secondary leak was observed, and the reactor was shut down to investigate its 
source. Subsequent inspections identified several degraded steam generator tubes in the second and 
third rows of the steam generator tube lane. The degradation consisted of localized loss of the outer 
surface of the tubes just above the top of the tubesheet. Extensive wall loss in one of these tubes 
resulted in a pinhole-sized perforation of the tube wall. 
 
Degradation of the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Tube Support 
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During the performance of a steam generator secondary-side visual inspection in 1999, Baltimore Gas 
and Electric Company (BGE) identified degradation at the periphery of the eggcrate tube supports in 
both steam generators at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2. In the #21 steam generator, BGE 
found minor degradation of the eggcrate supports on the hot-leg side at the sixth, seventh, and eighth 
support elevations. In the #22 steam generator, BGE found more extensive degradation of the eggcrate 
supports on the hot-leg side at the seventh and eighth support elevations, as well as on the cold-leg 
side at the sixth support elevation. On the basis of the location and nature of the degradation, BGE 
concluded that it was caused by erosion-corrosion, similar to, but much less extensive than, that 
observed at San Onofre Unit 3. (The San Onofre experience is discussed in GL 97-06). 
 
Possible Degradation in Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Tubes 
 
The steam generators at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 were replaced in 1982 and 1983, respectively, 
with steam generators of an improved design. The tubes of the replacement steam generators were 
made of a more corrosion-resistant material, thermally treated Alloy 600, and were hydraulically 
expanded (and therefore, subjected to less stress). The quatrefoil tube supports were also more 
resistant to corrosion, being made of stainless steel. 
 
During a steam generator tube examination in the spring of 2000, the licensee for Turkey Point Unit 3 
detected 69 tubes which required plugging. Of the 69 plugged tubes, 41 had volumetric pit-like 
indications, 15 had inside-diameter-initiated circumferential indications, eight had outside-diameter-
initiated circumferential indications, and five had wear indications. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• IN 96-38, "Results of Steam Generator Tube Examinations" 
• IN 97-26, "Degradation in Small-Radius U-Bend Regions of Steam Generator Tubes"; IN 97-49, 
"B&W Once-Through Steam Generator Tube Inspection Findings" 
• IN 97-88, "Experiences During Recent Steam Generator Inspections" 
• Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-22, "Issues Stemming From NRC Staff Review of Recent 
Difficulties Experienced in Maintaining Steam Generator Tube Integrity." 
• IN 96-09, "Damage in Foreign Steam Generator Internals" 
• IN 96-09 Supplement 1, "Damage in Foreign Steam Generator Internals" 
• GL 97-06, "Degradation of Steam Generator Internals." 
IN 2001-09 Main The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert addressees to Piping 
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Feedwater 
System 
Degradatio
n in Safety-
Related 
ASME 
Code Class 
2 Piping 
Inside the 
Containme
nt of a 
Pressurized 
Water 
Reactor 
the discovery of main feedwater (MFW) system wall thinning to below allowable limits in turbine 
building components and in risk-important, safety-related portions of American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers (ASME) Code Class 2 piping inside the reactor containment building (containment) at the 
Callaway Plant. 
 
Discussion 
During a refueling outage that began on April 7, 2001, the Callaway Plant licensee conducted 
scheduled inspections to assess the effects of erosion/corrosion on steel piping exposed to flowing 
water (single-phase fluids) and water-steam mixtures (two-phase fluids). These effects are commonly 
referred to as flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC). Inspections identified several instances of localized 
MFW system piping wall thinning to below the minimum thickness required by ASME Boiler and 
Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, for safety-related piping, and to below the minimum thickness 
specified by American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B31.1, "Power Piping," for non-safety-
related portions of the MFW system. The wall thicknesses in the degraded areas had not been 
previously measured. 
 
The licensee had expanded and upgraded its FAC program following an August 11, 1999, event in 
which an 8-inch moisture separator reheater drain line experienced a double-ended guillotine break 
causing operators to manually trip the reactor. The upgraded and expanded FAC program, utilizing 
CHECWORKS™ Rev. F software, predicted wall thinning in the MFW system. However, without 
wall thickness trending data, the software was not able to accurately predict the extent of degradation. 
After performing an inspection during the current outage, the licensee found the MFW degradation to 
be more extensive than anticipated. 
 
Based on the licensee's initial findings and on additional industry information, FAC inspections were 
expanded to include portions of the condensate system, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system, feedwater 
heaters, and other areas. Additional degradation was found in piping for the feedwater heaters. 
 
Summary of Previously Identified Pipe Wall Thinning Issues and Events 
 
• 1976 - Oconee 3 Pinhole leak in an extraction steam line. A surveillance program utilizing ultrasonic 
examination of extraction steam lines was initiated and, in 1980, identified two degraded elbows 
identical to the Unit 2 elbow that subsequently failed in 1982. The elbows were replaced. - IN 82-22 
• 1981 - Millstone 2 Use of engineering personnel unfamiliar with plant operating conditions, plant as-
built designs, or erosion/corrosion history. - IN 93-21  
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• January 1982 - Vermont Yankee Licensee shut down the plant after identifying steam blowing from a 
leak in the 12-inch-diameter drain line between a moisture separator and heater drain tank. - IN 82-22 
• January 1982 - Trojan Steam line failure resulting in plant shutdown. - IN 82-22  
• February 1982 - Zion 1 Steam leak in 150 psig high-pressure exhaust steam line originating from an 
8-inch crack on a weld joining 24-inch piping with the 37.5-inch high-pressure steam exhaust piping 
leading to the moisture separator reheater. The event resulted in plant shutdown. - IN 82-22  
• June 1982 - Oconee 2 While operating at 95-percent power, a 4-square-foot rupture occurred in a 24-
inch-diameter long-radius elbow in a feedwater heat extraction line. The reactor was manually 
tripped, a steam jet destroyed a non-safety-related load center and certain non-safety-related 
instrumentation. Personnel were hospitalized overnight with steam burns. An ultrasonic inspection 
had identified substantial erosion of the elbow In March 1982, but the erosion failed to meet the 
licensee's criteria for rejection. - IN 82-22  
• June 1982 - Browns Ferry 1 Steam line failure resulting in plant shutdown. - IN 82-22  
• March 1983 - Dresden 3 Steam leak from the shell side of the 3C3 low-pressure feedwater heater 
near the extraction steam inlet nozzle. The leak was attributed to erosion by deflected extraction 
steam. The feedwater heaters had not been included in a periodic inspection program. - IN 99-19  
• March 1985 - Haddam Neck Pipe rupture, approximately ½-by-2-1/4-inch, downstream of a normal 
level control valve for a feedwater heater. - GL 89-08  
• December 1986 - Surry 2 Catastrophic failure of 18-inch MFW pump suction line elbow when a 
main steam isolation valve failed closed on one of the steam generators. A 2-by-4-foot section of the 
elbow was blown out and came to rest on an overhead cable tray. The reactive force completely 
severed the suction line. The free end whipped and came to rest against the discharge line for another 
pump. The failure of the piping, which was carrying single-phase fluid, was caused by 
erosion/corrosion of the carbon steel pipe wall. The unit had been operating at full power. An 
automatic plant trip occurred and four workers suffered fatal injuries. Released steam caused the fire 
suppression system to actuate, releasing halon and carbon dioxide into emergency switchgear. The 
NRC dispatched an augmented inspection team to the site. - IN 86-106, Bulletin 87-01,IN 88-17, GL 
89-08  
• June 1987 - Trojan MFW degradation was discovered by the licensee in at least two areas of the 
straight sections of ASME Class 2 safety-related MFW piping inside containment. The thinning was 
discovered when the Trojan steam piping inspection program was expanded to include single-phase 
piping. The thinning was attributed to high fluid flow velocities and other operating factors. - IN 87-
36, IN 88-17, GL 89-08  
• December 1987 - LaSalle 1 Through-wall pinhole leaks due to erosion were discovered in a 45-
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degree elbow down stream of a turbine-driven reactor feedwater pump minimum-flow control valve. 
Subsequent inspections identified additional areas of wall thinning. - IN 88-17  
• September 1988 - Surry 2 The pipe wall of an elbow installed on the suction side of a MFW pump 
during a 1987 refueling outage was discovered to have thinned more rapidly than expected, losing 20 
percent of its 0.500-inch wall thickness in 1.2 years. Wall thinning was also observed in safety-
related MFW piping and in other non-safety-related condensate piping. - GL 89-08  
• December 1988 - Brunswick 1 Inspection indicated areas of significant but localized erosion on the 
internal surfaces of several carbon steel valve bodies. The affected safety-related valves were the 24-
inch residual heat removal/low pressure core injection (RHR/LPCI) system injection and 16-inch 
suppression pool isolation valves. - IN 89-01  
• April 1989 - Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Steam escaping from a ruptured 14-inch high-pressure 
steam extraction line caused a spurious turbine/reactor trip from 100-percent power. This straight run 
of piping terminates at an elbow that was replaced during the previous outage because of erosion-
induced wall thinning. The pipe and those of similar geometries had not been included in the 
licensee's surveillance samples, and the degraded condition was not detected during the elbow 
replacement. - IN 89-53  
• March 1990 - Surry 1 Rupture of a straight section of piping downstream of a level control valve in 
the low-pressure heater drain (LPHD) system. The LPHD system was included in the licensee's FAC 
program at the time, but the program did not provide an inspection for the affected section of piping. 
- IN 91-18  
• May 1990 - Loviisa 1 (foreign) A flow-measuring orifice flange in the main feedwater system 
ruptured after one of five main feedwater pumps tripped, causing a check valve in the line to slam 
shut, creating a pressure spike. Subsequent inspections determined that 9 of 10 flanges had thinned to 
below minimum wall requirements. - IN 91-18  
• July 1990 - San Onofre 2 The licensee was forced to shut down the unit after discovering a steam 
leak in one of the feedwater regulating valve bypass lines. - IN 91-18  
• December 1990 - Millstone 3 Two 6-inch pipes in the moisture separator drain (MSD) system 
ruptured when a MSD pump was stopped to facilitate component isolation for repairs. Stopping the 
pump caused a pressure transient. The high-energy water flashed to steam and actuated portions of 
the turbine building fire protection deluge system. Two 480-volt motor control centers and one non-
vital 120-volt inverter were rendered inoperable by the flooding, resulting in the loss of the plant 
process computer and the isolation of the instrument air to the containment building. - IN 91-18  
• November 1991 - Millstone 2 Rupture at an 8-inch elbow of a moisture separator reheater. High-
energy water flashed to steam, actuating portions of the turbine fire protection deluge system. The 
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license had not selected the ruptured elbow for ultrasonic testing in its erosion/corrosion monitoring 
program. See LER 50-336/91-12. IN 91-18  
• 1992 - Millstone 3 See LER 50-309/92-07. - IN 93-21  
• 1992 - Maine Yankee See LER 92-007. - IN 93-21  
• 1992 - Salem 1 Improper determination of code minimum wall thickness acceptance criteria resulted 
in improper disposition of degraded components. See Inspection Report 50-272/92-08. - IN 93-21  
• 1992 - Hope Creek Lack of baseline thickness measurements (history) of originally designed piping 
was identified. See Inspection Report 50-354/92-11. - IN 93-21  
• 1992 - Millstone 1 Lack of baseline thickness measurements of replacement piping before the 
replacement piping was put into service. See Inspection Report 50-245/92-80. - IN 93-21  
• 1992 - Hope Creek Use of engineering personnel who are unfamiliar with plant operating conditions, 
plant as-built designs, or erosion/corrosion history.  
• 1993 - Diablo Canyon 1 Erosion/corrosion wear was discovered behind a thermal sleeve in the 
interior of the feedwater nozzle and on the feedwater nozzle itself. - IN 93-21  
• November 1994 - Sequoyah 1 Licensee identified a 180-degree circumferential crack in a reduced 
section of 14-inch condensate piping used for flow-metering. The section of piping had been 
modeled incorrectly in CHECMATE™ without any diameter or thickness changes and had not been 
visually inspected. - IN 95-11  
• April 1997 - Fort Calhoun Manual scram and emergency boration following a 6-square-foot rupture 
of a 12-inch diameter sweep elbow in the fourth-stage extraction steam piping. A non-safety-related 
electrical load center, several cable trays and pipe hangers were damaged. In addition, asbestos-
containing insulation was blown throughout the turbine building and portions of the fire protection 
system were actuated. - IN 97-84  
• May 1999 - Point Beach 1 Manual trip from 100-percent power and manual safety injection actuation 
when the shell side of the feedwater heater ruptured. The fish-mouth rupture was approximately 27-
inches long and 0.75-inch at its widest point. Feedwater heater leaks were also identified at Pilgrim 
Station and the Susquehanna units. None of the feedwater heaters had been included in a periodic 
inspection program. - IN 99-19  
• August 1999 - Callaway Operators manually tripped the reactor on indication of a steam leak in the 
turbine building. An 8-inch line from the first stage reheater drain tank to the high-pressure heater 
experienced a double-ended guillotine break. - Event Notification 36015 
IN 2005-01 Through-
Wall 
Circumfere
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees 
to the recent detection of through-wall circumferential cracks in two of the control rod drive 
mechanism (CRDM) penetration nozzles and weldments at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 
RPB head 
CRD 
penetration 
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ntial 
Cracking of 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head 
Control 
Rod Drive 
Mechanism 
Penetration 
Nozzles at 
Oconee 
Nuclear 
Station, 
Unit 3 
(ONS3). It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and 
consider actions, as appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not 
NRC requirements; IN 2001-05 
 
Discussion 
On February 18, 2001, with ONS3 in Mode 5, Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) performed a 
visual examination (VT-2) of the outer surface of the unit's reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head to 
inspect for indications of borated water leakage. This RPV head inspection was performed as part of a 
normal surveillance during a planned maintenance outage. The VT-2 revealed the presence of small 
amounts of boric acid residue in the vicinity of nine of the 69 CRDM penetration nozzles (Figures 1 
and 2). Subsequent nondestructive examinations (NDEs) identified 47 recordable crack indications in 
these nine degraded CRDM penetration nozzles. The licensee initially characterized these flaws as 
either axial or below-the-weld circumferential indications, and initiated repairs of the degraded areas. 
NDEs of nine additional CRDM penetration nozzles from the same heat of material were conducted 
for "extent of condition" purposes, but did not detect recordable indications 
nozzles 
IN 200-17 
s2, s1 
and 
Original 
2000-17 
Crack in 
Weld Area 
of Reactor 
Coolant 
System Hot 
Leg Piping 
at V. C. 
Summer 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice (IN) supplement to 
provide updated information about the crack found in a weld in the A loop hot leg pipe in the reactor 
coolant system (RCS) at the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station. It is expected that recipients will review 
the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar 
problems. However, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
On October 7, 2000, during a containment inspection after entering a refueling outage, the licensee 
identified a large quantity of boron on the floor and protruding from the air boot around the "A" loop 
RCS hot leg pipe. Ultrasonic testing (UT) and eddy current testing (ET) identified an axial crack-like 
indication approximately 2.7 inches long located approximately 7 degrees counterclockwise from top 
dead center of the first weld between the reactor vessel nozzle and the "A" loop hot leg piping 
approximately 3 feet from the reactor vessel. Based on the UT data, the axial crack-like indication 
began at the inner diameter and shows evidence of complete through-wall extension. Visual 
examination from the outer diameter identified a small "weep hole" in the center of the weld at 
approximately the same circumferential location as the UT and ET indications. 
Piping 
IN 2000-09 Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Failure at 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice to inform addressees of a 
steam generator tube failure at Indian Point Unit 2. NRC investigations of the licensee's steam 
generator inspection program are ongoing and any potentially generic issues identified will be 
communicated in a separate generic communication. However, the investigations to date re-emphasize 
Steam 
Generator 
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Indian 
Point Unit 
2 
the importance of licensee involvement with ongoing industry efforts to understand and detect steam 
generator degradation. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to 
their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions 
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written 
response is required. 
 
Discussion 
On February 15, 2000, at 7:17 p.m., the Indian Point Unit 2 nuclear plant experienced a steam 
generator tube failure, which required the declaration of an Alert at 7:29 p.m., and a manual reactor 
trip at 7:30 p.m. The operators identified that the #24 steam generator was the source of the leak and 
completed isolation of the #24 steam generator by 8:31 p.m. 
 
IN 99-10, 
Rev. 1, 
and 99-
10 
Degradatio
n of 
Prestressin
g Tendon 
Systems in 
Prestressed 
Concrete 
Containme
nts 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees 
to the degradation of prestressing systems components of prestressed concrete containments (PCCs). 
The following specific items are addressed: (1) breakage of prestressing tendon wires, (2) effects of 
high temperature on the prestressing forces in tendons, and (3) trend analysis of prestressing forces. It 
is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider 
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information 
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
On April 13, 1999, the staff issued Information Notice 99-10 to describe the degradation associated 
with the tendon prestressing system of prestressed concrete containments (PCCs). The staff received a 
letter from Duke Energy on May 6, 1999, which indicated that Attachment 3 to IN 99-10, 
"Comparison and Trending of Prestressing Forces," misrepresented the Oconee experience. This 
revision corrects the observations made by the staff concerning the sixth tendon surveillance 
performed at Oconee Unit 3 in the summer of 1995 and provides other editorial and clarifying 
changes. 
 
Inspections of PCCs and PCC tendons have identified a number of concerns related to the degradation 
of prestressing tendon systems in PCCs. Findings relevant to these concerns are: Breakage of 
Prestressing Tendon Wires, Effects of High Temperature on the Prestressing Forces in Tendons, 
Comparison and Trending of Prestressing Forces 
Prestressing 
tendons 
IN 98-45 Cavitation 
Erosion of 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees 
to potential problems caused by cavitation erosion of letdown line orifices in the chemical and volume 
Piping 
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Letdown 
Line 
Orifices 
Resulting 
in Fatigue 
Cracking of 
Pipe Welds 
control system (CVCS). Such erosion has contributed to failures in pipe welds downstream of the 
letdown line orifices. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their 
facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions 
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written 
response is required. 
 
Discussion 
On September 11, 1996, Surry Power Station, Unit 2, experienced its fourth socket weld failure in 12 
months. The failed welds were located on the low-pressure portion of the CVCS letdown line, just 
downstream of the pressure-reducing orifice isolation valves. The licensee determined that the most 
likely cause of the weld failure was flow-induced vibration. The licensee performed a microscopic 
examination of the Unit 2 letdown line orifices and concluded that two of the orifices exhibited cone-
shaped patterns, wider at the discharge of the orifice and tapering toward the inlet of the orifice. In 
addition, the orifice exhibited very rough and irregular surface profiles. The damage to the letdown 
line orifices is indicative of cavitation erosion and is believed to have contributed to flow-induced 
vibration of the letdown line and to the socket weld failures. 
 
On March 15, 1997, the licensee performed radiographic examinations on the Surry Unit 1 letdown 
line orifices to check for an erosion condition similar to that previously seen in the Unit 2 letdown line 
orifices. The licensee concluded that erosion was present in all three orifices and that the most 
extensive deterioration was present in the 45-gpm orifice. 
 
Socket welds have also failed at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2. From June 1989 through 
December 1990, four socket welds failed on two of three reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure 
letdown lines in the CVCS. All four failed welds were located on the piping downstream of the RCS 
letdown orifice isolation valves. On March 19, 1991, Diablo Canyon Unit 2 experienced the fifth 
letdown leak since June 1989. During the repair effort, the licensee determined that the cause of the 
failures was flow-induced vibration due to a damaged letdown orifice upstream of the weld failure. 
IN 98-27 Steam 
Generator 
Tube End 
Cracking 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform licensees 
of instances of steam generator tube-end cracking. It is expected that recipients will review the 
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar 
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; 
therefore, no specific action or written response in required. 
 
Discussion 
Steam 
Generators 
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Entergy, the licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), conducted leak testing on each once-
through steam generator (OTSG) during the spring 1998 refueling outage to identify the source of 
primary-to-secondary leakage measured during the previous operating cycle. The leak testing revealed 
a small leak in one tube of each OTSG. The leak in each tube was in flaws in the tube hardroll just 
below the upper tubesheet seal weld. Subsequent eddy current inspections identified primary-water 
stress-corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in each of the two tubes. The through-wall flaws in the tubes were 
oriented both axially and circumferentially in the tubes. Examinations of all upper tubesheet seal weld 
areas in both OTSGs revealed possible flaws in 1896 additional tubes. 
 
Eddy current inspections completed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in April 1998 identified 
five tubes with "tube end anomalies" believed to be related to the flaws identified at ANO-1. Duke 
Power Co. recently completed an assessment to determine if its Babcock and Wilcox-designed, 
operating units, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 3, were affected by tube-end cracking. The 
licensee concluded that 372 indications in the Unit 1 OTSGs and 61 indications in the Unit 3 OTSGs 
exceeded the repair criteria in the Oconee Technical Specifications. Tube-end cracking has also been 
reported for the steam generators at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. 
IN 98-26 Settlement 
Monitoring 
and 
Inspection 
of Plant 
Structures 
Affected by 
Degradatio
n of Porous 
Concrete 
Subfoundat
ions 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform 
addressees who own and operate facilities with plant sites that include structures with porous concrete 
subfoundations of the possibility of degradation of these subfoundations. Such degradation could have 
deleterious effects on structures, systems, and components (SSCs). 
 
It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider 
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information 
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. 
 
Discussion 
The containment structure at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 (MNPS-3), has a 3.05-meter 
(10-foot) thick reinforced-concrete basemat founded on rock. Between the foundation rock surface and 
the underside of the basemat are several layers of different materials. In the upper porous concrete 
layer, 15-cm (6-inch) diameter porous concrete pipes are installed to collect and drain ground water, 
which may seep down along the periphery of the containment wall. The collected water drains into 
two sumps inside the engineered safety features (ESF) building. 
 
The MNPS-3 licensee, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, identified the issue of cement erosion 
from the porous concrete drainage system in 1987 upon examination of the accumulated white residue 
Concrete – 
porous 
concrete 
subfoundatio
n 
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in the two lower drain sumps in the ESF building. IN 97-11, "Cement Erosion From Containment 
Subfoundations at Nuclear Power Plants," was issued on March 21, 1997, to alert addressees to the 
potential for erosion of cement from porous concrete subfoundations. 
IN 98-11 Cracking of 
Reactor 
Vessel 
Internal 
Baffle 
Former 
Bolts in 
Foreign 
Plants 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees 
to the cracking of reactor vessel internal baffle former bolts found at several foreign PWRs and to 
inform addressees of actions taken and planned by domestic PWR owners groups in response to this 
experience. It is expected that the recipients will review the information for applicability to their 
facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions 
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; IN 98-11 
 
Discussion 
European plants identified the cracking of baffle former bolts as early as 1988 and this problem 
continues to occur. Although this cracking is not fully understood, testing of cracked bolts suggests an 
age-related intergranular stress-corrosion cracking process influenced by bolt material, fluence, stress, 
and temperature. The reported cracking occurred in 316 cold-worked stainless steel bolts. Most of the 
cracking reported has been in four French 900-MWe (megawatt electric) PWRs. 
RPV reactor 
internals –
internal 
baffle bolts 
Bulletin 
(BL) 
2004-01 Inspection 
of Alloy 
82/182/600 
Materials 
Used in the 
Fabrication 
of 
Pressurizer 
Penetration
s and 
Steam 
Space 
Piping 
Connection
s at 
Pressurized
-Water 
Reactors 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) advise PWR licensees that current methods of inspecting Alloy 82/182/600 materials used in the 
fabrication of pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections may need to be 
supplemented with additional measures to detect and adequately characterize flaws due to primary 
water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC), 
(2) request PWR addressees to provide the NRC with information related to the materials from which 
the pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections at their facilities were fabricated, 
(3) request PWR licensees to provide the NRC with information related to the inspections that have 
been and those that will be performed to ensure that degradation of Alloy 82/182/600 materials used in 
the fabrication of pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections will be identified, 
adequately characterized, and repaired, and 
(4) require PWR addresses to provide a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(f)). 
 
Operating experience, both domestic and foreign, has demonstrated that Alloy 82/182/600 materials 
connected to a PWR’s pressurizer may be particularly susceptible to PWSCC. Since the late 1980's, 
approximately 50 Alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeves at Combustion Engineering-designed (CE-
designed) facilities in the United States have shown evidence of RCPB leakage which has been 
attributed to PWSCC. The most recent events of this type 
Pressurizer 
and Piping 
135 
Type No. Title Topic SPC Affected 
occurred at Millstone, Unit 2, and Waterford, Unit 3, in October 2003, and at Palo Verde, Unit 3, in 
February 2004. All available evidence from finite element modeling studies and limited 
nondestructive evaluation (NDE) has suggested that these leakage events were the result of 
axially-oriented PWSCC of the pressure boundary portion of these heater sleeves. However, 
NDE results from Palo Verde, Unit 2's fall 2003 refueling outage, on heater sleeves which had not 
shown evidence of leakage have demonstrated that circumferentially-oriented PWSCC can occur in 
the non-pressure boundary portion (i.e., above the J-groove attachment weld) of these components. 
Cracking in a TMI-1 diaphragm plate was attributed to PWSCC in the heat affected zone of the seal 
weld. Boric acid corrosion of the low alloy steel strongback was also observed to have resulted from 
the leakage. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• Bulletin 2003-02, “Leakage From Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor 
Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,” August 21, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032320153) BL 
2004-01 
• Bulletin 2002-02, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection 
Programs,” August 9, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022200494) 
• Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary Integrity,” March 18, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020770497) 
• Bulletin 2001-01, “Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles,” 
August 3, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML012080284) 
BL 2003-02 Leakage 
from 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Lower 
Head 
Penetration
s and 
Reactor 
Coolant 
Pressure 
Boundary 
Integrity 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) advise PWR addressees that current methods of inspecting the RPV lower heads may 
need to be supplemented with additional measures (e.g., bare-metal visual inspections) 
to detect reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) leakage, 
(2) request PWR addressees to provide the NRC with information related to inspections 
that have been or will be performed to verify the integrity of the RPV lower head 
penetrations, and 
(3) require PWR addresses to provide a written response to the NRC in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR 50.54(f)). 
 
The RPV and its head penetrations are an integral part of the RCPB, and their integrity is 
important to the safe operation of the plant. The recent identification of cracking and leakage 
from two BMI penetrations at South Texas Project Unit 1 (STP Unit 1) raises questions about potential 
RPV head 
penetrations 
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degradation mechanisms which may be active in this area. In addition, licensee responses to the 
Bulletin 2002-01 followup RAIs raised questions about the adequacy of inspections performed by 
licensees to detect leakage from RPV lower head penetrations. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
• Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-13, “NRC Review of Responses to Bulletin 2002-01, ‘Reactor 
Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,’ July 29, 2003 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML032100653) 
• Information Notice 2003-11 “Leakage Found on Bottom-Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles,” August 
13, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032250135) 
• Bulletin 2002-02, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection 
Programs,” August 9, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022200494) 
• Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary Integrity,” March 18, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020770497) 
• Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary 
• Components in PWR Plants," March 17, 1988 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031130424) 
BL 2003-01 Potential 
Impact of 
Debris 
Blockage 
on 
Emergency 
Sump 
Recirculati
on at 
Pressurized
-Water 
Reactors 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) Inform addressees of the results of NRC-sponsored research identifying the potential 
susceptibility of pressurized-water reactor (PWR) recirculation sump screens to debris 
blockage in the event of a high-energy line break (HELB) requiring recirculation 
operation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or containment spray system 
(CSS). 
(2) Inform addressees of the potential for additional adverse effects due to debris blockage 
of flowpaths necessary for ECCS and CSS recirculation and containment drainage. 
(3) Request that, in light of these potentially adverse effects, addressees confirm their 
compliance with 10 CFR 50.46(b)(5) and other existing applicable regulatory 
requirements, or describe any compensatory measures implemented to reduce the 
potential risk due to post-accident debris blockage as evaluations to determine 
compliance proceed. 
(4) Require addressees to provide the NRC a written response in accordance with 
10 CFR 50.54(f). 
 
In the event of a HELB within the containment of a PWR, energetic pressure waves and fluid 
jets would impinge upon materials in the vicinity of the break, such as thermal insulation, 
coatings, and concrete, causing damage and generating debris. Debris could also be 
ECCS and 
CSS sump & 
drainage 
blockage 
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generated through secondary mechanisms, such as severe post-accident temperature and 
humidity conditions, flooding of the lower containment, and the impact of containment spray 
droplets. 
 
To assess the likelihood of the ECCS and CSS pumps at domestic PWRs experiencing a 
debris-induced loss of NPSH margin during sump recirculation, the NRC sponsored a GSI-191 
research program, which culminated in a parametric study. The parametric study mechanistically 
treated phenomena associated with debris blockage using analytical models of domestic PWRs that 
were generated with a combination of generic and plant-specific data. As documented in Volume 1 of 
NUREG/CR-6762, “GSI-191 Technical Assessment: Parametric Evaluations for Pressurized Water 
Reactor Recirculation Sump Performance,” dated August 2002, the GSI-191 parametric study 
concludes that recirculation sump clogging is a credible concern for the population of domestic PWRs. 
 
The NRC’s GSI-191 research identified the holdup or diversion of recirculation sump inventory as an 
important and potentially credible concern, and a number of LERs associated with this concern have 
also been generated, which further confirms both its credibility and potential significance. These LERs 
include: 
• LER 50-369/90-012, “Loose Material Was Located in Upper Containment During Unit Operation 
Because of an Inappropriate Action,” McGuire Unit 1, submitted August 30, 1990. 
• LER 50-266/97-006, “Potential Refueling Cavity Drain Failure Could Affect Accident Mitigation,” 
Point Beach Unit 1, submitted February 19, 1997. 
• LER 50-455/97-001, “Unit 2 Containment Drain System Clogged Due to Debris,” Byron Unit 2, 
submitted April 17, 1997. 
• LER 50-269/97-010, “Inadequate Analysis of ECCS Sump Inventory Due to Inadequate Design 
Analysis,” Oconee Unit 1, submitted January 8, 1998. 
• LER 50-315/98-017, “Debris Recovered from Ice Condenser Represents Unanalyzed Condition,” 
D.C. Cook Unit 1, submitted July 1, 1998. 
 
Other cases included in the BL: 
• On December 11, 2002, the licensee for Davis-Besse Unit 1 submitted LER 50-346/02-005-01, 
“Potential Clogging of the Emergency Sump Due to Debris in Containment.” 
• On May 5, 2003, the Davis-Besse licensee submitted LER 50-346/03-002-00, which stated that the 
HPI pumps had been declared inoperable as a result of the potential for debris to damage the pump 
internals during the recirculation phase of certain postulated LOCAs when the HPI pumps are 
required to take suction from the containment recirculation sump. 
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Related Generic Communications 
24 Generic Communications listed related to ECCS and CSS sump and strainer blockage. 
BL 2002-02 Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head and 
Vessel 
Head 
Penetration 
Nozzle 
Inspection 
Programs 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) Advise pressurized-water reactor (PWR) addressees that visual examinations, as a 
primary inspection method for the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head and vessel head 
penetration (VHP) nozzles, may need to be supplemented with additional measures 
(e.g., volumetric and surface examinations) to demonstrate compliance with applicable 
regulations. 
(2) Advise PWR addressees that inspection methods and frequencies to demonstrate 
compliance with applicable regulations should be demonstrated to be reliable and 
effective. 
(3) Request information from all PWR addressees concerning their RPV head and VHP 
nozzle inspection programs to ensure compliance with applicable regulatory 
requirements. 
(4) Require all PWR addressees to provide written responses to this bulletin related to their 
inspection program plans. 
 
Discussion 
Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in PWR control rod drive mechanism 
(CRDM) nozzles and other vessel head penetration nozzles fabricated from Alloy 600 is not a 
new issue; axial cracking in the CRDM nozzles has been identified since the late 1980s. In 
addition, numerous small-bore Alloy 600 nozzles and pressurizer heater sleeves have 
experienced leaks attributable to PWSCC. The area of interest for potential cracking of RPV head 
penetrations is the pressure-retaining boundary, which includes the J-groove weld 
between the nozzle and reactor vessel head and the portion of the nozzle inside the head. 
 
Inspections of the reactor nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Stations 2 and 3 in early 2001 identified 
circumferential cracking of the nozzles above the J-groove weld. 
 
In early March 2002, while conducting VHP nozzle inspections that were prompted by NRC 
Bulletin 2001-01, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station identified a large cavity in the RPV head near 
the top of the dome. The cavity was adjacent to a nozzle which was leaking as a result of through-wall 
axial cracking, and was located in an area of the RPV head that the licensee had left covered with boric 
acid deposits for a number of years. 
RPV head & 
nozzle 
penetrations 
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Related Generic Communications 
• Bulletin 2002-01, “Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary Integrity,” March 18, 2002. [ADAMS Accession No. ML020770497] 
• Information Notice 2002-11, “Recent Experience with Degradation of Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Head,” March 12, 2002. [ADAMS Accession No. ML020700556] 
• Bulletin 2001-01, “Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles,” 
August 3, 2001. [ADAMS Accession No. ML012080284] 
• Information Notice 2001-05, “Through-Wall Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel 
Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3,” April 
30, 2001. [ADAMS Accession No. ML011160588] 
• Generic Letter 97-01, “Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel 
Closure Head Penetrations,” April 1, 1997. 
• Information Notice 96-11, “Ingress of Demineralizer Resins Increases Potential for Stress Corrosion 
Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetrations,” February 14, 1996. 
• Information Notice 90-10, “Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of INCONEL 600,” February 
23, 1990. 
• Generic Letter 88-05, “Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary 
Components in PWR Plants,” March 17, 1988. 
• NUREG/CR-6245, ”Assessment of Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Drive Mechanism 
Nozzle Cracking,” October 1994. 
BL 2002-01 Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head 
Degradatio
n and 
Reactor 
Coolant 
Pressure 
Boundary 
Integrity 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to require pressurized-water 
reactor (PWR) addressees to submit: 
(1) information related to the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary including the reactor 
pressure vessel head and the extent to which inspections have been undertaken to satisfy applicable 
regulatory requirements, and  
(2) the basis for concluding that plants satisfy applicable regulatory requirements related to the 
structural integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and future inspections will ensure 
continued compliance with applicable regulatory requirements, and  
(3) a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of Title 10, Section 50.54(f), of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(f)) if they are unable to provide the information or 
they can not meet the requested completion dates. 
 
Discussion 
RPV head & 
nozzle 
penetrations 
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Type No. Title Topic SPC Affected 
On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure 
Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles" (ADAMS Accession Number ML012080284). That bulletin 
described instances of cracked and leaking Alloy 600 reactor pressure vessel head penetration nozzles, 
including control rod drive mechanism and thermocouple nozzles. In response to that bulletin, 
pressurized-water reactor licensees provided their plans for inspecting their reactor pressure vessel 
head penetrations and/or the outside surface of the reactor pressure vessel head to determine whether 
the nozzles were leaking. Some plants have completed these inspections. In conducting these 
inspections at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in February and March 2002, the licensee 
identified three control rod drive mechanism nozzles with indications of axial cracking that resulted in 
reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
16 Generic Communications listed related to this issue. 
BL 2001-01 Circumfere
ntial 
Cracking of 
Reactor 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Head 
Penetration 
Nozzles 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this bulletin to: 
(1) request that addressees provide information related to the structural integrity of the reactor pressure 
vessel head penetration (VHP) nozzles for their respective facilities, including the extent of VHP 
nozzle leakage and cracking that has been found to date, the inspections and repairs that have been 
undertaken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and the basis for concluding that their plans 
for future inspections will ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements, and  
(2) require that all addressees provide to the NRC a written response in accordance with the provisions 
of 10 CFR 50.54(f). 
 
Discussion 
The recent discoveries of cracked and leaking Alloy 600 VHP nozzles, including control rod drive 
mechanism (CRDM) and thermocouple nozzles, at four pressurized water reactors (PWRs) have raised 
concerns about the structural integrity of VHP nozzles throughout the PWR industry. Nozzle cracking 
at Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1 (ONS1) in November 2000 and Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 
(ANO1) in February 2001 was limited to axial cracking, an occurrence deemed to be of limited safety 
concern in the NRC staff's generic safety evaluation on the cracking of VHP nozzles, dated November 
19, 1993. However, the discovery of circumferential cracking at Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 
(ONS3) in February 2001 and Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2 (ONS2) in April 2001 - particularly the 
large circumferential cracking identified in two CRDM nozzles at ONS3 - has raised concerns about 
the potential safety implications and prevalence of cracking in VHP nozzles in PWRs. 
 
Related Generic Communications 
RPV head 
penetrations 
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Type No. Title Topic SPC Affected 
Same as BL 2002-02. 
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Table 4-2  Summary of Degradation Information by Generic Communications 
 
Generic 
Correspondence Component / Subcomponent 
Number of Generic 
Correspondences on 
this Component 
Generic Letter Steam Generators 4 
 Strainer – Sump Pump Screens 2 
 RPV – CRD nozzles & other penetrations 1 
 Subtotal = 7 
   
Bulletin RPV – head penetrations, & coolant boundary 4 
 Strainer – Sump Pump Screens 1 
 Pressurizer & steam space piping connection 1 
  Subtotal = 6 
   
Information Notice Steam Generators 9 
 RPV - nozzles 8 
 Piping 7 
 Containment 3 
 Concrete 2 
 Pressurizer 2 
 Spent fuel pool – liner 1 
 Equipment – boric acide leakage onto 1 
  Subtotal = 33 
   
  Total = 46 
 
143 
Table 4-3  Summary of Degradation by Components 
 
Component Number of Generic Correspondences 
Steam Generators 13 
RPV 13 
Piping 7 
Strainer – Sump Pump Screens 3 
Pressurizer 3 
Containment 3 
Concrete 2 
Spent Fuel Pool 1 
Equipment – boric acide leakage onto 1 
 Total = 46 
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Table 4-4  License Renewal Applications for Information Related to Aging Degradation – Palisades Nuclear Power Plant 
[Available on the NRC Website] 
 
Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
Alloy 600 
Program 
This is an existing program that manages aging due 
to PWSCC of the Primary Coolant System (PCS) 
pressure boundary Alloy 600 components, including 
Inconel 82/182 weld joints, reactor vessel head 
penetrations, etc. 
Industry: 
Instances of degradation of material have occurred as a result of PWSCC 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Pressurizer Temperature Element Penetration 
• Pressurizer Safe End 
• CRD Nozzle penetration indications (2) 
ASME 
Section XI 
IWB, IWC, 
IWD, IWF 
Inservice 
Inspection 
Program 
This is an existing program that facilitates 
inspections to identify and correct degradation in 
Class 1, 2, and 3 piping, components, their supports 
and integral attachments. The program includes 
periodic visual, surface and/or volumetric 
examinations and leakage tests of all Class 1, 2 and 3 
pressure-retaining components, their supports and 
integral attachments, including welds, pump casings, 
valve bodies, pressure-retaining bolting, 
piping/component supports, and reactor head closure 
studs. 
Industry: 
Numerous instances of degradation of components, component supports, and bolting 
have occurred. 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Control Rod Drive Housings 
• Piping Welds 
• Component Supports 
• Bolting 
• Temperature Element Penetration 
• Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Safe End 
• Engineered Safeguards Systems Check Valve 
Bolting 
Integrity 
Program 
This is an existing program that manages the aging 
effects associated with bolting through the 
performance of periodic inspections. The program 
also includes repair/replacement controls for ASME 
Section XI related bolting and generic guidance 
regarding material selection, thread lubrication and 
assembly of bolted joints. 
Industry: 
Numerous instances of degradation of bolting have occurred. 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Piping Flange Bolts (1) 
• Pump Studs (2) 
• Tank Flange Bolts (1) 
• Pipe Support Bolting (1) 
• ESS Equipment Bolting (1) 
Boric Acid 
Corrosion 
This is an existing program that monitors component 
degradation due to boric acid leakage through the 
Industry: 
• Boric acid wastage of reactor coolant system piping and nozzles 
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Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
Program performance of periodic inspections. It implements 
the recommendations of NRC Generic Letter 88-05. 
The program requires periodic visual inspection of 
all systems within the scope of license renewal that 
contain borated water for evidence of leakage, 
accumulations of dried boric acid, or boric acid 
wastage. The program also provides for visual 
inspections and early discovery of borated water 
leaks such that structures, electrical and mechanical 
components that may be contacted by leaking 
borated water will not be adversely affected such 
that their intended functions are impaired. 
• Boric acid corrosion of reactor vessel head and closure studs from leaking borated 
water 
• Failure of valve packing gland bolts due to boric acid wastage 
• Failure of valve body to bonnet studs/nuts due to boric acid wastage 
• Boric acid wastage of reactor coolant pump closure flange studs 
• Boric acid corrosion of steam generator manway closure studs 
• Boric acid corrosion of high pressure safety injection pump casing 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Boric acid leaks in the containment spray header in containment at flanges with 
carbon steel bolting and a threaded spray nozzle connection 
• Boric acid wastage of primary coolant pump studs 
• Boric acid wastage of manual valve body-to-bonnet bolts 
• Corrosion of flanges for primary coolant pump component cooling water 
connections due to external boric acid leakage 
Buried 
Services 
Corrosion 
Monitoring 
Program 
This is a new program that manages aging effects on 
the external surfaces of carbon steel, low-alloy steel, 
and stainless steel components that are buried in soil 
or sand. This program includes (a) visual inspections 
of external surfaces of buried components for 
evidence of coating damage and substrate 
degradation to manage the effects of aging, (b) 
visual inspection of the external surfaces of buried 
stainless steel components for evidence of crevice 
corrosion, pitting, and MIC. The periodicity of these 
inspections for carbon, low-alloy, and stainless steel 
will be based on opportunities for inspection such as 
scheduled maintenance work. 
Industry: 
Issues related to Diesel fuel line leakage from the absence of required coating leading 
to corrosion. 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Through wall leak in buried steam line. 
• Generic program deficiencies from internal Engineering Programs audit. 
• See the Fire Protection Program for OE related to buried fire main ruptures. 
 
None of the plant operating issues or instances resulted from normal aging, or reflect 
significant program deficiencies. 
Closed Cycle 
Cooling 
Water 
Program 
This is an existing program that manages aging 
effects in closed cycle cooling water systems that are 
not subject to significant sources of contamination, 
in which water chemistry is controlled and heat is 
not directly rejected to the ultimate heat sink. The 
program includes (a) maintenance of system 
Industry: 
• SCC in reactor coolant pump oil cooler discharge piping. 
• Corroded solder connections in diesel lube oil cooler due to inadequate corrosion 
inhibitor 
• Inoperable check valves (stuck open) due to corrosion product buildup 
• Cracks in Component Cooling Water piping 
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Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
corrosion inhibitor concentrations to minimize 
degradation, and (b) periodic or one-time testing and 
inspections to assess SSC aging. 
• Fouling of diesel cooling water heat exchangers 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Tube blockage and fouling in Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 
• Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger tube breakage due to high Component Cooling Water 
flow 
• Through wall flaw in Spent Fuel Pool Cooling pipe 
Containment 
Inservice 
Inspection 
Program 
This is an existing program that is designed to ensure 
that containment shell concrete, the post-tensioning 
system and steel pressure retaining elements 
continue to provide an acceptable level of structural 
integrity. In addition, it is designed to ensure that the 
liner (with associated moisture barriers), other 
leakage limiting steel barriers and pressure retaining 
bolted connections have not degraded. 
Industry: 
Instances have occurred with containments. 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Liner plate corrosion 
• Unacceptable tendon liftoff value 
• Tendon gallery corrosion 
• Tendon grease leakage 
• Moisture barrier not in place 
• Tendon sheath water intrusion 
 
Diesel Fuel 
Monitoring 
and Storage 
Program 
This is an existing program that assures the 
continued availability and quality of fuel oil to be 
used in diesel generators and diesel fire pumps. The 
program includes (a) monitoring and trending of fuel 
oil chemistry to maintain fuel oil quality and 
mitigate corrosion, (b) periodic draining, cleaning, 
and internal inspection of fuel oil storage tanks, and 
(c) verification of program effectiveness by a one-
time measurement of fuel oil storage tank bottom 
thickness confirming the absence of an aging effect. 
Industry: 
• Fuel contamination leading to corrosion of fuel oil system components. 
• Improper zinc coating curing and epoxy application by the manufacturer leads to 
zinc-fuel reaction creating adverse corrosion. 
• Fuel oil leak caused by improper outer coating application. 
 
Plant Specific: 
No aging issues were identified. 
Fire 
Protection 
Program 
This is an existing program that includes (a) fire 
barrier inspections, (b) electric and diesel-driven fire 
pump tests, and (c) periodic maintenance, testing, 
and inspection of water-based fire protection 
systems. Periodic visual inspections of fire barrier 
penetration seals, fire dampers, fire barrier walls, 
Industry: 
• Fire water system piping corrosion and ruptures 
• Fire retardant coatings and materials 
• Fouling of components in contact with raw water 
• Problems with fire barriers. 
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Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
ceilings and floors, and periodic visual inspections 
and functional tests of fire-rated doors are performed 
to ensure that functionality and operability is 
maintained. 
Plant Specific: 
• Blockage of Fire Protection piping with corrosion products 
• Deluge valve trim piping failures due to corrosion 
• Underground fire main rupture due to cyclic loadings 
• Water tight fire door seal degradation 
Flow 
Accelerated 
Corrosion 
Program 
This is an existing program that manages aging 
effects due to flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC) on 
the internal surfaces of carbon or low alloy steel 
piping, elbows, reducers, expanders, and valve 
bodies which contain high energy fluids (both single 
phase and two phase). 
Industry: 
• Feedwater heater shell degradation and ruptures 
• Feedwater and Condensate line ruptures 
• Pipe wall thinning downstream of control valves and flow restricting devices 
• Valve body erosion 
• Extraction steam line ruptures 
• Moisture Separator Reheater Drain Tank drain line ruptures 
• Steam Generator Feedwater distribution piping and J-tube damage 
• Erosion of carbon steel ribs and tube supports in Steam Generators 
 
Plant Specific: 
• FAC on 2 inch main steam line elbows 
• Higher than expected wear rates on 8 inch steam pipes and elbows on the outlet of 
Moisture Separator Reheater 
• Main Condenser tube leaks caused by FAC 
• Higher than expected wear rates on high pressure extraction steam piping to high 
pressure feedwater heater 
• FAC on end-bell of low pressure feedwater heater 
• Valve body FAC on control valves and check valves 
• FAC of feedwater heater shell side capped drains 
• FAC damage to low pressure turbine extraction sleeves 
• FAC damage to extraction steam lines to high pressure feedwater heaters 
• FAC damage to Moisture Separator Reheater vent line 
• FAC of feedwater piping 
• FAC of reducer downstream of control valve 
• Through wall steam leak on steam generator flash tank 
One-Time 
Inspection 
Program 
This is a new program that addresses potentially 
long incubation periods for certain aging effects, 
including various corrosion mechanisms, cracking, 
Industry: 
Not discussed 
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Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
and selective leaching, and provides a means of 
verifying that an aging effect is either not occurring 
or progressing so slowly as to have negligible effect 
on the intended function of the structure or 
component. 
Plant Specific: 
Not discussed 
Open Cycle 
Cooling 
Water 
Program 
This is an existing program that manages aging 
effects such as loss of material due to general, 
pitting, and crevice corrosion, erosion, MIC, and loss 
of heat transfer due to biological/corrosion product 
fouling (e.g., sedimentation, silting) caused by 
exposure of internal surfaces of metallic components 
to raw, untreated (e.g., service) water. The program 
scope includes activities to manage aging in the 
Service Water System (SWS) and Circulating Water 
system (CWS). 
Industry: 
• Accumulations of silt and corrosion products in service water piping, valves, and 
heat exchangers 
• Accumulation of biological growth (mussels, clams, and shells) in service water 
piping, valves and heat exchangers 
• MIC causing pitting attack of carbon steel and stainless steel service water piping, 
pump casings, and 90/10 Cu/Ni heat exchanger tubes 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Defective tubes in the Main Condenser that required plugging due to MIC 
• Control Room Condensing Unit Condenser Drain Plug severely corroded due to 
MIC 
• Large Zebra Mussel accumulation near traveling screens and inside intake piping 
• Blockage of heat exchanger and cooler tubing 
• Corroded service water piping at threaded connections 
• Pinhole leaks in service water piping due to MIC 
• Switch failure due to sediment and corrosion (galvanic) blocking sensing line 
• Tubercles growing in carbon steel service water piping 
• Erosion of pipes, cooling coils, and heat exchanger tubes causing service water leaks 
Reactor 
Vessel 
Integrity 
Surveillance 
Program 
This is an existing program that manages the aging 
effect reduction of fracture toughness due to neutron 
embrittlement of the low alloy steel reactor vessel. 
Industry & Plant Specific: 
GL 92-01, Revision 1, “Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity,” and Supplement 1 to GL 
92-01, Revision 1, “Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity.” Palisades' response to these 
documents has been incorporated into the Reactor Vessel Integrity Surveillance 
Program. 
 
A review of NRC Inspection Reports, QA Audit/Surveillance Reports, and Self 
Assessments since 1999 revealed no issues or findings that could impact the 
effectiveness of the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. 
Reactor The Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection Program is Industry: 
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Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
Vessel 
Internals 
Inspection 
Program 
an existing program that manages the aging effects 
for reactor vessel internals. 
Several instances were revealed where degradation has occurred within the reactor 
vessel internals. 
 
Plant Specific: 
Degradation was discovered in the core barrel and the control rod drive mechanism 
(CRDM) seal housings 
Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Integrity 
Program 
This is an existing program that manages the aging 
effects of steam generator tubes and tube repairs. 
The Program also manages the aging effects of 
accessible steam generator secondary side internal 
components and incorporates the guidance of NEI 
97-06. 
Industry: 
Instances of degradation have occurred within the steam generators. 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Top of tubesheet 
• Within the tubesheet 
• U-bends 
• Mechanical wear at eggcrate supports, vertical straps, and diagonal bars 
Structural 
Monitoring 
Program 
This is an existing program that is designed to ensure 
that age related (as well as other) deterioration of 
plant structures (including masonry walls) and 
components within its scope is appropriately 
managed to ensure that each such structure or 
component retains the ability to perform its intended 
function. 
Industry: 
• Corrosion of steel ice condenser containment vessels caused by boric acid and 
condensation 
• Cracks in concrete floors caused by flexing and shrinkage 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Settling of air compressor foundations 
• Watertight barrier degradation 
• Spalled concrete and exposed anchor bolts 
• Intake crib damage due to ice and to wave action 
• Cracking of concrete beams in the Auxiliary Building 
• Corrosion of condenser rock anchors caused by standing water and debris 
• Degradation of snubber anchor support structure concrete and grout 
• Deterioration of floor plugs due to leaking water 
• Moisture Separator Reheater foundation cracking 
• Cracks in concrete duct bank 
• Cracks in West ESS room west wall 
• Spalled concrete on wall of 1-2 Diesel Generator Exhaust Plenum 
• Groundwater leaks in Auxiliary Feedwater Pump room floor 
System This is an existing plant-specific program that Industry: 
150 
Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
Monitoring 
Program 
manages aging effects for normally accessible, 
external surfaces of piping, tanks, and other 
components and equipment within the scope of 
License Renewal. These aging effects are managed 
through visual inspection and monitoring of external 
surfaces for leakage and evidence of material 
degradation. 
• Service Water Pump flange welds and bolting found excess rusting leading 
to leakage (Inadequate/infrequent system walkdowns were cited). 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Various pump and valve flange welds and bolting (carbon steel) were found having 
significant material loss due to high moisture environment or boric acid 
accumulations. 
• Floor-mounted pipe supports were discovered with excessive corrosion of bolts. 
(Concrete failure may have contributed from vibration and/or concrete boric acid 
contamination) 
Water 
Chemistry 
Program 
This is an existing program that is credited for 
managing aging effects such as loss-of-material due 
to general, pitting and crevice corrosion; cracking 
due to SCC; and steam generator tube degradation 
caused by denting, intergranular attack (IGA) and 
outer diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC), 
by controlling the environment to which internal 
surfaces of systems and components are exposed. 
The aging effects are minimized by controlling the 
chemical species that cause the underlying 
mechanisms that result in these aging effects. 
Industry: 
• Cracking in steam generator welds 
• Cracking and pitting of steam generator tubes and components 
• Alloy 600 cracking 
• Thinning of pipe and components due to erosion/corrosion 
• Cracking in safety injection accumulator nozzles 
• High wear of Reactor Coolant Pump Aluminum Oxide coated seals 
• Cracking of Control Rod Drive Housings 
• Cracking of pressurizer instrument tap nozzles 
• Cracking of safety injection piping 
• Cracking in feedwater piping 
• Chemical impurity intrusions into primary and secondary systems 
• Resin intrusions into the primary coolant systems 
 
Plant Specific: 
• Defective tubes in the Main Condenser due to steam impingement wear and 
Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) pitting 
• Exceeding Action Level 3 Limits for Steam Generator Cation Conductivity 
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Table 4-5  License Renewal Applications for Information Related to Aging Degradation – Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2 
[Available on the NRC Website] 
 
Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
ASME Section 
XI, 
Subsections 
IWE & IWL 
Inservice 
Inspection 
Program 
This AMP manages aging of (a) steel liners of 
concrete containments and their integral 
attachments; containment hatches and airlocks; 
seals, gaskets and moisture barriers; and pressure 
retaining bolting, and (b) reinforced concrete 
containments and unbonded post-tensioning 
systems. 
Industry: 
Industry operating experience and NRC information notices have documented areas of 
concern regarding containment liner plate, concrete, and tendon degradation. 
 
Plant Specific: 
Plant specific operating experience has shown that degradation has occurred. For 
example: failed tendon wires, missing or broken components found in the tendon 
hardware, degraded concrete in containment structure, corroded containment liner, 
and corrosion of penetrations inside of containment. 
? Degradation has occurred in the Unit 1 and 2 containment liners at the 8 foot 
elevation due to poor condition of the moisture barriers. The degradation consisted 
of general corrosion and pitting. 
? Several mechanical penetrations inside the Unit 1 and 2 containments have shown 
indications of general corrosion and/or peeling paint.  
? Corrosion was also found in the Unit 1 and 2 Containment Sump A at the interface 
between the containment liner plates and containment floor slabs. 
? Inspections performed on the containment tendons have discovered the following 
degradations: 
Broken wires, 
Wires with 2% to 4% less than expected pre-stress, 
Presence of nitrates in grease, 
Cracked button-head, missing button-heads, 
Tendon void of 9.7% of grease volume, 
More grease added than removed in some instances. 
ASME Section 
XI, Subsection 
IWF Inservice 
Inspection 
Program 
This AMP manages aging effects for Class 1, 2, and 
3 component supports. 
Industry: 
NRC Information Notice 80-36 notified utilities of the potential for stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC) of high strength component support bolts. 
 
Plant Specific: 
The most common relevant condition discovered by this AMP has been loose 
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Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
fasteners in supports. Loose fasteners are a maintenance issue, rather than a sign of 
age-related degradation. 
Bolting 
Integrity 
Program 
This AMP manages the aging effects associated 
with bolting through the performance of periodic 
inspections. The program also includes 
repair/replacement controls for ASME Section XI 
related bolting and generic guidance regarding 
material selection, thread lubrication and assembly 
of bolted joints. 
Industry: 
Numerous instances of primary pressure boundary degradation. There have been 
various NRC communications including information notices, bulletins, and generic 
letters on bolting degradation. Most instances of degradation fall into two categories: 
boric acid corrosion caused by leakage at mechanical joints; and degradation of high 
strength bolting caused by stress corrosion cracking. General corrosion of bolting and 
fasteners has also occurred for structural bolting located in a humid environment. 
 
Plant Specific: 
Boric acid wastage on one body/bonnet check valve stud. General corrosion was also 
found on structural steel bolting. There were also a few instances of improper bolting 
material and torque values being used. There were no incidents of loss of intended 
function of a component or system due to fastener degradation. 
Boraflex 
Monitoring 
Program 
The Boraflex Monitoring Program manages aging 
effects for the Boraflex material in the spent fuel 
racks. 
Industry: 
NRC Information Notice IN 87-43 addresses the problems of development of tears 
and gaps in Boraflex sheets due to gamma radiation-induced shrinkage of the 
material. NRC IN 93-70, NRC IN 95-38 and NRC GL 96-04 address several cases of 
significant degradation of Boraflex test coupons due to accelerated dissolution of 
Boraflex caused by spent fuel pool water flow through panel enclosures and high 
accumulated gamma dose. 
 
Plant Specific: 
The latest inspection of the SFP Boraflex panels was conducted in August 2001. The 
results of the Blackness Test (neutron attenuation measurements) indicated that for the 
first time since the Boraflex panels have been inspected, gaps have been found in 27 
panels ranging from 0.8 inches to 3.4 inches. 
Boric Acid 
Corrosion 
Program 
This AMP manages aging effects for structures and 
components as a result of borated water leakage. 
The program requires periodic visual inspection of 
systems that contain borated water for evidence of 
leakage or accumulations of dried boric acid. 
Industry: 
Boric acid solution leaking from the Reactor Coolant System can cause significant 
corrosion damage to carbon steel reactor coolant pressure boundary components. 
Severe corrosion damage to the RPV head at Davis-Besse and observed cracking and 
leakage on the RPV bottom head penetrations at South Texas have resulted in much 
industry attention to ensuring the implementation of an effective boric acid corrosion 
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Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
program. 
 
Plant Specific: 
Numerous Work Orders, Condition Reports/Action Requests, and several Licensee 
Event Reports have been issued as a result of this AMP discovering boric acid leaks 
and corrosion of components due to borated water leakage. A large percentage of 
these described finding dried boric acid crystal deposits either on the component from 
which it leaked or on the floor below the leaking component. Occasionally, dried 
boric acid crystals were found on components located below the leaking component. 
Buried 
Services 
Monitoring 
Program 
This AMP manages aging effects on the external 
surfaces of carbon steel, low-alloy steel, and cast 
iron components (e.g., tanks, piping) that are buried 
in soil or sand. 
Industry: 
Carbon steel, low alloy steel, or cast iron buried components have experienced 
corrosion and selective leaching degradation. The critical areas appear to be at the 
interface where the component transitions from above ground to below ground. This 
is also the area where coatings and wrappings will most likely be missing or damaged. 
 
Plant Specific: 
No degraded conditions discussed. 
Closed-Cycle 
Cooling Water 
System 
Surveillance 
Program 
This AMP manages aging effects in closed cycle 
cooling water systems that are not subject to 
significant sources of contamination, in which 
water chemistry is controlled and heat is not 
directly rejected to the ultimate heat sink. 
Industry: 
Not discussed 
Plant Specific: 
The closed-cycle (CC) System performance has been very good. PBNP has not 
experienced degradation of its CC System due to corrosion product build up or 
cracking. 
 
Tube vibration in the CC Heat Exchangers has been documented. The vibration has 
been attributed to increased clearances in the tube to tube support plate interface. The 
CC Heat Exchangers were re-tubed with SeaCure tube material, which creates the 
potential for galvanic corrosion of the carbon steel tube support plates. Galvanic 
corrosion of the tube support plates is believed to be the reason for the increased 
clearances and subsequent tube vibration at high CC flows. 
 
Trending of nitrite and microbiological levels in the engine coolant of G01 and G02 
EDGs has revealed slight in-leakage of service water into the engine coolant. 
Fire Protection This AMP includes (a) fire barrier inspections, (b) Industry: 
154 
Aging 
Management 
Program 
Description of Aging Management Program 
(AMP) Operating Experience 
Program electric and diesel-driven fire pump tests, (c) 
periodic inspection and testing of the halon fire 
suppression system, and (d) periodic maintenance, 
testing, and inspection of water-based fire 
protection systems. 
Not discussed 
 
Plant Specific: 
Some cases of small pipe threaded connection leaks, small pipe external corrosion 
leaks, spray nozzles for the transformer deluge system plugged due to rust scale build-
up, and cracked piping and fittings. Pinhole leaks have also been found on the 10 inch 
fire water supply header and sprinkler heads have been found to leak. Inspections 
performed on the fire hydrants did reveal that three hydrants were found to be stuck 
shut over a ten year inspection period. None have been found stuck during the last few 
inspections. Plant-specific operating experience has indicated that below grade fire 
system piping leaks are very rare. The sandy soil condition is such that it is not 
conducive to high rates of corrosion and the Lake Michigan water used for the fire 
protection system is not aggressive to the internal surfaces of the piping. Fire doors 
are occasionally found in need of repair. Some of the electrical penetration fire seals 
in containment were also found in need of repair. 
Flow-
Accelerated 
Corrosion 
Program 
This AMP manages aging effects due to flow-
accelerated corrosion (FAC) on the internal 
surfaces of carbon or low alloy steel piping, 
elbows, reducers, expanders, and valve bodies 
which contain high energy fluids (both single phase 
and two phase). The program implements the EPRI 
guidelines in NSAC-202L-R2 for an effective FAC 
program and includes (a) an analysis using a 
predictive code such as CHECWORKS to 
determine critical locations, (b) baseline inspections 
to determine the extent of thinning at these 
locations, (c) follow-up inspections to confirm the 
predictions, and (d) repairing or replacing 
components, as necessary. The FAC Program has 
been an ongoing program at PBNP since 1987 in 
response to NRC IEB 87-01. 
Industry: 
There are many instances where components have failed in service due to component 
wall thinning and rupturing due to erosion. A large number of these failures occurred 
in two phase systems (saturated steam) where a change in geometry exists. Operating 
experience has also shown failures occurring in single phase systems mostly where a 
change in geometry exists. 
 
Plant Specific: 
In 1999, Unit 1 experienced a plant shutdown due to steam leaking from 
feedwater heater 4B. Wall thinning due to steam impingement and FAC had occurred 
in the heater shell causing the leak. Inspection of similar Unit 1 feedwater heaters 
indicated that they required repairs due to wall thinning. Inspection of the Unit 2 
feedwater heaters revealed no comparable wall thinning. Root cause analysis of the 
event also discovered that the materials of construction for the Unit 1 feedwater 
heaters did not contain a sufficient amount of chromium or molybdenum to help 
mitigate FAC effects. The original design did not specify for chromium or 
molybdenum content. Unit 2 feedwater heater materials contain an adequate amount 
of chromium and molybdenum to mitigate the effects of FAC. 
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Fuel Oil 
Chemistry 
Control 
Program 
This AMP mitigates and manages aging effects on 
the internal surfaces of fuel oil storage tanks and 
associated components in systems that contain fuel 
oil. The program includes (a) surveillance and 
monitoring procedures for maintaining fuel oil 
quality by controlling contaminants in accordance 
with applicable ASTM Standards, (b) periodic 
draining of water from fuel oil tanks, (c) periodic or 
conditional visual inspection of internal surfaces or 
wall thickness measurements (e.g., by UT) from 
external surfaces of fuel oil tanks, and (d) one-time 
inspections of a representative sample of 
components in systems that contain fuel oil. 
Industry: 
The operating experience of some plants has included identification of water in the 
fuel, particulate contamination, and biological fouling. 
 
Plant Specific: 
The internals of the above ground fuel oil tanks and the underground emergency fuel 
tank were inspected in August of 2000 and no significant rust deposits, corrosion, or 
other obvious defects were found. Thickness measurements of the underground 
emergency fuel tank and the bottom of the above ground fuel oil tanks were 
performed and indicated no significant loss of material. 
 
One-Time 
Inspection 
Program 
This AMP addresses potentially long incubation 
periods for certain aging effects and provides a 
means of verifying that an aging effect is either not 
occurring or progressing so slowly as to have 
negligible effect on the intended function of the 
structure or component. 
Industry: 
NA 
 
Plant Specific: 
Not applicable because this is a new program to be implemented before 
the current operating license expires. 
 
Open-Cycle 
Cooling 
(Service) 
Water System 
Surveillance 
Program 
This AMP manages aging effects caused by 
exposure of internal surfaces of metallic 
components in water systems (e.g., piping, valves, 
heat exchangers) to raw, untreated (e.g., service) 
water. 
Industry: 
Heat exchangers have experienced erosion/corrosion of end bells, biofouling build-up, 
and silt accumulation. Erosion/corrosion has also been experienced at or near throttled 
valves. Zebra mussels have been found. Piping systems have experienced corrosion, 
pitting, MIC, and sedimentation build-up especially in low flow areas and stagnant 
dead legs off the main flow stream. 
 
Plant Specific: 
Descriptions of some of the typical deficiencies found in Service Water System 
components are: 
• Component Cooling Water heat exchangers experienced corrosion in the wall and 
nozzle area of the outlet channel head. 
• Localized pitting was found in the Service Water piping supply to the old Spent Fuel 
Pool heat exchanger. UT examination revealed that 68% wall thinning had occurred 
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and silt was found in the pipe. 
• Leakage was found in the Component Cooling Water heat exchanger blowdown 
lines. 
• Deep pitting due to MIC was found on the G01 Diesel Generator heat exchangers. 
The pitting occurred beneath deposits formed by iron oxidizing bacteria. 
• Radiography of the K-3A Service Water Air Compressor After Cooler heat 
exchanger showed significant wall thinning due to internal corrosion. The heat 
exchanger also exhibited blockage due to nodule buildup. 
• The G01 Diesel Generator heat exchangers (HX-55A-2 and HX -55A-1) were found 
to have significant erosion/corrosion at the south end bells. 
• Spent Fuel Pool heat exchanger HX-13A outlet valve body was found to be severely 
pitted and eroded. 
Periodic 
Surveillance 
and Preventive 
Maintenance 
Program 
This AMP is an existing plant-specific program that 
manages aging effects for certain SSCs within the 
scope of license renewal. The program provides for 
inspection, examination, or testing of selected 
structures and components, including fasteners, for 
evidence of age-related degradation on a specified 
frequency based on operating experience or other 
requirements (e.g., Technical Specification or code 
requirements). Additionally, the program provides 
for replacement of certain components on a 
specified frequency based on operating experience. 
This AMP is also used to verify the effectiveness of 
other aging management programs. 
Industry: 
NA 
 
Plant Specific: 
Not discussed 
Reactor 
Coolant 
System Alloy 
600 Inspection 
Program 
This AMP manages crack initiation and growth due 
to primary water stress corrosion cracking 
(PWSCC) of RCS pressure boundary nickel-based 
alloy components (e.g., Alloy 600/690 reactor 
vessel/head penetration nozzles, Inconel 82/182, 
82/152, and 52/152 weld joints). 
Industry: 
Numerous occurrences of cracks and leaks of Alloy 600 nozzles and penetrations with 
partial penetration welds. Most of the cracks of Alloy 600 penetrations caused by 
PWSCC have initiated on the inner diameter of the penetration near the elevation of 
the J-groove weld and have been short and axially oriented. Recently, a few PWRs 
have experienced circumferential cracking, outer diameter initiated cracking, and 
cracking initiating in the J-groove weld, in CRDM penetrations. A PWR has 
experienced a throughwall PWSCC crack in an Inconel 82/182 piping butt weld, one 
PWR has experienced severe degradation of the RPV head due to boric acid corrosion 
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resulting from a VHP leak and another PWR has detected axial cracking in reactor 
vessel BMI penetrations. 
 
Plant Specific: 
No plant specific aging related cases identified. 
Reactor Vessel 
Internals 
Program 
This AMP manages the aging effects for reactor 
vessel internals (RVI). 
Industry: 
Most of the industry operating experience reviewed has involved cracking of 
austenitic stainless steel baffle-former bolts, or SCC of high-strength internals bolting. 
SCC of guide tube split pins has also been reported. 
 
Plant Specific: 
An augmented examination via UT was conducted on the baffle-former bolts of 
PBNP-2. The UT examination identified a number of bolts with indications indicative 
of crack like flaws. 
Reactor Vessel 
Surveillance 
Program 
The Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program manages 
the aging effect reduction of fracture toughness due 
to neutron embrittlement of the low alloy steel 
reactor vessels. 
Industry: 
Industry operating experience related to this AMP includes GL 92-01, Revision 1, 
“Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity,” and Supplement 1 to GL 92-01, Revision 1, 
“Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity.” 
 
Plant Specific: 
PBNP-1 and PBNP-2 have generally operated successfully within their licensed 
Pressure-Temperature (P-T) limits. The current P-T curves for PBNP-1 and PBNP-2 
are valid until 34.0 Effective Full Power Years (EFPY). New PT curves are developed 
and issued, as required. 
Steam 
Generator 
Integrity 
Program 
This AMP incorporates the guidance of NEI 97-06 
and maintains the integrity of the steam generators 
(SG), including tubes, tube plugs or other tube 
repairs, and various secondary-side internal 
components. 
Industry: 
Supplement 1 of NRC Information Notice (IN) 2002-21 discusses Outside Diameter 
SCC (ODSCC) found in Alloy 600 SG tubes at Seabrook. The ODSCC at Seabrook 
was caused by high residual stresses resulting from non-optimal tube processing and 
could generically affect mill-annealed Alloy 600, thermally treated Alloy 600, or 
thermally treated Alloy 690 SG tubes. 
 
Plant Specific: 
The most recent Unit 1 and 2 SG inspection results indicate that they are in very good 
condition. For Unit 1 only 10 of the 6,428 heat transfer tubes have been plugged. For 
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Unit 2 only 4 of the 6,998 heat transfer tubes have 
been plugged. No tubes have been plugged because of corrosion type degradation, 
which is consistent with the experience of all other SGs with thermally treated Alloy 
600 heat transfer tubes. Secondary-side inspections of the current SGs to date have 
revealed no degradation of the swirl vane, moisture separator, feed ring areas, J-
Tubes, or tube support plates. There has been no evidence of wrapper drop on any of 
the SGs. 
Structures 
Monitoring 
Program 
This AMP manages the aging effects associated 
with steel (including fasteners), concrete (including 
masonry block and grout), earthen berms, and 
elastomers. The environments include below grade 
and fluid exposed material, outdoor weather, and 
indoor air. The program includes all safety related 
buildings, structures within the containment, other 
buildings within the scope of license renewal, crane 
bridge and trolley structures, and component 
supports (including HELB structures, panels, etc.) 
within the scope of license renewal. 
Industry: 
Industry operating experience has shown that degradation occurs in structural steel 
and concrete components. 
 
Plant Specific: 
The inspections performed at PBNP as part of the Structures Monitoring Program 
have revealed that degradation has occurred in both concrete and structural steel 
components. 
 
Cracks in masonry walls have been found primarily at the mortar joints and these 
findings have been documented and resolved. 
 
Concrete structure inspections have been and continue to be a large part of this AMP 
as described in plant procedures. Cracks, erosion, corrosion of embedded steel, and 
concrete spalling have been observed. Periodic inspections of the circulating water 
pumphouse have been an ongoing program. Divers perform inspections during 
refueling outages. Minor degradation of these concrete structures has been found and 
recorded. Zebra mussels are periodically removed from the forebay areas. 
Systems 
Monitoring 
Program 
This AMP manages aging effects for normally 
accessible, external surfaces of piping, tanks, and 
other components and equipment within the scope 
of license renewal. 
Industry: 
Not discussed 
 
Plant Specific: 
A PBNP review of documentation for seven systems within the scope of license 
renewal indicated that these walkdowns usually result in the initiation of corrective 
Work Orders for the repair of minor leaks from both flanged connections and valve 
stem packing, degraded grout under pumps, or pipe supports. 
Tank Internal This AMP is a new plant-specific program that Industry: 
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Inspection 
Program 
manages aging effects on the (a) internal surfaces 
of carbon steel tanks, and (b) inaccessible external 
surfaces of carbon steel tanks (i.e., tank bottoms) 
where wall thickness measurements may be taken 
from inside the tank to detect external degradation 
(e.g., using ultrasonic techniques). 
A coated carbon steel Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was found to have 
coating degradation. 
 
Plant Specific: 
The south Condensate Storage Tank was internally inspected in January 2000 with 
minor surface rust observed on the floor of the tank and corrosion through the tank 
coating observed on the lower 6 to 8 inches of the tank wall. Inspection of the north 
Condensate Storage Tank revealed minor surface rust similar to that found in the other 
tank. 
Thimble Tube 
Inspection 
Program 
This AMP is an existing plant-specific program that 
manages aging effects for incore instrument 
thimble tubes. This program requires periodic eddy 
current testing of thimble tubes and contains criteria 
for determining sample size, inspection frequency, 
flaw evaluation, and corrective action, in 
accordance with NRC Bulletin 88-09. 
Industry: 
NRC Bulletin 88-09 was issued in response to the thinning of thimble tubes 
experienced at several Westinghouse pressurized water reactors. 
 
Plant Specific: 
5 tubes on Unit 1 have been replaced due to wear since 1985. One of these 5 tubes had 
been capped, one other showed significant wear and would require repositioning or 
capping prior to the next inspection, while the other 3 were replaced since they 
indicated the most wear when compared to the remaining tubes. 
Water 
Chemistry 
Control 
Program 
This AMP manages aging effects by controlling the 
internal environment of systems and components. 
Primary, borated and secondary water systems are 
included in the scope of the program. The program 
conforms to the guidelines in EPRI TR-105714 and 
TR-102134. 
Industry: 
Not discussed 
 
Plant Specific: 
Review of plant-specific operating experience indicates that the chemistry program is 
performing its function of mitigating aging effects. No reports were found that 
attributed water chemistry as the cause of component deterioration, showing signs of 
aging effects, or failing to perform its function. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS  
This report describes the research effort performed for the Year 1 scope of work under a 
collaboration effort between BNL and KAERI. This research focused on collecting and reviewing 
degradation occurrences in US NPPs and identifying important aging characteristics needed for 
the seismic capability evaluations that will be performed in the subsequent evaluations in the 
years that follow.  The report presents the results of statistical and trending analyses of this data 
and compares the results to prior aging studies. In addition, this report provides a description of 
current regulatory requirements, regulatory guidance documents, generic communications, 
industry standards and guidance, and past research related to aging degradation of SSCs.  This 
section of the report presents the conclusions reached from this research effort, which includes a 
summary of the findings from the identification and evaluation effort of degradation occurrences, 
an assessment of the degradation trending results, and insights into the important aging 
characteristics that should be considered in the tasks to be performed in the Year 2 through 5 
research efforts. 
 
A survey of degradation occurrences for structures and passive components (SPCs) was 
conducted using recent licensee event reports (LERs) and recent generic letters, bulletins, 
information notices, and license renewal applications.  The study also included trending analysis 
of the degradation occurrence records (DORs) obtained from LERs, in combination with data 
reported in NUREG/CR-6679.  The goal of this study was to identify any new degradation trends 
and to determine whether the findings reported in NUREG/CR-6679 still hold.  The ultimate goal 
of this study is to assist in identifying those degraded SPCs that are significant to plant safety for 
use in the development of seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and 
components.  
 
Past studies on aging-related degradation were critically evaluated; part of the evaluation 
presented in this report included a summary of the relevant information presented in 
NUREG/CR-6679.  A description of regulatory requirements, NRC regulatory guidance, NRC 
programs, industry programs, and international research efforts were presented.  Also included in 
this report is a brief discussion of the NRC sponsored multi-year research program on aging-
related degradation, which was performed by BNL recently.  This information provides an 
extensive literature overview that is beneficial to the current BNL-KAERI collaborative effort.  
 
After a thorough examination of possible approaches for performing the review of 4,323 LERs 
from 1999 to April 16, 2008, software tools were developed to assist the review process of the 
LERs.  These tools assisted in downloading all LERs automatically and in speeding up the review 
process significantly.  The completion of this study benefited greatly from the development of 
these tools.  
 
Ten component categories were identified for this study which consist of anchorage, concrete, 
containment, exchanger, filter, piping system, reactor pressure vessel (RPV), structural steel, tank, 
and vessel.  A total of 223 DORs were identified for the ten component categories, and the 
relevant information is summarized in the primary information table and the secondary 
information table presented in Section 3 of this report.  The results of this study demonstrated that 
piping systems have the most degradation occurrences reported in LERs, about 36% of the total 
DORs.  Exchangers and RPVs have the next two largest numbers of degradation occurrences, 
representing about 22% and 17% of the total DORs, respectively.  The other seven component 
categories represent less than 25% of the total DORs.  It should be noted that part of the 
explanation for these results is related to the number of components that are found at a NPP.  For 
example, there are many piping systems and many of these systems are quite long, as compared 
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to a more limited number of other components such as containments and tanks. Also, the 
environment for certain components such as RPVs is much harsher, and therefore, leads to a 
greater number of degradation occurrences. It was also found that LERs do not report a 
significant number of structural type components, such as containments, structural steel, concrete, 
and anchorages.  The number of structural DORs reported in LERs was judged to be lower than 
the actual structural degradations.  However, this does not indicate in any way that structural 
degradations are of less significance to plant safety. The lower number of structural degradations 
may be partially attributed to the fact that they may be difficult to identify and the degradations 
may not have been judged to reach a level that would require a formal submittal of an LER to the 
NRC. 
 
Taking into consideration that the number of DORs for the piping system was limited during the 
LER review in NUREG/CR-6679, the current study concluded that exchangers, piping system, 
and RPVs were found to be the first three categories with the greatest number of DORs.  The 
distribution of DORs over time was somewhat cyclic, which is judged to be partially influenced 
by inspection intervals that often are scheduled at refueling or are required by special NRC 
mandatory inspection requirements.  Distribution of the average DORs by plant age at event 
(PAAE) showed that the average number of DORs per plant increase as the plant gets older, with 
a slightly higher rate for older plants as shown by the steeper slope using the LER 1999-2007 
results.  The slightly higher degradation rate using more recent LERs reflects the fact that older 
plants show in general more degradation occurrences.  Omitting other factors that may affect the 
accuracy of the trending analysis, the older plants have about 3 times higher average DORs/year 
than the younger plants, although the absolute value of the average DORs is considered to be very 
small (1~1.8 occurrences/plant/year for those plants which have degradation occurrences).   
 
Using the NUREG/CR-6679 (1985 to 1997) results for all sources of degradation occurrences, the 
NUREG/CR-6679 results based only on LER data, and the current LER study (1999-2008) results, 
cracking was found to be the most predominant aging effect.  Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) 
was the most significant aging mechanism for all three data series.  Primary water stress corrosion 
cracking (PWSCC) was found to be the major contributor to SCC based on the LER results and 
intergranular SCC (IGSCC) was the major contributor if the entire NUREG/CR-6679 data was 
used.  The LER 1999-2008 data series also showed that fatigue was the second significant aging 
mechanism, indicating the possibility that some components might be approaching their fatigue 
life as NPPs got older.  Moisture, organisms, chemical attack, and foreign object were shown to 
be less important mechanisms using the LER 1998-2008 series.  The system that was most 
vulnerable to degradation is the reactor coolant systems (RCS), as expected because the RCS 
includes many subcomponents that are constantly subjected to harsh environments such as high 
temperature, high pressure, high fluid velocity, boron acid, radiation, etc. Also, the RCS receives 
close scrutiny in terms of inspections and examination in view of the safety importance of the 
system. 
 
Review of recent generic communications (generic letters, bulletins, and information notices) 
indicated that exchangers, RPVs, and piping systems are the top three components that generic 
correspondences address.  Generic communications discuss more structural type components than 
the LERs do.  Documents related to LRAs are also useful because they identify applicable aging 
effects, discuss industry and plant specific operating experience, and describe instances of aging 
degradation of structures and components at their plants.  Two recent representative LRAs, 
Palisades and Point Beach Units 1 & 2, were chosen for review.  Regarding aging-degradations, 
the information presented in LRAs is not as detailed as in the LERs.  These reviews did not yield 
adequate data for a direct comparison to those found using LERs.  However, these reviews 
confirmed qualitatively the findings using LERs, because in many cases the plant-specific 
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information in the LRAs, for the more significant degradation occurrences, was already in the 
LERs for that plant.   
 
Utilizing the trending analysis from previous DORs reported in NUREG/CR-6679, DORs from 
the review of LERs described in this report, and from the general observations obtained from the 
review of recent representative generic letters, bulletins, information notices, and license renewal 
applications, it is concluded that the patterns of degradation occurrences have not significantly 
changed from past studies, although signs of a slight increase in the number of DORs have been 
observed.  Although the LERs do not report many structural degradations based on the reporting 
requirements governed by 10 CFR 50.73, structural degradations are expected to be a factor as 
plants age, and are important to plant safety when extreme environmental demands such as large 
earthquakes are considered.  It can be further stated that the conclusions reached from the 
NUREG/CR-6679 study, regarding the list of components whose age-related degradation is 
significant to plant safety and the characteristics of aging degradation, are still valid for the 
collaborative research being performed by BNL and KAERI. 
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